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
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY (FISCAL YEAR) 1984
(U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE
AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON DC FEB 83


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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FY 1984



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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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Prepared by

**Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)**

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FY 1984 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1984 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of Title 19, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the following related Defense Department reports:

1. The Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget.
2. The FY 1984 Military Manpower Training Report.
3. Volume III of the FY 1984 Force Readiness Report.

I. Organization of the Report

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1984. To assist the Congress, the report includes detailed information concerning manpower plans for FY 1985 and a summary of manpower plans included in the five year defense plan. In response to a specific inquiry from the House Armed Services Committee, the choice of adding active or reserve forces is addressed in ~~Section XI~~ of this chapter and in each service chapter.

The report is organized into two major parts and three annexes that are submitted separately. The annexes are sent to Congress at the same time as this report.

Defense Manpower Requirements (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1984 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military services and the defense agencies.

Special Analyses and Data (Chapters VIII through XI). This part contains special analyses or data on subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter VIII discusses drug and alcohol abuse in the armed forces. Chapter IX discusses the cost of manpower. Chapter X presents data on forces and manpower by location. Chapter XI contains an audit trail of the structure changes within the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) that have occurred since the FY 1983 DMRR.

Base Structure Annex. The Base Structure Annex relates our FY 1984 base structure to the force structure for that period and provides estimates of base operating support costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Public Law 96-513, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in a separate annex.

II. The Total Force

There are three types of Defense manpower: active military, reserve component military, and civilian employees. Each of these categories of manpower contribute to the total US military capability; hence, they constitute the "Total Force."

A. Active Military. The active military are those men and women who serve in combat units (units that engage enemy forces), combat support units (units that provide support in the combat theater), and other support units. These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are about two million active duty military people.

B. Reserve Component Military. Reserve component manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has three elements: Selected Reserve Units, Pretrained Individual Reservists, and a training pipeline. Selected Reserve units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform a wartime mission. Members of Selected Reserve units train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training.

Pretrained Individual Reservists include Individual Mobilization Augmentees, members of the Inactive National Guard, and Individual Ready Reservists. The Individual Ready Reserve generally consists of people who have served recently in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. The majority of the members in the Individual Ready Reserve do not participate in organized training.

The training pipeline is composed of those people who are members of the Selected Reserve but who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a skill. Training pipeline personnel may not deploy upon mobilization until minimum training . completed.

The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory six-year military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve forces who have retired. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserve do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be mobilized by authority of Congress.

The reserve component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress. The Selected Reserve numbers about one million people.

C. Civilian Employees. Defense Department civilians provide support services to the active and reserve military in all of those functions that do not require a military incumbent. Of a total population of over one million civilians, 67 percent repair airplanes, ships, and tanks, provide logistical support, or operate and maintain military installations. Another 11 percent provide research and development support, medical support, and communications support. These activities contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces.

FY 1984 promises important improvements in DoD civilian operations. In previous years, DoD has been hampered by limits on civilian employment that were too low to fulfill all defense program objectives. The FY 1984 authorization request will, in contrast, balance civilian employment with program demands. Gains from the Defense Productivity Program will become increasingly evident during FY 1984.

Congress' customary practice is to authorize the Department of Defense to employ no more than a specific number of civilians each year. The long-standing use of specific limits on civilian employment reflects a belief that managers of government operations, free from the necessity to show a profit, tend to hire more people than are needed. The counter argument is that ceilings lead to poor management practices and are unnecessary because of DoD's strong incentive to use the annual Defense fiscal budget efficiently.

Ceilings on civilian personnel impede efficient operations by (1) discouraging substitution of nonuniformed for uniformed persons; (2) causing imbalances between program demands and personnel levels; (3) encouraging the use of borrowed military manpower; and (4) increasing reliance on overtime and temporary workers. Analyses by DoD, the General Accounting Office and Congress have found many opportunities to convert military jobs to civilian positions. DoD has made progress in this area, but more can be done. However, further civilianization will be resisted by the Services if ceilings are in effect in the future. The Services believe that if military positions are civilianized, possible future civilian employment reduction will degrade readiness.

We recognize the concern of the Congress about converting commercial activities to contract to avoid manpower ceilings. We have stopped the practice of reducing civilian end strength in anticipation of conversion to contract. This should help ensure that decisions to convert to contract are not influenced by civilian ceiling constraint. However, we are continuing our studies of activities that are not required in-house for national defense and we anticipate that roughly the same number of conversions will occur as in the past few years--3,000 to 5,000 spaces per year.

Civilian employment controls may decrease the ability of defense management to balance program demands and personnel levels. Congressionally approved increases in operations necessitate an increase in manpower authorizations for successful execution. When a mismatch occurs between civilian workers and authorized increases in program levels, inefficient or incomplete execution results. DoD's FY 1984 civilian manpower request balances employment with program demands.

Ceilings sometimes lead to the borrowing of military manpower to perform civilian jobs. Programmatic changes may require an increase in functions traditionally performed by civilians such as base operations support. If such functional increases are not accompanied by a higher allocation of civilians, enlisted personnel may be used to fill the gap. This use of uniformed manpower decreases morale and adversely affects readiness.

Imbalances between civilian ceilings and program levels also cause industrial activities to rely too much on overtime and temporary workers to complete their work. Extensive use of temporary employees who are released to meet year-end ceilings disrupts the flow of work and may increase costs. Excessive overtime raises total personnel costs and may lower worker productivity through fatigue.

The Department supports a broad range of programs designed to achieve our mission more efficiently.

The Defense Productivity Program (DPP) was established to improve DoD's effectiveness through more efficient use of human and capital resources. DPP efforts can be divided into three areas: productivity enhancing capital investments, efficiency reviews, and work force motivation. Although categorized for the ease of policy direction and program management, these three are implemented as an integrated approach.

The Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) program is a multi-faceted effort involving both the Components and OSD. Initiatives focus on major investments that release resources for higher priority work. As part of PECI, \$129 million is earmarked by OSD in FY 1984 for major investments that are expected to produce a life-time return of approximately \$14 for each \$1 invested. In addition to projects financed by OSD, the Services are funding major productivity enhancing investments.

OSD requires DoD Components to conduct efficiency reviews for all support functions that are not subject to the contracting considerations of OMB Circular A-76. All reviews are to be completed by FY 1987. Efficiency reviews are now being linked to the processes by which DoD Components determine how many workers are required for various functions. Results take the form of improved staffing standards and improved operating methods. Efficiency reviews are conservatively estimated to yield a four percent improvement in productivity.

Efforts to improve work force motivation within DoD have taken two forms that should assist in both improving the quality of working life and increasing productivity. DoD now has 1,300 quality circles with every indication that this number will increase in FY 1984. These have resulted in both tangible and intangible returns for the time invested in the groups. Another method of motivating employees is through sharing the gains from higher productivity. DoD has conducted experiments in incentive pay involving sharing of the benefits from exceeding past output levels. These experiments will provide a basis for broader application in FY 1984.

DoD and contractor civilians play and will continue to play an essential role in the support of military forces worldwide. Many perform emergency essential functions that must continue to be accomplished during mobilization and emergency situations. Unless we have assurances that these civilians will be available to continue to support military forces during hostile situations, the Department could be faced with an unacceptable degradation of its capabilities to conduct military operations. We are developing plans and policies designed to increase the assurance that civilian personnel in emergency essential positions overseas will remain on the job during emergency situations.

III. Manpower Mix.

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report on the FY 1983 Defense Authorization Bill, requested "... an analysis of those missions that could be performed by reserve personnel and an explanation of why reserve personnel cannot be assigned to these missions in any instance in which the latter is determined to be the case."^{1/} This section addresses our policy toward the Defense manpower mix. Each service chapter explains why specific increases in military manpower, by mission (Defense Planning and Programming Category), were assigned to either the active or the Reserve Component.

Our policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, our military strategy and our overseas commitments permit. Our overall military strategy dictates the missions that must be performed by military people, reserve or active, because they are trained to perform their duties in confrontation with the enemy. DoD policy is to consider active military manpower as the last resort when filling a support manpower requirement.

The least costly way to fill overseas peace and war support requirements is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the BENELUX countries to provide port operations and surface transportation for deploying U.S. units are examples of this support. Another type of host nation support is the recently-concluded agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to activate 93,000 reservists to support U.S.

^{1/} Report on the FY1983 Defense Authorization Act, page 193.

forces in time of war. This innovative program allows us to provide essential support for Army and Air Force combat units at a substantial reduction over the cost of equipping and maintaining U.S. units to perform those missions. The Congress deleted from the FY 1983 Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) the funding necessary to cover the U.S. share of the first-year costs to implement this US/FRG wartime HNS program. It is imperative that we be able to provide essential logistics support to our combat forces in Europe in wartime; we can ensure this support via the US/FRG HNS agreement at a small fraction (one-tenth to one-fortieth) of the cost of any other solution. Therefore, we will continue to seek the funding necessary to implement this program that would be crucial to the safety and effectiveness of US combat forces in wartime.

We have substantially increased our reliance on Reserve Component units for more and more complex missions and plan to increase that reliance where our analyses show it warranted. The Army relies heavily on Reserve Component units to round-out one-third of its active divisions and to provide combat support. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of the Total Force in every mission area of the Navy. Air Force Reserve Component units bear considerable responsibility for many combat and support missions including tactical fighter, airlift, continental air defense, and aerial refueling missions.

The primary criterion for choosing between an active or a reserve unit is the responsiveness required to perform the mission. Strategic units and overseas deployed units must be immediately ready for combat operations, so they must be manned with active military manpower. Most Navy ships must be manned by active military because they routinely deploy and remain overseas. In peacetime, we also authorize active military manpower to maintain a training and professional base and to provide meaningful assignments in the United States for people who have been serving at sea or overseas (termed rotation base).

Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, the higher the readiness level required of a Reserve Component unit, the higher will be the cost of maintaining the unit because of the amount of training time and full-time support needed.

For support services, DoD uses civilians except where the positions must be military for the reasons discussed above. Decisions whether to use government employees or contractors for support services are based on which can provide the services most efficiently. In certain cases, national security considerations--such as ensuring that a particularly critical job will be performed during wartime--dictate the use of DoD employees.

IV. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The Department of Defense has developed a comprehensive, analytic framework for the determination of wartime supply and requirements for manpower--both military and civilian. The current calculations are based on a scenario of a short warning period followed in sequence by partial and full mobilization, deployment sequencing and prosecution of a global conflict.

The supply of military manpower, particularly in the Army, still shows major weaknesses. The Army manpower shortage is felt most about four months into the scenario, M+120 days, when by FY 1988 we estimate that, if the scenario develops as we have described it, the Army will be short about 110,000 trained people in total, and will face a shortage of 168,000 in combat enlisted skills. If we attempt to solve the Army's shortfall with more IRR members, we will actually need an additional 240,000 trained combat enlisted people in the IRR. This is because not all IRR members will be available when called. Physical disabilities, hardship excusals, delayed availability and obsolete addresses are a few of the reasons that we estimate about 70% of IRR enlisted members will be available immediately.

This Army shortage is overcome by about M+150 days as large numbers of volunteers and draftees complete training and join units overseas in the fifth month after mobilization. We have requested that Congress authorize IRR enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to increase the size of the IRR. Also to this end, we have requested an extension of the military service obligation from six to eight years. Although we have mentioned the Army problem, all Services have significant shortfalls in certain critical occupations. We are working to better understand military occupational shortfalls.

We are also looking at our additional civilian workforce needs during mobilization and war. The purpose of this analysis is not to add strength to the peacetime workforce. The purpose is to identify the additional civilian manpower new-hire requirements we will have upon mobilization. This will help us ensure that we have adequate plans and procedures to find and hire the numbers of people in the occupations and locations that we will need to ease our transition into mobilization. The following table summarizes our current estimates of civilian new hires required:

Civilian Wartime Manpower New Hire Requirements
 (U.S. Direct Hire - Full Time Permanent)
 (Manpower in 000 at M+180)

	<u>Demand</u>	<u>Current Supply*</u>	<u>New Hires Required</u>
Army	413	253	159
Navy	370	237	133
Air Force	266	205	61
Marine Corps	27	16	11
DLA	56	44	12
DoD Total	1,131	756	376

*Supply estimates are based on FY 82 end strength; i.e., if we mobilized now. They are decremented for our estimate of civilians recalled to military duties and assume full utilization of all employees in new positions; i.e., complete skill interchangeability is assumed.

NOTE: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

V. Manpower Counting

The manpower figures used in the report reflect strength as of the end of a fiscal year. This is the number of people on, or expected to be on, departmental rolls or receiving drill pay at that time.

In the manpower authorization request (Chapter II), we show average strength for the Reserve Component as required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code. Additionally, fiscal year end strengths are given.

Beginning in FY 1981, personnel employed under the part-time career employment program established by section 3402 of title 5, United States Code, are counted as a fraction of full-time based on the number of hours worked, as set out in section 3404 of that title. The FY 1983 and FY 1984 civilian end strengths reflect this accounting change.

VI. Defense Planning and Programming Categories

Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the defense manpower program. All three types of Defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no individual being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs, on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The DPPCs are listed below.

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

1. Strategic

Offensive Strategic Forces
Defensive Strategic Forces
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

2. Tactical/Mobility

Land Forces
Tactical Air Forces
Naval Forces
Mobility Forces

3. Auxiliary Activities

Intelligence
Centrally Managed Communications
Research and Development
Geophysical Activities

4. Support Activities

Base Operating Support
Medical Support
Personnel Support
Individual Training
Force Support Training
Central Logistics
Centralized Support Activities
Management Headquarters
Federal Agency Support

5. Individuals

Transients
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdées
Trainees and Students
Cadets

DPPC DEFINITIONS

1. Strategic

The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

Offensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs; sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships; long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft; strategic cruise missiles; and operational headquarters for these forces.

Defensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems, and for support to the civil defense preparedness program.

Strategic Control and Surveillance

This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY

The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

Land Forces

This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

Division Forces

This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel are also included in this category.

Theater Forces

This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Alaska, Berlin, and the Caribbean; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Forces Command.

Tactical Air Forces

This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units and

weapon system security units; multipurpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) and war reserve materiel.

Naval Forces

The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) and Fleet Air Defense (FAD) Forces

This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and directly supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

Amphibious Forces

This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

Naval Support Forces

This category contains program elements for carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the TRITAC program.

Mobility Forces

This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift, sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the auxiliary activities category consist of those major Defense-wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control. Includ-

ed are DPPCs in intelligence, centrally managed communications, research and development, and geophysical activities.

Intelligence

This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

Centrally Managed Communications

This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications System, the military service communications systems, satellite communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions.

Research and Development Activities

This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the FYDP projection and except for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6 but containing research and development resources.

Geophysical Activities

This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for both combat and support installations; centralized activities, services and organizations providing medical and personnel support; individual and force support training; central logistics; management headquarters; federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Base Operating Support - Combat Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Program 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property main-

tenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

Base Operating Support - Support Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands (Program 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

Medical Support

This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD military medical facilities, including medical centers, hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, infirmaries, and laboratories and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research and medical equipment and systems.

Personnel Support

This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career training and intern programs. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

Individual Training

This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

Force Support Training

This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant,

surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, Air Force combat crew training squadrons, and Army jungle and arctic training facilities.

Central Logistics

This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

Supply Operations

This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement offices and for military personnel support to DLA. It also includes resources for POL pipeline and tanker operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

Maintenance Operations

This category contains program elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities, and logistic centers.

Logistics Support Operations

This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment, logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistic support services.

Centralized Support Activities

This category contains miscellaneous service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, combat development, counter-intelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, Defense Technical Information Center, personnel administration, finance centers, audiovisual activities, criminal investigations, claims, service-wide support, and other miscellaneous support.

Management Headquarters

The DPPCs in this category consist of five DPPCs for Management Headquarters as defined in DoDD 5100.73: Defense Agencies, International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Service Support - Combat Commands, and Service Support - Service Commands.

Management Headquarters - Defense Agencies

This category contains the management headquarters program elements for OSD, OJCS, and the defense agencies. The defense agencies are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

Management Headquarters - International Military Organizations

This category contains the program elements for the military services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

Management Headquarters - Unified Commands

This category contains the program elements for the military services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, Pacific Command, etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Combat Commands

This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the combat commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Support Commands

This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of support commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Federal Agency Support

This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

5. INDIVIDUALS

The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, or cadets.

Transients

This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element, which consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets

This category contains active service officer students, active service enlisted students, active service enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, and active service officer accession students.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. National Security Objectives, Policy, and Defense Manpower

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1984.

Defense manpower comprises active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The size of the manpower program is based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure for FY 1984 continues to be based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small a peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. In addition, a pool of pretrained military manpower is maintained. Selected Reserve units and pretrained manpower are available upon mobilization to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Some reserve units must also be responsive to call up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

Civilians are the third component of the Total Force and they provide 25 percent of Defense's manpower. In addition to providing civilian leadership, Defense civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communication systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analyses; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not require military personnel. The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its civilian work force. Work is contracted out when it is economical to do so. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in the Department. However, recent emphasis on increases in

readiness and sustainability requires more civilians in maintenance and supply functions. Borrowed military manpower must be replaced by civilians in order for military personnel to man combat units. Increased procurement activity will require more civilians. In fact, the increased tempo in the Department will require more civilians in nearly every phase of DoD's activities.

The table on the following page is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1983 and FY 1984 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1982.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
Strategic			
ICBM/SLBM	1,596	1,611	1,650
Bombers (PAA) 1/	372	328	297
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) 1/			
Active	487	487	487
Guard/Reserve	128	128	128
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	5	5	5
Guard/Reserve	10	10	10
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	33	34	35
Tactical/Mobility			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	16	16	16
Guard	8	8	9
Army Separate Brigade/Regiments			
Active	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve 2/	29	29	26
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces 3/			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	104	105	108
Guard/Reserve 4/	60	61	61
Navy Squadrons			
Active	83	83	88
Reserve	16	16	16
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	31	31	31
Reserve	9	9	9
Naval Forces			
Carriers (active only)	13	13	13
Attack Submarines (active only)	96	96	98

Surface Combatants			
Active	193	186	193
Reserve	5	7	10
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	59	58	58
Reserve	6	2	2
Patrol Ships (active only)	4	6	6
ASW and FAD Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	54	54	54
Reserve	17	17	17
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active	34	34	34
Guard/Reserve 5/	53	51	51
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet 6/	91	89	100
Chartered Fleet	17	22	24

- 1/ Primary aircraft authorized.
- 2/ Includes four Reserve Component Brigades that roundout active divisions and one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization.
- 3/ Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, airborne TACS and TACCS, tanker/cargo (KC-10), and electronic combat squadrons.
- 4/ Includes 2 KC-10 Reserve Associate Squadrons as of FY 1983.
- 5/ Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate squadrons, but excludes ARRS, WX and C9s.
- 6/ Includes naval fleet auxiliary force, mobility enhancement, nucleus fleet and scientific support vessels operated by MSC.

II. Manpower Request

The Department requests that Congress authorize manpower strength for FY 1984 and FY 1985 as shown in the following tables.

A. Active Duty Strength

Active Duty Military Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>
Army	782.6	791.0
Navy	572.2	586.6
Marine Corps	197.3	199.0
Air Force	612.6	636.4
Total	2,164.7	2,213.0

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

B. Selected Reserve Strength

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve expressed in average strengths. The table also includes the corresponding end strength and the appropriate wartime manning requirement.

	<u>Selected Reserve Manpower</u> (Thousands)				<u>Unit Wartime Requirement</u>
	<u>Average Strength</u> <u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>End Strength</u> <u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>Strength</u> <u>FY 1984</u>
Army National Guard	418.4	427.7	421.1	435.3	453.1
Army Reserve 1/	270.7	277.6	272.9	282.4	300.8
Naval Reserve	112.6	121.7	119.0	126.4	117.6
Marine Corps Reserve	40.3	42.5	43.4	44.2	42.3
Air National Guard	103.4	105.2	104.1	106.1	105.5
Air Force Reserve 2/	68.6	72.5	69.9	74.0	57.3
DoD Total	1,014.0	1,047.2	1,030.4	1,068.3	1,076.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ End strength figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA).

2/ Figures include full-time Reservists and civilian technicians.

The following table shows the number of reserve personnel on active duty in support of the reserve components. This full-time manpower is included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

	<u>Full-Time Reserve Manpower 1/</u> (End Strength in Thousands)	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>
Army National Guard		18.6	21.4
Army Reserve		10.7	11.8
Naval Reserve		13.8	14.5
Marine Corps Reserve		0.8	0.9
Air National Guard		5.9	6.8
Air Force Reserve		0.5	0.5
DoD Total		50.4	56.0

1/ It should be noted that military technicians are not included in these data. They are counted as civilians.

C. Civilians

Civilian Authorization Request 1/

Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions

End Fiscal Year Strength

	FY 1984	FY 1985
Total DoD	1,072,174	1,080,880

1/ Includes approximately 56,000 National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

As directed by Congress, these figures do not include anticipated reductions made possible by conversion of activities to contract under the A-76 program. Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories, based on past experience, will be about 8,500 in FY 1984 and FY 1985.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works, ceremonial activities, and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1984 and FY 1985 is planned to be about 33,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1984 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Authorization Request For 1984
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Direct Hire	Indirect Hire	Total
Army	340.2	59.8	400.0
Navy	323.4	10.9	334.3
Marine Corps 1/	(18.6)	(3.0)	(21.6)
Air Force 2/	236.5	13.2	249.7
Defense Agencies	86.4	1.8	88.2
Total DoD	986.5	85.7	1,072.2

1/ Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.
 2/ Includes military technicians.

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

III. Manpower Overview

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 64	FY 68	Actual FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 1984 Budget FY 83	FY 84
Military							
Active	2,687	3,547	2,050	2,082	2,109	2,127	2,165
Selected Reserve	953	922	851	899	964	1,002	1,030
Civilian ^{2/}	1,176	1,393	990	1,019	1,030	1,056	1,072

1/ As directed by the Congress, these numbers do not reflect anticipated conversions to contract. The FY1983 civilian employment is an estimate.

2/ Direct and indirect hires.

A. Active Military Strengths. The FY 1984 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,164,700. This request is greater than the planned FY 1983 end strength. Most of the increases are in combat forces and training support. The following table shows the shift in military manpower away from auxiliary and support activities since FY 1973.

Percent of Active Military Strength ^{1/}

	Actual FY 1973	Actual FY 1981	FY 1984 Budget FY 1983	FY 1984 Budget FY 1984
Strategic/Tactical/ Mobility Forces	53.6	59.4	59.9	60.0
Auxiliary and Support Activities	46.4	40.6	40.1	40.0

1/ Military manpower in the Individuals account is not included.

Specific details of the force improvements are in the Service chapters. Highlights of the active military manpower programs by Service follow.

Army

The Army's end strength increases by 2,600 between FY 1983 and FY 1984. Programmed force structure changes are targeted to increase the readiness of existing forces and to facilitate and support essential

modernization and the programmed transition to Army 86 force designs. Force structure initiatives are directed toward improving the readiness of the current force by modernizing and converting to Army 86 designs, continuing the High Technology Test Bed leading to conversion in subsequent years to the High Technology Light Divisions, improving the equipment posture of the Army, building staying power for committed forces, and improving the support base.

Navy

In FY 1984 the Navy's regular active duty military strength increases by 11,900. This growth is primarily to provide manning and support for an increased number of ships and aircraft squadrons. Reserve active duty (TAR) strength increases by 1,800, primarily to support the manning of additional reserve ships in the Naval Battle Forces. The remainder of the Selected Reserve also grows via initiatives designed to close the gap between mobilization requirements and existing force levels.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps will continue to make changes in its structure in order to enhance readiness and increase mobility and fire power. This effort is highlighted in FY 1984 by the addition of two TOW platoons, a general support artillery battalion and a 155 self-propelled artillery battery. Another direct support artillery regiment will be reorganized and activation of the first light armored vehicle battalion will be completed. Ongoing activation of Forward Area Air Defense and Hawk anti-aircraft missile units will continue. Restructuring of eleven infantry battalions will offset some of this growth; even so, the active force will increase by 2700 from FY 1983 to FY 1984.

Air Force

Air Force manpower increases by 20,100 from FY 1983 to FY 1984. The Air Force continues to program for full equipage, modernization, and manning of its 26 tactical fighter wings. The Air Force is increasing support to new weapon systems, training, wartime readiness activities, and medical activities.

B. Guard and Reserve Strengths. Selected Reserve end strength is programmed to increase by 66,620 in FY 1984 over the FY 1982 levels and by 28,030 over FY 1983 levels. These increases are possible because of improved retention and vigorous recruiting.

The Army National Guard will create an additional mechanized infantry division in FY 1984 by consolidating three existing separate brigades and activating a divisional headquarters company. In subsequent years, the remaining portion of the division base will be created by redesignating existing units and activating other support units.

Pretrained manpower, which consists of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Inactive National Guard, the Standby Reserve, and retired personnel will increase from 617,000 at the end of FY 1981 to 935,000 at the end of FY 1983. This is an increase of 155,000 over planned FY 1982 levels. While these increases are encouraging, we must exert more effort to increase the levels of pretrained manpower needed to meet wartime requirements.

C. Civilian Manpower. Beginning with the FY 1981 Budget Supplement, civilian manpower increased for the first time since the peak of the Vietnam War (FY 1968). This increase in civilian strength is programmed to continue in FY 1983 and FY 1984.

There is an increase of 15,989 in FY 1984 over the FY 1983 level. The distribution of the increase is Army, 7201, Navy, 3542, Air Force, 3504 and 1742 among the defense agencies. Augmentation of the civilian workforce is required to support direct readiness-related functions. Specifically, additional manpower is programmed to support growing Army industrially-funded workloads; to improve Navy inventory management at supply centers and to improve fleet operational readiness; to support Air Force depot maintenance requirements associated with their flying hour program; and to support defense agency contract administration and audit, increased logistics workload, and to meet special education requirements in dependent schools, and to support intelligence operations.

For the past several years, each fiscal year, the Congress has authorized a civilian end strength for the Department. Beginning in FY 1982, the Congress for the first time authorized operations and maintenance (O&M) funds. Since almost all of the Department's civilians are paid from the O&M account, the Department believes that the imposition of both a fiscal ceiling and a civilian end strength ceiling is redundant and unnecessary.

IV. Summary of Manpower Requirements

The following tables summarize the FY 1984 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1982 and FY 1983 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

Beginning with the revision to the FY 1982 DMRR, operating strength deviation (over and undermanning of the force structure) has been shown as a single item. Discussions of operating strength deviation are contained in each Service chapter.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1982 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1983 <u>FY 1984</u>	FY 1984 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	93.5	93.0	94.1
Offensive Strategic Forces	73.2	72.3	73.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	7.7	7.1	6.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.7	13.6	14.2
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	975.3	1,002.4	1,017.0
Land Forces	559.0	568.3	572.3
Tactical Air Forces	188.4	195.9	202.1
Naval Forces	189.0	198.0	201.8
Mobility Forces	39.0	40.0	40.7
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	96.1	100.8	107.9
Intelligence	31.5	33.4	34.5
Centrally Managed Communications	32.2	33.6	38.5
Research and Development	22.4	23.5	24.4
Geophysical Activities	10.1	10.3	10.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	635.6	637.1	649.0
Base Operating Support	306.8	301.0	306.0
Medical Support	43.6	43.5	45.2
Personnel Support	32.0	31.8	31.6
Individual Training	101.1	102.5	105.7
Force Support Training	45.6	48.9	50.5
Central Logistics	19.4	21.3	21.7
Centralized Support Activities	44.9	46.0	45.8
Management headquarters	39.6	39.5	39.8
Federal Agency Support	2.7	2.9	2.8
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	1,800.5	1,833.3	1,868.0
<u>Undermanning</u>		-18.1	-12.2
<u>Individuals</u>	308.2	312.2	308.6
Transients	77.6	75.8	78.3
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	15.7	11.8	12.5
Students, Trainees	201.6	211.1	204.6
Cadets	13.6	13.3	13.3
<u>Total</u>	2,108.6	2,127.4	2,164.7

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>24.5</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	13.5	13.2	13.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.9	10.1	10.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>732.9</u>	<u>753.3</u>	<u>766.0</u>
Land Forces	562.2	575.0	580.4
Tactical Air Forces	62.2	67.5	69.4
Naval Forces	54.4	58.3	60.9
Mobility Forces	54.0	52.9	55.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>24.3</u>
Intelligence	6.6	7.0	7.6
Centrally Managed Communications	12.9	13.0	13.5
Research and Development	1.6	1.3	1.4
Geophysical Activities	1.8	1.8	1.8
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>146.9</u>	<u>158.2</u>	<u>167.1</u>
Base Operating Support	41.8	45.2	47.1
Medical Support	15.9	19.4	23.9
Personnel Support	6.2	6.6	6.7
Individual Training	53.3	57.4	57.8
Force Support Training	2.0	1.7	1.8
Central Logistics	7.1	6.7	7.2
Centralized Support Activities	14.3	15.1	16.2
Management Headquarters	5.3	5.0	5.2
Federal Agency Support	1.0	1.1	1.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>926.5</u>	<u>959.1</u>	<u>982.3</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees (Navy)</u>	*	0.4	0.7
<u>Active Guard and Reserve (Navy)</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>37.2</u>	<u>42.7</u>	<u>47.5</u>
Transients	-	0.2	0.2
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	37.2	42.5	47.3
<u>Total</u>	<u>963.4</u>	<u>1,001.4</u>	<u>1,029.4</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1982 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1983 <u>FY 1984 Budget</u>	FY 1984 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>11.0</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	6.0	6.0	6.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.1	3.0	3.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.7	1.8	2.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>59.6</u>	<u>60.9</u>	<u>62.5</u>
Land Forces	22.9	23.6	24.6
Tactical Air Forces	16.1	16.7	16.7
Naval Forces	.5	.5	.5
Mobility Forces	20.1	20.1	20.5
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>92.3</u>	<u>94.2</u>	<u>95.3</u>
Intelligence	7.2	7.9	8.6
Centrally Managed Communications	10.9	11.4	11.5
Research and Development	64.0	64.4	64.7
Geophysical Activities	10.2	10.6	10.6
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>865.0</u>	<u>890.3</u>	<u>903.4</u>
Base Operating Support	347.0	353.3	352.7
Medical Support	21.8	21.9	22.4
Personnel Support	21.3	23.8	24.5
Individual Training	21.0	21.6	23.1
Force Support Training	5.0	5.3	5.6
Central Logistics	352.9	364.9	374.2
Centralized Support Activities	58.4	60.7	61.8
Management Headquarters	37.4	38.6	38.8
Federal Agency Support	.1	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,027.6</u>	<u>1,056.2</u>	<u>1,072.2</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

CHAPTER III
ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Army's manpower program in terms of its active military, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian manpower components for FY 1984. The Army's manpower program is derived from the force structure required to accomplish its missions within the national military strategy and the civilians required to help sustain this force.

This chapter contains information on changes affecting the active, reserve, and civilian components and the manpower requirements essential to accommodate these changes. Significant program highlights are discussed for each component with the Commercial Activities (CA), Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM), Civilian Substitution, Wartime Manpower Requirements, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs discussed separately.

The Army request for active military, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1984 and FY 1985 is as follows:

Army Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Active Military	782.6	791.0
Selected Reserve		
Army National Guard	421.1	435.3
Army Reserve ^{1/}	272.9	282.4
Civilian	400.0	400.1

^{1/} Includes 10.7 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1984 and 11.3 in FY 1985.

The Army needs a manpower base sufficient to:

- Recruit, train, and maintain the total Army during peacetime for wartime responsiveness.
- Provide for timely and rapid expansion up to and including full mobilization and deployment of the total Army in support of combat operations.

- Permit rapid expansion to support the deployed force and accommodate a mobilization surge, if necessary, to increase the force beyond 25 divisions for total mobilization.

B. Major FY 1984 Force Structure Changes

1. Active Component.

In Europe the Army will deploy in FY 1984 eight PATRIOT air defense batteries to replace theater NIKE-HERCULES units, and will activate two combat aviation squadrons (ACR), three forward support battalions, and two hybrid ammunition battalions. The Army will convert four heavy divisions to the Division 86 design, seven military intelligence units to Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) units, one combat support hospital to a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH), and four aviation units to combat support aviation companies. Additionally, the Army will convert six ammunition battalion headquarters and headquarters companies (HHC) and one ammunition ordnance group HHC to the Munitions Systems Support Structure (MS3) design, and one ordnance company to a guided missile maintenance company. The Army will inactivate five NIKE-HERCULES batteries, two attack helicopter companies, four mechanized infantry battalions, and one mechanized infantry brigade.

In CONUS, the Army will activate one headquarters and headquarters air assault combat troop, one attack helicopter battalion, and one Special Forces Group consisting of a headquarters and headquarters company, two special forces battalions, one service company, one military intelligence company, and one signal company. The Army will convert one combat support hospital to a MASH, three medical battalions and six heavy divisions to the Division 86 design, four combat support hospitals to evacuation hospitals, two ammunition battalion headquarters to the MS3 design, one combat aviation battalion to the J Series MTOE, and five CEWI Units and three cable and wire signal companies to a more modern structure. One combat support hospital will be inactivated. Five HAWK batteries will also be inactivated in concert with the activation and deployment of the PATRIOT air defense system.

The Army will also reorganize the command and management structure of the Reserve Components in FY 1984 to reduce layering and duplications of missions and enhance the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve. The Army plans to eliminate nine Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMR) and add two Continental Army (CONUSA) headquarters. These additional CONUSAs are required for effective and efficient span of control based on the elimination of the ARMRs and the assumption of many of their functions. An additional structural change is the consolidation or elimination of some Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) as a result of boundary changes necessitated by the addition of two CONUSAs and internal realignments. The remaining ARCOMs will assume additional responsibility for the management and coordination of training and mobilization planning of their assigned units.

In the Pacific, one NBC Defense Company will be activated in Hawaii.

FY 1984 force active component planned force structure increases cannot be assigned to the Reserve Component and still maintain the required readiness and combat capability of forward deployed and early deploying active combat and combat support units. The active component units are the first-line until reinforcing units from the Reserve Components and later deploying active forces can arrive. It should be noted that active Army structure increases are a reflection of the units planned positions on the Total Program Force Deployment List (TPFDL) and must meet the readiness criteria for that list for early deployment. Additional rationale is discussed in more detail in Sections II and IV of this chapter. Much of the FY 1984 increase is already offset by actions that transfer lower priority active units to the US Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) so that active component spaces can be used to increase manning levels and the potential readiness of other higher priority active component units.

2. Reserve Component.

a. United States Army Reserve (USAR).

In FY 1984 the Army Reserve will activate two additional CEWI divisional battalions, seven training base expansion units (FA OSUT Brigade, Chemical OSUT Battalions, and Basic Training Battalions), and one nondivisional light equipment maintenance company. Thirty-seven conventional ammunition units (groups, battalions, and companies) will reorganize in FY 1984 to the MS3 design. Additionally, four USAR rail units will be reorganized into unit structures that are more appropriately aligned with mobilization missions. Initial reorganizations of USAR MTOE hospitals to H series MTOE have also begun. A medical, a transportation, and a military police group headquarters will each be reorganized/redesignated as brigade headquarters, and the last four forward and rear maintenance companies will be reorganized as nondivisional direct support companies.

b. Army National Guard (ARNG).

In FY 1984, the Army National Guard (ARNG) will activate five combat heavy engineer companies, six 8-inch artillery battalions, three Vulcan air defense batteries, a ROLAND air defense battalion, one medium helicopter company, four augmentation units for heavy divisions, and one NBC platoon. It will also create an additional mechanized infantry division by consolidating three existing separate brigades and activating a division headquarters company (the remaining portion of the division will be formed in subsequent years). Also during FY 1984, the ARNG will convert two engineer brigade headquarters and headquarters companies from Corps to Theater Army design, two brigade engineer companies to Division 86 design, two engineer bridge companies from non-divisional to divisional design, five combat support hospitals to three MASH and two evacuation hospitals, six mechanized infantry battalions and four tank battalions to an interim Division 86 design, one tank battalion to M1 tank design, one general supply company to a supply and service company, and ten combat support maintenance companies to a non-division design. Two support battalions will reorganize under a new Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and one military police hospital security platoon will be inactivated.

C. Major Outyear Manpower Changes

Army force structure/manpower initiatives for the FY 1985-1988 program period are directed toward improving readiness, assuring modernization (conversion to Division 86 designs and high technology light divisions), improving the equipment posture of the Army, and building sustainability for committed forces. In addition, the Army plans to expand special operations forces and improve the training base over the program years.

The tables below display the manpower programs for the Active and Selected Reserve forces by DPPC for FY 1983 through FY 1988.

Army Active Strength Distribution by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88
Strategic	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Tactical/Mobility	476.9	478.5	483.5	484.8	495.1	498.6
Auxiliary Activities	24.3	29.4	30.2	30.9	31.4	31.8
Support Activities	173.3	174.6	171.8	171.6	171.4	170.9
Individuals	105.2	99.6	105.1	111.7	109.0	112.8
Totals	780.0	782.6	791.0	799.4	807.4	814.4

^{1/} includes force structure deviation (over and under manning).

Army Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88
Strategic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tactical/Mobility	543.7	548.6	565.7	579.1	589.6	600.2
Auxiliary Activities	2.0	2.1	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4
Support Activities	106.7	109.1	105.2	108.7	112.2	116.3
Indiv Mob Aug	(8.6)	(10.7)	11.3	11.4	11.6	11.6
Individuals	33.2	34.2	35.2	35.7	35.4	35.7
Totals	685.6	694.0	717.7	735.3	749.2	764.2

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management System

Army manpower requirements are derived from analysis of wartime combat and support structures and essential peacetime support requirements. To meet the wartime requirements the first step is to review the potential support assets available from host countries. The recent agreement by the Federal Republic of Germany to provide reserve forces, civilian personnel, and infrastructure for support of US combat forces is a result of this process. In meeting the remaining requirements, which must be done by US personnel, the manning levels, the mix of units among Active and Reserve Component forces, and the mix of military and civilian personnel are established within the constraints of resource availability. Within the Army, all manpower requirements fall within three categories: TOE units, Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units, and the Individuals account.

The Army uses a biennial computer-assisted study called Total Army Analysis (TAA) to specify force structure requirements for the Army program. Once the requirements have been identified and validated, Headquarters, Department of the Army, in conjunction with the major Army commands (MACOMs), determines the best possible allocation of resources to satisfy those missions. Given available resources and through interaction between the Army staff and the MACOMs, recommendations are provided to the Army leadership for the assignment of missions to the Active Component (AC) or the Reserve Components (RC). Units are generally assigned to the AC when (1) the peacetime mission entails day-to-day support of other active units; (2) the wartime mission necessitates rapid deployment to a theater; or (3) the unit may be required prior to a mobilization decision. Additionally, the day-to-day training requirement to maintain mission readiness during peacetime often dictates that the RC requirement be filled by an active unit rather than a reserve unit.

1. Manpower Requirements Within TOE Units. Manpower requirements for Army units are developed through analytical techniques that consider the nature of the mission. The Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) provide manpower and equipment levels for standard unit wartime mission accomplishment. The manpower requirements for a TOE unit are determined as follows:

- The mission and desired capabilities of the unit are determined, and the organizational entities required for mission accomplishment (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams) are identified.

- The number of combat type positions required in a TOE is dictated by tactical and organizational doctrine, the firepower desired, and/or the number of weapons included. Each weapon has a specific number of operators. Rifle squads or firing sections are aggregated into units to produce the optimal combat capability with a manageable span of control.

- The number of personnel required for TOE service and support activities (such as mess, maintenance, supply) is determined by the application of Manpower authorization Criteria (MACRIT), which are based on engineering data, field training exercises, professional experience, and other sources of technical information. The criteria assume that, in a wartime environment, individuals will be available for duty twelve hours per day, seven days per week. MACRIT are reviewed for update once every three years.

A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for five organizational options (from full manning to cadre levels) for a particular type of unit. These options provide a model for fielding the unit at full or reduced capability. A unit organized at full TOE capability is defined as having the minimum essential personnel and equipment for sustained operations. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is the authorization document for an actual unit. It shows the actual organizational option selected from the TOE, as amended by changes, to fit the unit to a specific geographical or operational environment and reflects manpower and equipment constraints.

The approved MTOE document is the authorization for the unit to requisition personnel and equipment.

2. Manpower Requirements Within TDA Units. Organizations developed to accomplish specific local support missions for which no appropriate TOE is available are displayed in Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). TDA units are usually non-deployable units organized to fulfill mission, functional, and work load obligations at a fixed support establishment in CONUS or overseas.

The organizational structures of TDA units are developed to attain minimum essential staffing, the most effective use of personnel, and the most efficient operational capability. TDA units, unlike TOE units, may include civilian manpower.

Manpower requirements in TDA units are developed and validated by manpower standards studies and manpower survey teams. Manpower standards are developed and applied functionally, while manpower surveys are organizational in nature. Both processes seek to eliminate inefficiencies in organizations and to develop the minimum essential manpower requirements to accomplish the mission.

TDA authorizations may be equal to or less than the recognized requirements as determined by the allocation of available resources. When authorizations are less than requirements, the reduced capability is defined in the unit's capability statement. Personnel and equipment requisitioning is based on authorizations, as it is in TOE units.

The structure of TDA activities changes substantially upon mobilization; therefore, a new authorization document, a mobilization (MOB) TDA, is required. Mobilization TDAs reflect increased or decreased work loads due to new missions. Savings in manpower are due to reduced or eliminated functions, longer work weeks, and the use of such additional assets as Mobilization Designees, Mobilization Augmentees, and military manpower diverted from uncommitted or late deploying units. Unless otherwise stated in the mobilization order, MOB TDAs replace their peace-time counterparts upon mobilization.

3. Operating Strength and Individuals Accounts

Operating strength is the number of soldiers assigned to the mTOE and TDA units of the active Army at any specified time. Operating strength is measured or forecast for each month in the Active Army Manpower Program. More important than the month-end or year-end snapshot, however, is the average, or manyears, of operating strength during a fiscal year. The units of the active Army may be undermanned at year-end, but fully manned on the average throughout the year.

Individuals are soldiers not assigned to units at any specified time. They include trainees, transients, holdees, students, and cadets (TTHS). Although these people are not under the direct control of unit commanders, they are not unwanted "overhead." Every soldier in the

individuals accounts is there because the Army wants him there to be trained, to be moved to a new assignment, to get well, or to serve a sentence imposed by a court-martial. Individuals are necessary to sustain the operations of the Army.

The number of people required in the individuals accounts is forecasted based upon history and projected policy changes that are input to a computer-generated model called the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students Forecasting model. More specifically, the magnitude of individuals in these accounts is a result of the number of personnel leaving, entering, or receiving initial entry training; moving between assignments; attending school; being placed in a hospital or prison; or separating from the military.

The TTHS Forecasting System operates in conjunction with the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model-Computation of Manpower Program Using Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP) system. The ELIM-COMPLIP is the Army program to project Army manpower requirements through budget execution and program years. These systems interact with each other to forecast the number of Individuals (trainees, transients, holdees, and students) for the Active Army Manpower Program.

End strength is the sum of operating strength and the individuals accounts. The end strength authorized by the Congress each year fixes the year-end snapshot that the Army manages toward throughout the year.

4. Active Army Military Manpower Program

The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP) permits the Army to examine alternative combinations of such factors as force structure fill, recruiting goals, training base utilization, and personnel costs in order to arrive at an optimal manpower program considering a large number of real world constraints. The Army uses an automated, goal programming model, ELIM-COMPLIP, that produces the AAMMP using a historical data base and state-of-the-art mathematical techniques to project enlisted force dynamics for the current, budget, and five program years. The AAMMP is used in budgeting, planning the use of the training base, setting recruiting objectives, and examining the fill and content of the force structure. Each year the Army makes refinements to ELIM-COMPLIP that improve enlisted loss projections and enlisted force management. Although a highly successful tool, ELIM-COMPLIP is limited in that it actually models only the enlisted force and cannot discriminate by grade or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Officer computations are done externally and are manually entered into the ELIM-COMPLIP system so that they are available for the AAMMP that the system produces. The Army's FORECAST project (discussed later in this chapter) will increase the capabilities of ELIM-COMPLIP.

B. Manpower Management Improvements.

1. General.

GAO has been critical of the Army's manpower management procedures, in particular its manpower requirements determination program,

and has emphasized the success of the functionally oriented, standards-based, manpower management systems of the Air Force and Navy. The following paragraphs discuss initiatives that respond to these criticisms and improve the manpower requirements determination process and other managerial procedures.

2. Requirements Determination Initiatives.

a. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3). In response to GAO criticism, the Army has embarked on a workload based manpower requirements determination system, using manpower standards as its basic tool. The first effort was the Functional Army Manpower Evaluation (FAME) project which resulted in manpower standards for the Civilian Personnel Office function. This standard was fully implemented in FY 1982.

As a result of the success of the FAME effort to date, additional manpower standards will be developed in FY 1983 in many functional areas, to include:

- Training development
- Installation safety offices
- Drug and alcohol abuse
- Dining facilities
- Installation fire protection
- Postal facilities
- Finance and Accounting Offices
- Central Accounting Offices
- Installation Directorate of Industrial Operations

b. Functional Dictionary. A major supporting initiative of MS-3 is the development of the Army Functional Dictionary. Its purpose is twofold: (1) to provide definition to all Army functions for manpower staffing standards studies; and, (2) to provide a substantive link between Army functional manpower requirement's determination and the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS).

The project is being accomplished via contract in three phases. Phase I was begun during FY 1982 and is targeted to Army base operations (BASOPS) functions. Phase II is funded as part of the Army FY 1983 studies program and will begin during FY 1983 concentrating primarily on Army training, communications, and health functions. Phase III will begin during FY 1984 and target the balance of Army TDA functions.

The total project is being accomplished in cooperation with the Army management structure code redesign effort at the US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAfAC). The contractor, with ODCSPER assistance,

will provide the architecture and functional definitions, and USAFAC will supply the coding structure that will coincide with the new revised Army Financial Coding Structure. When completed, the functional dictionary will provide the tool to aggregate manpower by function and provide the manpower planning link to the PPBS.

c. Updated Availability Factors. The Army 10 percent non-productive time factor used in manpower surveys since the early 1950's needs to be revalidated. As a result, the non-productive time factors are often locally negotiated. In FY 1982, to avoid this and to provide a uniform Army policy on Army approved absences from the work center, the Army commenced development via contract of Army availability factors for peacetime and wartime; CONUS and OCONUS environments; and for military and civilian employees. Availability factors are determined by measuring authorized absences and subtracting them from total paid time in order to determine the number of hours an individual is available to perform his/her primary function.

During FY 1983, measurement commenced using a questionnaire mailed to a random sample of 25,000 TDA military and civilian personnel and by sampling actual Army leave and medical data. When completed in May 1983, the availability factors will be promulgated Army-wide and used both in manpower surveys and manpower staffing standards studies.

d. Improvements to the Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT). Manpower requirements in TOE units are determined by tactical considerations, doctrine, and MACRIT. MACRIT provide manpower standards that address the minimum numbers of non-supervisory manpower (enlisted) requirements necessary to perform essential wartime workloads in combat support (CS) or combat service support (CSS) functions in TOE units. As discussed in previous DMRRs, ODCSPER initiated a study project to evaluate more accurately the impact of the wartime environment, wartime scenario, and other battlefield variables. This study, which was recently completed, used a multitude of wartime work load factors, battlefield simulations, operations research techniques, and computer modeling to produce a required MACRIT process. The study focused on providing a credible, systematic, and scientific method to justify wartime requirements. The final report is now being staffed and reviewed. An implementation scheme will be published as a result of this analysis. Initial results of the study indicate that the improved MACRIT concept is feasible and will be effective in determining wartime manpower requirements for Army TOEs.

3. Manpower Management Initiatives.

a. Force Alignment II. The Army's documented authorizations for basic branch field grade officer positions exceed Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) limits during fiscal years 1983-1988 by an average of 4,600 positions. Force Alignment Plan (FAP) II provides for reducing this imbalance by converting 1,000 field grade military positions to civilian, filling 1,000 field grade positions in MTOEs at the next lower grade, and filling 2,600 field grade positions in TDAs at the next lower grade. The plan for implementation is for these reductions to become effective in FY 1984; the goal of 4,600 is projected to bring authorizations into alignment with DOPMA by FY 1986.

b. Increase in DOPMA Field Grade Tables. In addition to downgrading the number of field grade positions as part of FAP II, the Army has asked JSD for an increase of 1,000 majors in its strength authorizations as established in Title 10, United States Code 523. This request, in conjunction with FAP II, will better allow the Army to man its tactical units at authorized levels.

c. The Manpower Evaluation Tracking System (METS). Development of the Manpower Evaluation and Tracking System (METS), a three phase program to monitor manpower utilization, continued in FY 1982. Part of Phase II was completed in FY 1982 and provides data to manage the manpower related resources of the total Army's manned units, to include data for the active military at the grade/skill level. When Phase II is completed in FY 1983, METS will also provide management level civilian cost/work hour data. During Phase III, scheduled for the FY 1984-1988 timeframe, METS will be expanded to provide automated, remote access to the system by major Army commands and agencies.

d. Officer and Enlisted FORECAST. Active Army military manpower is currently programmed at an aggregate of officer and enlisted level using ELIM-COMPLIP. A five-year project is underway to develop a more comprehensive system called FORECAST - a multi-level, modular, integrated ADP system that will make possible the projection of active Army military strength (officer and enlisted) both in aggregate terms and by grade, skill, and unit. The Enlisted MOS Level Subsystem will be placed in operation in FY 1983 and will provide detailed skill and grade information. In FY 1982, development efforts continued for the Mobilization (Enlisted) Subsystem, the Unit Level Subsystem, and the Officer Subsystem. Also in FY 1982, contracts were awarded for the development of the functional requirements of the Budget Module and Civilian Forecasting Module of FORECAST (the Civilian Module is discussed in more detail later in this chapter). All these subsystems are scheduled to be operational between FY 1983 and FY 1987 and, when combined with the existing capabilities of FORECAST, will enable the Army to both project peacetime strengths (officers, enlisted, and civilian), and plan for and project strengths under mobilization conditions.

e. Officer Manpower Management Career Field and Training. Efforts to improve the Army officer personnel and manpower management programs have continued since the 1979 and 1980 GAO findings proposed the establishment of a separate career field for these officers. In 1981, after extensive review, the Army manpower and force development functions were combined into a single commissioned officer subspecialty of the Operations, Plans, Training, and Force Development Career Field. The review included a complete look at the GAO proposal. Analysis showed, however, that the functional relationship between the manpower and force development functions was too strong to separate the two. For this reason, a new separate manpower specialty was not created. Infusing manpower managers into an established career field was determined to be more advantageous than establishing a separate career field. The effort includes an expansion of the Army's manpower training with a new functional course that will focus on the manpower, force development, and force modernization systems within the Army. The Army goal is continued improvement of the established personnel management systems. The GAO findings have assisted this effort.

f. United States Army Reserve Manpower Program (ARMPRO).
An upgraded programming system for the US Army Reserve (USAR) became fully operational in FY 1982. This system, entitled ARMPRO, provides manpower planning, budgeting, and programming information for USAR troop program units similar to that provided by ELIM-COMPLIP for the active Army. In FY 1983, plans are to enhance the capabilities of this model and expand the model to include the USAR portion of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program.

4. Personnel Mobilization Process. The Army is preassigning retired personnel to meet mobilization needs. Ordering retirees to active duty in primarily CONUS positions during a mobilization contributes to the efficient operation of CONUS installations and activities under surge conditions. It also permits reassignment of significant numbers of younger persons for deployment or other necessary tasks not appropriate for retired personnel. Approximately 98,000 retirees (mostly Regular Army) now have preassignment recall orders.

III. Significant Program Highlights.

A. Active Military Manpower.

1. General. The active Army entered FY 1982 with an authorized strength of 780,300. In a February 1982 supplemental, the Army requested an increased end strength of 784,400. During June 1982, it became apparent that the prospect for the approval of the supplemental was not good, and the Army began to manage to an end strength of 780,300. Contributing to the June decision to target end strength at 780,300 was the increased cost of the unprogrammed growth of the actual end strength in the 2nd Quarter of 791,000 people. To achieve an end strength of 780,300, the Army implemented policies to recruit and retain quality soldiers and discharge poor performers. These policies worked. The overall quality of the Army has been significantly improved, and the Army actually achieved an FY 1982 end strength of 780,391. On 8 September 1982, Congressional action on the supplemental request raised the FY 1982 end strength authorization to 782,500; too late for the Army to retarget its end strength. The active military end strength requested in the FY 1984 budget is 780,000 for FY 1983, and 782,600 for FY 1984. These strengths will enable the Army to meet its goals of increased readiness and force modernization, while continuing to maintain a high quality enlisted and officer force.

2. Enlisted. FY 1982 was one of the best recruiting years since the inception of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). The Army achieved its enlisted end strength of 672,699 and progress was made on the critical Top Five NCO shortage. If this trend continues, the NCO shortage should be eliminated in FY 1983 in the aggregate and in virtually all skills except some intelligence, electronic warfare and chemical specialities. These skill shortages should be eliminated in FY 1984. The Army was successful in increasing the quality content of accessions, and will continue to recruit and retain sufficient high quality volunteers to meet the requirements of force readiness and modernization.

a. Accessions. In FY 1982, the Army was able to meet its aggregate objectives and significantly improve the number and proportion of new recruits who were high school diploma graduates or who scored average or above on the enlistment test. The Active Army achieved 86.0 percent high school diploma graduates, an increase of 9.3 percent compared to FY 1981; and enlisted only 19.2 percent Mental Category IVs, a decrease of 36.5 percent when compared to FY 1981.

While general economic conditions have been in our favor, a number of other factors contributed to Army's FY 1982 performance. These include increases in pay, increased recruiting resources, better recruiting management, a variety of training and assignment enlistment options, enhanced educational benefits, and the growing support of the American public for young men and women in uniform. With the continuing support of the Congress and the American people, the Army should be able to continue to recruit and retain sufficient volunteers.

Enlisted Strength Plan
(In Thousands)

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	9.5	9.8	10.5	10.0
<u>Non-Prior Service</u>				
Male	100.5	105.2	112.1	105.5
(Male I-IIIa)	51.1	54.1	60.6	64.5
(HSDG)	85.2	88.4	91.0	95.0
(HSDG I-IIIa)	39.1	43.3	47.3	54.0
Female	15.1	15.2	20.0	19.0
(Female I-IIIa)	9.0	9.7	10.2	10.5
(HSDG)	15.1	15.2	20.0	19.0
(HSDG I-IIIa)	9.0	9.7	10.2	10.5
<u>Reenlistments</u>				
Initial Term	35.2	34.0	31.4	30.5
Mid Term	30.3	28.6	32.3	31.2
Career	<u>20.2</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>22.6</u>
Total	85.7	84.2	87.8	84.3

b. Quality. In FY 1983 and beyond the Army will continue its objective of increasing the number of high quality people in order to build a competency based force. The goal is a minimum of 55 percent Mental Category I-IIIa male accessions each year; better than 75 percent male high school graduates and 100 percent female graduates; and the limitation of Mental Category IV accessions to less than 20 percent each year.

Failure to achieve the Army program would have an adverse impact on force readiness and modernization. Lower quality non-high school graduates would cause an increase in first term accessions due to increased attrition and result in more rapid turnover, which would decrease stability and cohesiveness in the force. Additionally, if these lower quality individuals were enlisted, the Army would face a degradation of its non-commissioned office corps in the 1980's and have difficulty in modernizing the force with high technology equipment.

c. Retention. In FY 1982, the Army was faced with a unique reenlistment challenge that will continue through FY 1983: managing success.

Historically, the Army has been successful in meeting its quantitative reenlistment objectives. Because of this, the thrust in FY 1982 was and will continue to be to develop a qualitative reenlistment program. Major policy changes that were instituted to insure this occurs include:

(1) Restricting reenlistments to soldiers in paygrades E4 and above.

(2) Requiring all soldiers to meet current physical fitness and weapons standards to be reenlistment eligible.

(3) Requiring a waiver for reenlistment on all soldiers who have been administered either judicial or non-judicial punishment in the form of a court-martial or Article 15.

(4) Requiring all initial term soldiers, except pay grade E5, to have at least three scores of 85 on the current Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery Test (or three scores of 95 on the pre-FY 1981 test) to be reenlistment eligible.

As the Army attracts higher caliber recruits, it will be essential to continue the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program. This program has been extremely successful as a management tool in retaining high quality soldiers.

d. NCO Shortages. One of the keys to an effective fighting force is having a qualified NCO of the right grade and MOS in every position. As the Army implements its planned force modernization and supports such new requirements as full-time manning, the need for NCOs in the top five grades will increase. However, as the following table shows, in the aggregate the Army's chronic shortage in the top five enlisted grades will be eliminated in FY 1983. However, some spot shortages or overages will continue to exist in some occupations, with shortages almost exclusively in the electronic warfare, intelligence and chemical specialties.

Top Five Enlisted Strength
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Authorized strength	274.3	276.0	280.3
End strength	266.6	276.0	280.3

e. Overseas Extension Incentive Program. Public Law 96-579, enacted in December 1980, attracted about 2,000 extendees in FY 1982 in return for an incentive for either \$50 per month or a period of non-chargeable leave. By encouraging extendees, the incentive program seeks to slow the rate at which soldiers return overseas. Approximately 50,000 soldiers in designated grades and 128 MOSs who are experiencing turnaround times of less than 24 months between overseas assignments are eligible for the overseas extension program.

3. Officer. As in the enlisted force, FY 1982 was a successful year for the officer corps. Although the Army fell short of its accession goal, an end strength of 103,109 was achieved. This reflects increased retention beyond projected levels. Retention of lieutenants through colonels increased by approximately ten percent in FY 1982, and is expected to remain at these levels throughout FY 1983. Significantly, field grade retention has increased by approximately nine percent due, in part, to the effects of DOPMA and the transition to an all regular field grade officer force. The result of these successes is that the Army is in a good position to achieve the officer strength needed in the late 1980s to meet the projected threat.

Procurement goals for active commissioned and warrant officers are shown below:

Active Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Programmed	10,032	11,030	11,540
Actual		9,417	

Much of the future leadership of this country is on the college campus. Army ROTC now draws students from over 1,400 colleges, and the number of host institutions has increased from 279 to 315 over the past four years.

The Army ROTC scholarship is an incentive that generates interest and attracts people of high quality to the ROTC program. In 1980 the Congress, recognizing the success of Army ROTC scholarships, increased the Army's scholarship authorization from 6,500 to 12,000. The Army awarded 2,000 of these scholarships in FY 1981 and FY 1982. The remaining 3,500 scholarships will be awarded in FY 1983.

Between FY 1981 and FY 1982, ROTC average enrollment rose from 69,663 to 72,463; a four percent increase. The FY 1983 opening enrollment increased to 73,819; a two percent increase over FY 1982. Although this was only a slight increase in overall enrollment, the advanced ROTC enrollment (the last two years of the ROTC program) increased by ten percent over FY 1982. The Army expects further increases over the next several years. A total of 6,174 officers were produced in FY 1981 and 7,079 in FY 1982. The Army expects to produce 8,745 in FY 1983 and 8,973 in FY 1984. By FY 1985, Army ROTC has been tasked to produce 10,500 officers per year. Approximately one-half of this production will be for the Reserve Components.

In addition to increasing its output, ROTC has also been tasked to produce officers with academic disciplines needed by the Army. Based on these needs, ROTC has been tasked to produce in FY 1985 the following academic discipline mix: Business-30 percent; Engineer-20 percent; Science-20 percent; Social Science-20 percent; Other -10 percent. Historically, ROTC has produced the following mix: Business -29 percent; Engineer-8 percent; Science-10 percent; Social Science-42 percent; and Other-11 percent. Each academic institution will be given a mission to produce based on prior year production and the market available at the school. The ROTC Scholarship Program will be a major resource in obtaining the technical skills (Science and Engineer) needed by the Army.

4. Women in the Army. The Army differs from the other Services in that there are no statutory constraints on the utilization of women. The Army operates under a combat exclusion policy established by the Secretary of the Army in 1977.

On 12 November 1982, the Secretary of the Army approved the report of the Women in the Army Policy Review Group. This report dealt with the combat exclusion policy and a methodology for assessing the physical demands of each job skill in the Army's enlisted force. With regard to the combat exclusion policy, the Army has added a needed dimension of clarity with respect to the routine risk of direct combat with a hostile force.

This policy provides women the opportunity to serve in 89 percent of all officer, warrant officer, and enlisted specialties. Women may be assigned to all units which do not routinely perform their mission forward of the brigade tactical rear boundary and will not be assigned to brigade or smaller sized units of Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Low Air Defense Artillery, and Combat Engineer. The policy acknowledges that women will have substantial risk of injury, death, or capture in a battlefield environment which may include the use of nuclear, chemical, and unconventional forces, but has as its goal the removal of women soldiers from units which can be expected to routinely engage in direct combat with the enemy. Within the context of this combat exclusion policy, the Army closed an additional 23 MOS to enlisted women, resulting in a total of 61 MOSs closed to women.

The physical demands analysis for each Army military occupational specialty will be institutionalized through the fielding of the Military Enlisted Physical Strength Capacity Test Battery (MEPSCAT) as soon as possible after validation of this testing instrument.

After a series of briefings by the Army and discussions with the Army Secretariat, on 26 August 1982 the Secretary of Defense announced the decision to increase the female enlisted content of the Army from 65,000 to 70,000 women.

The Army National Guard policy regarding the utilization and assignment of women is in consonance with Department of the Army policy. In 1971, the first two prior service women (other than nurses) enlisted in the ARNG. The policy at that time permitted the recruiting of prior service female officer and enlisted personnel only. In 1972 the

ARNG extended its women's recruiting program to include enlistment of non-prior service women. By the end of FY 1972 there were 86 women in the ARNG; by the end of FY 1982 there were 22,429 women assigned. As indicated in the following table, women in the ARNG approximate 5 to 6 percent of its programmed strength.

The combined female officer/warrant officer actual and projected strengths appear in the following table.

Women in the Army
Commissioned and Warrant Officers

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Active Army	9,033	9,713	10,576	12,921
USAR				
Individual Ready Reserve	3,371	3,434	3,980	4,994
Selected Reserve	5,457	5,529	5,566	5,869
ARNG Selected Reserve	1,917	2,231	2,393	3,042
TOTAL	19,778	20,907	22,515	26,826

The actual and programmed female enlisted end strengths for the Army appear in the following table.

Women in the Army
Enlisted Women

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Active Army	63,622	1/ 66,000	66,700	70,000
USAR				
Individual Ready Reserve	20,664	26,286	29,457	31,031
Selected Reserve	35,793	37,819	39,072	42,154
ARNG Selected Reserve	20,512	22,320	23,800	23,800
TOTAL	140,591	152,425	159,029	166,985

1/ Active Army female strength shown above is understated because of coding errors in male and female enlisted personnel records. The correct (but unofficial) strength is about 64,432 when adjusted for the miscoded records.

Since the All Volunteer Force began in 1972, the Army has been in the vanguard of efforts to increase career opportunity for women. The number of enlisted women in the Army has increased sixfold from 1968 to 1982.

5. New Manning System. The Army's New Manning System (NMS) will increase combat effectiveness by stabilizing soldiers and enhancing cohesion in units. These goals will be achieved through implementation of two major initiatives: a Unit Replacement System, supplemented by the

existing individual replacement system, to achieve stability and cohesion; and a U.S. Army Regimental System to further enhance cohesion and esprit. Both initiatives have been developed conceptually and are being implemented in conjunction with an overall evaluation program focused on sustainability.

Specially recruited groups will go through initial entry training and report as a group to a U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) installation to join a company level cadre of leaders for a stabilized three-year unit life cycle. This newly formed unit will then begin collective training and remain in FORSCOM for 18 months if deploying to Europe and other long-tour areas, and 24 months if deploying to Korea. The units will live out their life cycle by remaining in the long-tour area for 18 months and in Korea for 12 months. Upon completion of the OCONUS tour, the unit will be replaced by another deployed unit from CONUS. This system will result in keeping groups of first term soldiers together with their leaders for three years at a time.

The regimental system will foster cohesion, esprit, and identification by affiliating soldiers with a single regiment throughout their careers, with repetitive troop assignments to units of the same regiment.

There are currently 28 NMS units in the Army, with 53 units programmed by the end of FY 1983; 72 by end of FY 1984; 77 by the end of FY 1985; and 82 by the end of FY 1986. An armor company and an artillery battery have already deployed to Germany, and five more company size units will deploy there in early 1983. The first deployment to Korea is scheduled for April 1983.

As the unit deployment schedule progresses, a regimental designation program will be implemented. The first two regimental designations occurred in January 1983 involving units in the 101st AA Division, the 2nd and 9th Infantry Divisions, and the 172nd Light Infantry Brigade.

The evaluation of the NMS is being conducted with infantry, armor and cannon field artillery units. Company size application of the concept to other combat arms units is under development along with the concept for combat support, and combat service support units. Future considerations also include the concept of battalion rotation.

6. Personnel Support of Force Modernization. The Army continues the largest modernization effort in recent times. Progress in fielding large and diverse weapons and other hardware systems continues. These new systems will be placed into organizational structures designed to provide leadership stability, organizational integrity, and unit cohesiveness in order to increase combat effectiveness and battlefield survivability.

These force structure modernization initiatives are demanding dramatic changes to the personnel composition of the force and to the Army's personnel management process. In the near term, the Army is responding to this challenge through extensive personal involvement by

Army's top personnel managers in the modernization process. The DCSPER Functional and Systems Review process examines the personnel impacts of new organizations and systems being fielded through the 1980s and 1990s. Concurrently, the Army is developing an automated system that will provide the capability to make on-line, aggregate and marginal personnel supportability assessments of each change to the force. Once this capability is achieved and a base line is established, credible supportability analyses can be performed for any change in the programmed force caused by organizational, materiel systems, or force structure revisions. This system is currently programmed to be operational by the end of FY 1983.

B. Reserve Military Manpower.

1. Selected Reserve

a. General

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR)

In FY 1979, the strength of the USAR stopped shrinking and began to grow. This growth continued through FY 1982 with the Selected Reserve showing an increase in end strength of approximately 31,445 over FY 1981. This strength is expected to continue to grow even though the USAR will remain below its required wartime unit strength level of 300,800 in FY 1984. However, 7,844 of the growth included the Individual Mobilization Augmentees which were made a part of the Selected Reserve effective 1 October 1981. The remainder of the significant gains are in large part directly related to Congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentives Program (SRIP) and other initiatives, including the use of full-time personnel, and policies that assist recruiting and retention efforts. These individuals provide Active Component organizations with pre-identified, pretrained reservists to serve in critical wartime required positions.

The FY 1982 Selective Reserve end strength of 256,659 includes paid drill strength (PDS), Active Guard/Reserve strength (AGR), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). The PDS of 242,921, which is 5,921 above the programmed level, capitalized on the year's tremendous recruiting and retention successes. Shown below are the FY 1979-FY 1984 strengths for the Selected Reserve.

Selected Reserve Strength

<u>FY</u>	<u>Congressionally Authorized Average</u>	<u>Actual Average</u>	<u>Actual End of Year</u>
	<u>Strength 1/</u>	<u>Strength 1/</u>	<u>Strength 1/</u>
1979	195,750	186,843	189,990 <u>2/</u>
1980	197,400	197,546	206,626
1981	204,500	216,688	225,214
1982	235,300	242,965	256,659
1983	258,700		
1984	270,700 (requested)		

1/ Beginning in FY 1980, includes AGR. Beginning in FY 1982, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, which are included in the totals, are not a paid strength category.

2/ The FY 1982 and FY 1983 reports cited an incorrect number. The above number is the correct figure.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG)

During FY 1982, the aggregate Selected Reserve strength of the ARNG increased by 18,592 (or 4.8 percent); from 389,009 to 407,601, and exceeded the initial objective of 398,016 by 9,585 (or 2.4 percent). This is the third successive net increase in ARNG strength (in FY 1980 the net increase was 21,057; and 22,424 in FY 1981).

The ARNG strength trend experienced during FY 1982 is expected to continue beyond FY 1984, even though a manpower strength constraint is anticipated to dampen the magnitude of this growth in FY 1984. As a result the ARNG will not achieve its wartime required trained strength in units of 453,100 in FY 1984. The ratio of non-prior service to prior service accessions is programmed to be 75:25 for FY 1983; 76:24 for FY 1984; and 63:33 for FY 1985-1988. The FY 1983 and FY 1984 ratios were revised from the ratio of 57:43 contained in the FY 1983 President's Budget.

ARNG

<u>FY</u>	<u>Congressionally Authorized Average</u>	<u>Actual Average</u>	<u>Actual End of Year</u>
	<u>Paid Strength</u>	<u>Paid Strength</u>	<u>Paid Strength</u>
1979	362,200	343,677	345,528
1980	355,700	353,189	366,585
1981	371,300	376,827	389,009
1982	392,800	399,270	407,601
1983	407,400		
1984	418,400 (requested)		

b. Enlisted

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR)

One of the keystones of the USAR Selected Reserve strengths gains is the Selective Reserve Incentive Program. Targeted on both accessions and retention, this program has provided the flexibility needed to focus both monetary bonuses and educational incentives on high priority units and selected skills. Since its introduction in FY 1979, several modifications to improve the program have been implemented. An FY 1983 improvement involves the precise targeting of high priority units and management of the selected skills at the MOS level of detail. In FY 1984 a reevaluation of the program may cause a change in targeted units and/or skills.

Actual USAR recruiting and retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table.

	FY 82 <u>Goal</u>	FY 82 <u>Actual</u>	FY 83 <u>Goal</u>	FY 84 <u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	33,403	39,364	28,387	24,415
Non-Prior Service	33,085	35,110	33,241	28,686
Male	24,028	25,328	24,211	21,004
(HSDG)	15,618	16,438	17,328	14,212
Female	9,057	9,782	9,030	7,682
(HSDG)	8,752	8,940	9,030	7,682
<u>Reenlistments (Total)</u>	31,235	32,053	28,712	26,014
First Term	5,419	5,917	7,376	6,685
Career	25,816	26,136	21,336	19,329

The execution of the USAR Enlisted Accession Plan depends upon the Recruiting Command and the recruiters assigned to it. These people, who are part of the Full-Time Support program, provide direct contact with the civilian or prior service person being recruited. In FY 1982 these recruiters enlisted 74,474 people for the USAR units. In FY 1983 approximately 1,423 recruiters dedicated to enlisted accessions will be in the field, and in FY 1984 that number will increase to approximately 1,483.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG)

During FY 1982, the enlisted Selected Reserve strength of the ARNG increased by 16,569 (or 4.7 percent); from 350,645 to 367,214, and exceeded the initial objective of 359,228 by 7,896 (or 2.2 percent). This growth constituted 89.1 percent of the aggregate net strength ARNG increase in FY 1982. This growth is, in turn, attributed to an increase in the number of non-prior service personnel recruited during recent years, including FY 1982.

Congressional guidance for FY 1982 set total accessions objectives of no less than 65 percent male non-prior service high school graduates, and no less than 25 percent in Mental Category IV.

Much of the ARNG strength growth success is due to the Selective Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP), in particular the enlistment and extension (reenlistment) bonus incentives. The split training option, to be continued through FY 1984, contributes to the increase in the number of high school graduates in the ARNG.

The following table shows the actual and projected accessions strength plan for the ARNG.

Enlisted Strength Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>			
Prior Service	41.0	44.0	22.0
Non-Prior Service			
Male	49.5	45.6	61.0
(HSDG)	32.2	31.2	47.3
Female	5.5	6.0	6.0
(HSDG)	3.6	5.1	6.0
<u>Reenlistments</u>			
First Term	10.3	10.3	10.8
Career	54.9	56.9	60.9
12.2 64.7			

c. Officer

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR). The number of officers in paid drill status grew by 2,523 in FY 1982. The goal is to increase further the number of officers by 336 in FY 1983. These increases still leave the USAR significantly below its required wartime strength. Unlike active component officers, USAR officer accessions come from a number of sources which are not controlled by the USAR. Accessions for the USAR units come from ROTC, OCS, direct appointments, and transfer from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), which includes officers being released from active duty. The accessions from ROTC vary based upon the needs of the active component. This variation makes programming accessions for USAR units heavily dependent on the remaining sources. However, the most significant source of accessions for units is the IRR transfer. To assist in the area of improving the accession of officers, the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) began a program in FY 1981 that requires the interview of each officer being released from active duty. This program, which will continue in FY 1983 and 1984, assists the USAR in placing officers, reduces time lag in processing paperwork from the installations to the Reserve Components and Administration Center (RCPAC), and assists efforts in developing personal contact between the officer and RCPAC.

(2) Army National Guard (ARNG).

During FY 1982, the ARNG combined commissioned and warrant officer strength increased by 2,023 (or 5.3 percent); from 38,364 to a record high of 40,387, and exceeded the initial objective of 38,788 by 1,599 (or 4.1 percent). This net increase is the largest in several years (in FY 1981 the increase was 1,077; and 1,438 in FY 1980).

During FY 1982, 5,074 commissioned officers and 984 warrant officers were appointed in the ARNG, with 40 percent of the commissioned officers having graduated from State OCS, and 20 percent having graduated from ROTC. While State OCS remains the primary source of career ARNG officers, ROTC has emerged as a key source of lieutenants. Contributing to the increase in officer accessions from ROTC were the assignment of 50 additional ARNG officers to ROTC detachments under the Expand the Base Program, increased use of guaranteed Reserve Forces duty contracts, and funding of 50 ROTC scholarships for ARNG members. The upward trend is projected to continue through FY 1984.

The recruitment and retention of AMEDD officers, chaplains, and warrant officer aviators remains of concern. During FY 1982, the ARNG completed fielding of the full-time AMEDD recruiting force to assist in alleviating AMEDD officer shortages. Other significant accomplishments included attainment of over 100 percent strength in Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, and Army Nurse Corps officers; establishment of an ARNG Health Services Liaison Detachment; graduation of 12 ARNG physician's assistants (PA) from the DoD PA Course; and receipt of additional quotas for ARNG personnel to attend the Officer/Warrant Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course.

d. Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program.

In accordance with OSD directions, the Army implemented an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program. The purpose of the IMA program is to preassign individual reservists with active component units in peacetime to train for their wartime duties. Effective 1 October 1981, the Mobilization Designation (MOBDES) program was redesignated as the IMA program, and its members were transferred from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the Selected Reserve. The transfer provides the option of including individuals, as well as units, in the Presidential 100,000 call-up.

Assignment policies under the program have been modified to allow the assignment of IMAs to active component wartime-required positions not authorized at peacetime levels of organization. Priority of position assignment will be in early-deploying active component units. However, IMAs will continue to be assigned with installation and support activities that will expand operations during a mobilization.

Modification of assignment policies has greatly increased the number of mobilization manpower positions eligible for fill by IMAs. As these positions are filled, training funds allocated to the program must be increased.

The program's personnel strength is projected to increase significantly as follows:

<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
7,844	8,600	10,718

2. Pretrained Individual Manpower. In the event of a major conflict, the active component would require significant augmentation by trained individual reservists to achieve full wartime strength. In addition, large numbers of pretrained individual manpower (PIM) would also be required as casualty replacements until inductees could be trained and transported to the theater of operations. Since the output of trained inductees from the training base cannot begin until approximately 100 days after the receipt of inductees (with peacetime registration, first inductees will be received at M+13; trained output begins at M+113), heavy reliance must be placed on PIM. Because the strength of active and reserve component units is much less than full wartime required levels and PIM inventories will not be large enough to overcome the difference and replace casualties, there will continue to be a mobilization and wartime trained military manpower shortfall. The PIM pool consists of Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Standby Reserve, and Recalled Military Retirees.

a. Pretrained Individual Manpower Projections. The following paragraphs discuss the current and projected inventories of the various PIM pools.

(1) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). One of the largest segments of these trained individuals is the IRR which is currently about 219,000 and projected to be 260,000 by FY 1984. In February 1983 the Army plans to institute an IRR Direct Enlistment Program to support the increase in strength of the IRR. This enlistment option is designed to provide non-prior service (NPS) members for the IRR in combat and medical skills. Individuals will be enlisted for this program using Selected Reserve NPS enlistment standards. However, individuals who meet NPS Active Component enlistment criteria and elect to enlist in the Active Army while undergoing Initial Entry Training will be discharged from the IRR and allowed to enlist into the Active Army as NPS. No more than ten percent of the annual IRR enlistees will be permitted this option. IRR enlistees may also transfer to the Army Selected Reserve providing a unit has a vacancy in the individual's MOS in an area where the individual plans to reside. Although the program was originally funded to enlist 4,500 NPS people in FY 1983 (5,000 accessions less 10 percent training attrition), because of a late start, training constraints, and lack of incentives, only about 3,500 people will be enlisted under the program this year.

Individual Ready Reserve
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
219.0	242.6	260.0

(2) Inactive National Guard (ING). The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who would join and deploy with their units upon call to active duty. Actual and projected strengths of the ING as of the end of FY 1982 are shown below (does not include training/pay category L):

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
9.3	10.2	10.5

(3) Standby Reserve. The strength of the Standby Reserve is being managed to place more eligible reservists in the Ready Reserve. Actual and projected strengths of the Standby Reserve as of the end of FY 1982 are shown below:

Standby Reserve
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
0.3	0.2	0.9

(4) Recalled Retirees. Regular Army and Reserve Retirees that match mobilization requirements can be recalled upon mobilization. The data on recallable retirees and the positions that they could fill is being improved. The number of preassigned retirees (actual and projected) is shown below:

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
98	110	120

b. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) Management and Training. In the event of mobilization, large numbers of pretrained individuals are required to augment active and reserve component units as well as to provide casualty replacements until inductees can be trained. Improved management of the IRR is intended to increase mobilization responsiveness by having people identified, located, and screened for availability to meet PIM inventory objectives. Management also encourages IRR participation by offering training opportunities with Active, Guard, and Reserve units; school attendance; and participation in exercises and other training activities to insure proficiency in mobilization skills.

3. Full-Time Support. The ultimate goal of the various full-time support programs is to provide the Army with operationally ready units now and upon mobilization. To accomplish this, sufficient full-time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, and

manage the force. There is simply not enough time between mobilization and deployment to correct deficiencies or to train units. This must be accomplished prior to mobilization. Increasing reliance on the reserve components, increases in strength and force structure, increases in equipment fill, increased training requirements, and force modernization require additional trained personnel. Full-time support people greatly assist in achieving this training and mobilization readiness. Full-time support for the ARNG consists of the additive full-time manning (FTM) program, the conversion to full-time military (CTFM) program, and the military technician program. The corresponding full-time unit support for the USAR consists of the full-time manning (FTM) program, the Army Reserve Technician Redesignation Program (ARTRP), and the military technician program.

The FTM program aids unit commanders by improving training, logistics, and mobilization planning and readiness. In the event of a call-up, these soldiers would mobilize with the unit to which they are assigned.

The conversion/redesignation program is designed to replace military technician (civilian) personnel in troop units with Active Duty Guard/Reserve personnel. The technician conversion program is discussed more fully in the next paragraph of this chapter.

The Reserve Component technician program provides full-time support to all federally recognized units. While serving in a civilian status, technicians must be members of the National Guard/Army Reserve, perform all military training and duty in their units, and be available to enter military active duty when their units are called up. Technician personnel are concentrated in the maintenance, logistics, and ARNG state headquarters functional areas.

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
USAR			
AGR	5,894	8,251	10,664
Military Technicians	6,753	6,753	6,753
ARNG			
AGR	11,374	13,819	18,630
Military Technicians	22,557	22,351	22,285
Active Army			
With USAR	770	1,370	1,370
with ARNG	784	784	784
TOTAL	48,132	53,324	60,483

4. Technician Conversion Program. The program of converting personnel to full-time military status had its inception in 1978 when the Congress mandated a test to determine the ability of the Army Guard and other reserve organizations to attract and retain personnel in an Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) status. Conversion of positions in the Reserve Components is accomplished by changing vacant positions or by voluntary conversion of the incumbent military technician. The Congress directed that no conversion take place in FY 1983 that would reduce the number of

military technicians below the end FY 1982 level. The FY 1984 budget reflects this decision. However in an unrelated action, OSD directed a reduction of total Army civilian end strength, resulting in ARNG technicians being reduced 206 positions in FY 1983 and an additional 66 positions in FY1984. DoD is developing information, at the request of the House Appropriations Committee, to ascertain the cost effectiveness of using full-time active duty people versus technicians. Subsequent to the review by the committees involved, DoD may request reinstitution of the conversions which were orginally programmed for FY 1984.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. Manpower Requirements and Trends. The readiness of today's Army depends, to a large part, on its civilian component. Civilian manpower is a critical resource when the realities of the constraints of a no-draft environment are recognized. It is one resource that can be utilized selectively and in a timely manner as new mission and readiness needs dictate. Civilian manpower is an invaluable resource to help accomplish force structure changes, relieve manning shortfalls, improve training, assist the modernization process, and provide the base for mobilization and sustainability.

Seeking the best possible use of our military, civilian, and contract labor resources, Army policy has been to use civilians or cost-effective contract services to release military members for essential combat, combat support, and combat service support units. In this regard, Army has vigorously pursued several initiatives to return soldiers to combat units. These initiatives, discussed later in this chapter, include the Commercial Activities, Civilian Substitution, and Borrowed Military Manpower programs. While these programs have been successful, success has been partially restricted due to changing legislative and regulatory guidance that effects program momentum.

The FY 1984 Army civilian end strength request of 399,981 reflects an increase over the authorized FY 1983 level of 392,780. The growth in civilian end strength is attributable to commercial activities restorals, National Guard and Reserve technician restorals, and an increase in industrial funded civilians. However, there are some areas that, because of end strength constraints, will not get the full attention that they require. These areas are training and education, force structure support, soldier support programs, logistics support, support of new weapon systems, military construction, and medical support. If additional civilian spaces were to become available, the Army would increase the number of civilians in the above areas with primary emphasis on the support of fielding new weapon systems.

2. Overseas Family Members. The Army has continuously sought ways to support employment opportunities for family members of a civilian employee or of a member of the uniformed service while serving in overseas positions. It has been Department of Defense policy since 1972 to provide employment preference to family members in foreign areas. The large scale employment of family members is a significant contribution to the military family's standard of living. The Army has periodically converted indirect hire positions to direct hire positions to provide approximately 9,000 job

opportunities to overseas family members. In legislative action on the 1983 DoD Authorization Act, the Congress specified that 1,500 of the borrowed military manpower replacement civilian spaces would be used to hire dependents of military personnel in overseas areas. The Bill also provided for fractional accounting of overseas dependents employed part time thus expanding employment opportunities. The Army has requested conversion of an additional 2,100 indirect hire spaces to direct hire spaces in FY 1984 to increase overseas job opportunities for family members.

The Army supports continued conversion of indirect hire positions to direct hire positions as a direct enhancement to the soldier's quality of life in overseas locations.

3. Civilian FORECAST. The civilian module of FORECAST is a portion of the Army effort to automate personnel forecasting techniques. A contracted effort to develop the functional description for computer modeling capabilities and a management information system is underway. The Civilian FORECAST system will project quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements and portray the impacts of alternative civilian personnel policy decisions during peacetime, mobilization, or demobilization. The system will be compatible and integrated with the Officer and Enlisted FORECAST Modules (discussed previously in this chapter). The contractor is required to prepare a feasibility determination and provide cost data for an economic analysis of the Civilian FORECAST system by May 1983.

Benefits from Civilian FORECAST include improved workforce planning methodology, integrated (civilian and military) forecasts of strength and personnel management data, accurate predictions of workforce characteristics and shortfalls, computer simulation of the effects of civilian personnel policy decisions, and management information required to formulate future civilian personnel policy and program planning.

The Civilian FORECAST system is primarily for use by the Department of the Army headquarters staff and should provide information necessary for the development of, and change to, the Civilian Human Resource Plan, a comprehensive plan of action for managing the civilian component of the total Army. This plan is projected for issue after the Civilian Module of FORECAST is brought on-line (FY 1985).

4. Civilian High Grade Management. The DoD Authorization Act, 1982 (1 December 1981), repealed the civilian high grade (HG) reductions required by the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978. The Department of Defense however, recognizes the continued need to manage high-grade positions responsibly. The Office of the Secretary of Defense established guidelines for HG growth and asked the components to describe how they would maintain growth within these boundaries. The Army, through assignment of HG authorizations to its major commands and agencies, is keeping within the allowed growth target. As of 30 September 1982, Army civilian HG employment was 795 positions above the earlier baseline (a growth of 4.2 percent), set as a result of limitations in the 1978 Act.

Although Army is striving to keep within the growth allowance by more aggressive position management, additional HG requirements have been generated by new and expanded missions, such as:

- Ballistic Missile Defense, and the MidEast construction program.
- The requirement to manage expanded numbers of sophisticated weapons systems using state-of-the-art technology.
- More employees with broader perspectives due to the number of actions that now span the DoD and Federal/State interest.
- Management of limited quantities of human resources that have caused the automation of routine duties and provides greater need for high level analytical efforts, and
- The substitution of civilians for military field grade officers (discussed later in this chapter).

These additional HG position requirements will cause the Army's HG requirements to grow. Therefore, Army has requested OSD's prior approval for additional allocations to meet the civilian substitution program requirements.

D. Commercial Activities (CA) Program. The Commercial Activities program implements OMB Circular A-76. This circular provides general guidance to the Federal Government and affirms the long standing policy that the Government will rely on the private sector for the goods and services it requires when it is proper and economical to do so. Army implementation of this policy is in accordance with specific guidance issued by OSD and with the statutory requirements applicable to execution of the CA program within the DoD.

Combat, combat support, and combat service support units; activities that are inherently governmental in nature; and overseas activities are excluded from the Army CA program. All other activities that provide services available from private commercial sources are reviewed to see if the activity must be operated by government civilian or military personnel. In-house performance may be dictated by a number of requirements. The activity may be required to deploy or to support contingency plans. In-house performance may be required for military training, to maintain positions for the military overseas rotation base, or to retain a core capability for intermediate and depot maintenance. Operation of the activity by a contractor could delay or disrupt an essential operation. When the review of the activity is completed, a decision is made to either retain it as an in-house operation, or to conduct a cost study to see if conversion to contract operation would produce significant savings to the Government. A cost study is initiated only when the review has determined that there is no noncost reason for in-house performance and that performance by a contractor would not degrade readiness in any way.

The CA cost study compares the estimated cost to the Government of performing the projected workload of the activity by in-house civilian

personnel and performance by contract. A performance work statement is prepared that specifies the services to be provided and sets standards for quality and timeliness. A rigorous management study is conducted to develop the most efficient and competitive organization to perform the workload in the performance work statement.

The performance work statement that is used to develop the most efficient in-house organization is also used to solicit bids from commercial firms, insuring that the costs of in-house and contract performance are comparable. In the solicitations for CA studies, small business firms are provided opportunities to compete for contracts under both small business set-aside and the 8A programs. The Army has issued guidance in accordance with the OSD memorandum of 1 June 1982 requiring solicitations to be packaged so as not to preclude small business from bidding. Exceptions to this policy are only granted for overriding national defense considerations.

At the completion of the cost study, the decision to remain in-house or convert to contract is made by comparing the cost of in-house operations to the cost of operation with the selected responsive and responsible contractor. The activity is converted to contract only if the estimated cost advantage to the Government of conversion will exceed ten percent of the in-house personnel cost. If this minimum cost differential is not met, or if the in-house cost is less than contract cost, the activity is retained in-house and reorganized into its most efficient structure.

Commercial activity cost studies offer the Army a unique and effective method of improving the management of resources. The preparation of a performance work statement requires the identification of essential services, output levels, and quality standards rather than reliance on standing procedures and traditional methods of operation. The performance work statement and the most efficient in-house organization to perform the work are developed under the pressure of competition with the private sector and with the participation of a fully informed workforce. This situation produces savings that cannot be obtained from management actions that do not have to meet the acid test of cost comparison. Also, savings to the Government are achieved regardless of the the outcome of the cost study; either by cost effective contracting or by a more efficient in-house operation.

Some examples of Army CA cost studies completed during FY 1982 are shown in the following table. The column headed "Manpower Reduction" shows the space savings achieved through the management study. The cost advantage to the Government shown is projected over a three year period. The data shown are from installation support services package studies made prior to the revision of OSD guidance on small business accessibility.

Examples of Savings Achieved
FY 1982 CA Cost Studies of Installation Support Services

Installation	Authorized (Civ & Mil)	In-House Bid (Civ)	Manpower Reduction	Cost Advantage to Government
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant	202	140	62 (30.7%)	\$7.1M in favor of in-house performance
Fort Monmouth	552	515	37 (6.7%)	\$6.9M in favor of conversion of contract
Picatinny Arsenal	407	308	99 (24.3%)	\$0.6M in favor of in-house performance

Army CA cost studies completed during the past four fiscal years and associated manpower data are shown in the following table.

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES COST STUDIES COMPLETED

FY	Number of Studies Completed	End Strength Involved in Studies Completed			End Strength Involved in Activities Converted			Projected Annual Cost Advantage to the Govt
		Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	
1979	20	705	14	719	441	0	441	\$ 4.5M
1980	66	3,285	610	3,895	2,294	537	2,831	\$60.0M
1981*	72	2,019	656	2,675	1,047	334	1,381	\$46.2M
1982	70	1,640	195	1,835	1,069	181	1,250	\$37.2M

*These data reflect refinements to the data reported in the FY 1983 DMRR.

During FY 1983, the Army will continue to pursue the CA program. The studies that were announced and in progress prior to the implementation of the six month moratorium on new studies on 1 October 1982 will be completed. However, the requirement to delay initiation of new studies until April 1983 will cause slippage of many of the studies planned for completion in FY 1984-1985 into FY 1986 and beyond. Fragmentation of base operations support packages to accommodate small business bidders will delay studies because of the requirement to do a greater number of studies at each installation. Also, small business cannot obtain the economies of scale necessary to compete with an efficient in-house organization; therefore, fewer studies are expected to result in conversion to contract when smaller solicitation packages are issued. The effort involved in administering numerous small contracts mixed in with in-house activities will also result in less savings in installation overhead staffing than would be achieved with consolidated operations.

E. Wartime Manpower Requirements versus Supply

1. Military Requirements versus Supply. The following table shows the Army mobilization wartime requirements and supply of trained military manpower. The FY 1982 column uses actual, end FY 1982 data. The FY 1984 column reflects a revised warfighting scenario and illustrates the situation if all planned programs are approved, fully resourced, and totally successful.

**TRAINED MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS VERSUS SUPPLY
(In Thousands)**

	<u>FY 82</u> <u>(M+90)</u>	<u>FY 84</u> <u>((M+120))</u>
Total Requirements		
(Structure, overhead, casualties)	1,766	1,797
Supply		
Active Component	751	755
Guard & Reserve Units	591	613
New Volunteers & Inductees	0	30
Individuals Accounts	24	26
Remaining Requirements	400	373
Available PIM 1/	286	360
SHORTFALL	114	13

1/ PIM: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Standby Reserve, and Recalled Military Retirees.

The major difference in the shortfall between FY 1982 and FY 1984 is due to programmatic actions and changes in the warfighting scenario, with the peak shortfalls occurring at M+90 for FY 1982 and M+120 for FY 1984. These changes have resulted in a reduction of the Army aggregate trained military manpower shortfall. The revised conflict scenario establishes a different sequencing of major casualties. This allows the combination of all manpower sources, including the IRR and draft, to better meet replacement requirements.

The former guidance which applied to the FY 1982 calculation was based on a short time period between mobilization and the taking of heavy casualties. This demand for casualty replacements was higher and came at an earlier time period which placed the burden for replacements primarily on pretrained individuals. The resulting peak shortfall was 114.0K at M+90.

The FY 1984 Defense Guidance is based on a mobilization with a longer lead time prior to incurrence of heavy casualties. Thus, demand for casualty replacements is both smaller and deferred so it is better

satisfied by new inductees from the training base after M+113. Also, total force structure increases planned for FY 1984 were deferred in favor of modernization and improved readiness of the current force. Due to these programmatic changes and the revised war scenario, the peak aggregate shortfall for FY 1984 is 13.0K at M+120. However, this shortfall figure is misleading. It includes overages of officers and enlisted personnel in some support skills, and thus masks a most serious shortage of approximately 100K enlisted personnel in the combat arms skills.

The Army has initiated several programs to offset near and long term shortfalls. For the near term, the Army continues to pursue the goal of achievement and maintenance of an experienced and competent career force through both intensive attrition/separation management; and aggressive, attractive enlistment, reenlistment, and extension programs.

Because of resource and manpower constraints, the most flexible source of meeting the Army's PIM needs are the IRR and the ING. Accordingly, to meet near term needs, the Army encourages transfers from both the active component and Selected Reserves to the IRR in lieu of loss to a nonmilitary status. To further encourage these transfers, the Army has submitted to the Congress a proposal to pay a bonus of up to \$900 for those who reenlist or extend their service in the IRR or ING. A part of that same legislative package also requests authority to offer bonuses of up to \$1,000 for non-prior service personnel to enlist for service in the IRR for skills which are in short supply, primarily the combat arms.

The Army has also proposed initiatives to offset shortfalls on a long term basis. The primary initiative is to increase the current military service obligation of six years up to eight years. Since it would be legally objectionable to increase the obligation of those already serving, no increase in the strength of the IRR would be realized until six years after the Congress approves the increase. Legislation is now pending in the Congress in regard to this initiative.

Finally, the Army is also considering amending current reenlistment contracts to require all those who reenlist to serve an additional two years in the IRR after they complete their term of initial service in the active and reserve components. This initiative is still being staffed and, if approved, will be initiated in FY 1983.

2. Civilian Requirements versus Supply. The Army bases its plans for military force buildup, deployment, employment, and sustainment --and, thus, its projected military manpower requirements--on the assumption that an adequate civilian work force will be available when needed to accomplish the Department of Defense generated work load. Executing many contingency operations, particularly those involving the mobilization of all or part of the Reserve, will require the "mobilization" of additional civilian employees to bring the civilian work force up to the levels required by the conflict scenario.

Before M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime authorized civilian work force. The FY 1983 civilian end strength is currently budgeted at 392,780. On M-Day, the

termination of peacetime activities that are not required in wartime and the assumption of some wartime activities by military manpower reduce the theater of operation requirement for civilian manpower. Concurrently, the worldwide (non-theater of operation) requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with the mobilization activities of the total military force structure. Accordingly, on M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower begins to increase to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. By M+30 days the requirement reaches 560,500 and remains at that level until M+60 days, whereupon the requirement increases to 570,500 and continues to rise incrementally, peaking at 586,200 at approximately M+120 days.

On M-Day, the only component of the civilian manpower supply is the peacetime work force. With an FY 1983 peacetime civilian strength of 392,780, there would be a need to hire 168,000 people by M+30. This shortfall would be compounded, almost immediately, by the loss of borrowed and diverted military manpower as well as civilian employees subject to call-up as reservists, retired military, and draftees. Others would be needed to meet the expanded level of activity resulting from mobilization. To avoid calling up civilians in essential positions, the Army continuously screens individuals who hold such positions in the Federal government who are also members of the Ready Reserve and is examining the problem with respect to preassigned retired personnel. Even with emergency hiring authority and favorable labor market conditions, it would be difficult to hire all the needed additional workers by M+30. One way to reduce this gap is to increase the peacetime civilian strength to the number required to meet current and projected peacetime needs.

Army's plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day include using individuals pre-recruited as National Emergency Standby Reserves and members of the National Defense Executive Reserve, and immediately available new-hires provided by local public employment offices in response to pre-positioned recruitment requests. Additionally, the Army is studying the possibility of using Federal retirees and DoD employees whose positions become excess upon mobilization to further reduce the civilian manpower mobilization shortfall. Simulated recruitment conducted during recent mobilization exercises indicates that approximately 68,000 positions could be filled by M+5 days through means other than using evacuees from overseas. Based on FY 1984 end strength, at M+5 days the total civilian strength would be about 468,000. At that time, the shortfall in the civilian mobilization manpower requirement of 586,200 projected for M+120 days would be about 118,000. This shortfall could be met by filling an average of 7,900 positions per week.

F. Borrowed Military Manpower As outlined in the FY 1983 DMRR, the history of insufficient civilian authorizations to meet Army manpower requirements has required commanders to borrow or divert soldiers from their assigned jobs, primarily in tactical units, to fill this workload shortfall.

In FY 1982, the Congress provided 16,800 civilian spaces to solve this problem. However, in FY 1983 the Congress reduced this authorization to 14,300. It is anticipated that the 14,300 civilians authorized will be hired by end FY 1983. At that time, approximately 5,000 soldiers will still be borrowed or diverted to fill positions which could be filled by civilians if sufficient authorizations were available.

During FY 1982, an estimated 12,000 civilian were hired to replace soldiers and 12,000 soldiers were returned to their units. This influx of soldiers has improved near term readiness. The Army will strive to maintain the use of borrowed military manpower/troop diversions (replaceable with civilians) at 5,000 or below during FY 1984. However, this can only be accomplished if civilian end strength is allowed to change in relationship to workload appropriate for civilian manning.

G. Civilian Substitution Program. DoD and Army policy is to use civilian personnel in positions that do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, career progression, or combat readiness; that do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved; and that do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment. Civilian substitution retains the programmed military authorizations and end strength while increasing readiness through the conversion of military TDA positions to civilian positions and the assignment of released military personnel to other higher priority force structure needs.

The civilian substitution program, as outlined in the FY 1983-1987 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), is designed to retain programmed military end strength while increasing readiness through conversion of 4,000 military positions within TDA units to civilian positions and assignment of released military personnel to other high priority force structure needs. Civilian substitution started with the conversion of 1,000 field grade officer authorizations to direct hire civilian authorizations in FY 1983 and continues by increasing this number to 3,000 (all military grades) in FY 1984 and 4,000 in FY 1985 and succeeding years. Substitution of the 1,000 field grade officer authorizations requires an increase in high grade civilians, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

H. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. During the past few years, the Army has been concerned that civilian manpower ceilings have restricted the hiring of adequate civilian personnel to fully implement the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. In legislative action on the 1982 DoD Appropriations Bill, the House Committee on Appropriations recognized this problem and recommended that personnel ceilings exclude personnel who work fifty percent or more of their time in support of the FMS function. Currently, the annual Authorization Act and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 preclude treatment of FMS manpower differently from other categories of Defense programs in formulating budget authorizations. The Army has proposed amendatory legislation that recommends changes to Section 138(c)(2) of Title 10, United States Code and 605(a) of Public Law 94-329 (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976). The proposed legislation has been staffed with the other Services.

IV. Army Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display Army manpower by DPPC for FY 1982 through FY 1984. Under and overmanning is also shown. Selected Reserve strengths throughout this section include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1982 Actual	FY 1983 FY 1984	FY 1984 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.5	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>471.2</u>	<u>476.9</u>	<u>478.5</u>
Land Forces	471.0	476.6	478.3
Division Forces	(428.3)	(439.4)	(436.3)
Theater Forces	(42.8)	(37.2)	(42.0)
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>29.4</u>
Intelligence	8.3	8.8	9.2
Centrally Managed Communications	9.7	10.0	14.5
Research and Development	5.6	5.4	5.5
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>181.4</u>	<u>173.3</u>	<u>174.6</u>
Base Operating Support	62.4	55.0	54.9
Medical Support	18.6	17.6	18.1
Personnel Support	13.2	13.0	12.5
Individual Training	42.9	42.8	44.0
Force Support Training	3.8	3.7	4.1
Central Logistics	8.0	8.7	8.8
Centralized Support Activities	21.6	21.9	21.7
Management Headquarters	10.8	10.3	10.3
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>676.7</u>	<u>674.8</u>	<u>683.0</u>
<u>Operating Strength Deviation</u> (Under and Overmanning)	<u>(0.7)</u>	<u>-2.5</u>	<u>1.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>103.7</u>	<u>107.6</u>	<u>98.5</u>
Transients	24.6	26.3	26.8
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	7.1	5.3	5.3
Students, Trainees	67.5	71.7	61.9
Cadets	4.6	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>780.4</u>	<u>780.0</u>	<u>782.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ARNG)

(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1982 Actual	FY 1983 FY 1984	FY 1984 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>359.5</u>	<u>363.2</u>	<u>364.4</u>
Land Forces	359.5	363.2	364.4
Division Forces	(346.6)	(349.6)	(350.8)
Theater Forces	(12.9)	(13.6)	(13.6)
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>28.5</u>	<u>31.7</u>	<u>32.5</u>
Base Operating Support	18.0	18.9	19.0
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	2.4	2.6	2.6
Individual Training	3.7	3.8	3.8
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	4.2	6.1	6.8
Management Headquarters	*	*	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>388.0</u>	<u>394.9</u>	<u>396.9</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>22.1</u>	<u>24.2</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdées	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	19.6	22.1	24.2
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>407.6</u>	<u>417.0</u>	<u>421.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAR)

(End Strength in Thousands) (***)

	FY 1982 Actua.	FY 1983 FY 1984 Budget	FY 1984 Budget
Strategic	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defense Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
Tactical/Mobility	<u>172.2</u>	<u>180.1</u>	<u>182.3</u>
Land forces	170.6	178.5 (0.4)	180.7 (1.9)
Division Forces	155.0	162.8	164.3
Theater Forces	15.6	15.7	16.4
Mobility Forces	1.6	1.6	1.6
Auxiliary Activities	0.5 (1.4)	0.5 (1.5)	0.5 (1.6)
Intelligence	0.5 (0.7)	0.5 (0.8)	0.5 (0.9)
Centrally Managed Communications	- (0.1)	- (0.1)	- (0.1)
Research and Development	- (0.2)	- (0.2)	- (0.2)
Geophysical Activities	- (0.4)	- (0.4)	- (0.4)
Support Activities	<u>66.4</u> (6.4)	<u>68.3</u> (6.7)	<u>69.4</u> (7.2)
Base Operating Support	4.0 (0.5)	4.2 (0.5)	4.4 (0.6)
Medical Support	7.7 (0.8)	8.0 (0.9)	8.3 (0.9)
Personnel Support	1.7 (0.3)	1.9 (0.3)	2.0 (0.3)
Individual Training	47.3 (1.3)	50.7 (1.3)	51.2 (1.4)
Force Support Training	- (1.0)	- (1.1)	- (1.2)
Central Logistics	- (1.3)	- (1.4)	- (1.5)
Centralized Support Activities	5.2 (0.1)	3.0 (0.1)	3.0 (0.1)
Management Headquarters	0.1 (0.8)	0.1 (0.8)	0.1 (0.8)
Federal Agency Support	0.4 (0.4)	0.4 (0.4)	0.4 (0.4)
Subtotal-Force Structure	<u>239.1</u>	<u>248.9</u>	<u>252.2</u>
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	<u>7.8*</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>10.7</u>
Individuals	<u>9.8</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>10.0</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees**	9.8	11.1	10.0
Cadets	-	-	-
Total	<u>256.7</u>	<u>268.5</u>	<u>272.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Included in Authorization request for the first time in FY 1982.

** Includes pay category F (non-prior service personnel currently on Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT); and pay category U (non-prior service personnel serving on the second part of their IADT).

*** Numbers in brackets show distribution of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), and are not included within the DPPC totals.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>25.1</u>	<u>26.1</u>
Land Forces	22.9	23.6	24.6
Division Forces	(21.9)	(22.5)	(23.3)
Theater Forces	(1.0)	(1.2)	(1.4)
Mobility Forces	1.3	1.4	1.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>26.5</u>	<u>26.2</u>	<u>26.6</u>
Intelligence	1.5	1.6	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	4.2	4.4	4.5
Research and Development	20.8	20.2	20.3
Geophysical Activities	*	*	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>327.8</u>	<u>341.4</u>	<u>347.2</u>
Base Operating Support	162.8	168.2	167.6
Medical Support	14.8	14.7	14.9
Personnel Support	7.8	8.5	9.2
Individual Training	12.0	12.4	13.7
Force Support Training	1.6	1.8	2.0
Central Logistics	79.5	86.2	89.8
Centralized Support Activities	33.8	34.1	34.4
Management Headquarters	15.3	15.5	15.5
Federal Agency Support	0.1	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>378.4</u>	<u>392.8</u>	<u>400.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

A. Strategic Forces

1. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.5	0.4	0.4
Civilian	0.1	0.1	0.1

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces

1. Land Forces

a. Division Forces

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	428.3	439.4	436.3
Reserve Components			
ARNG	346.6	349.6	350.8
USAR	155.0	162.8	164.3
Civilian	21.9	22.5	23.3

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to or in support of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units. Reflected in this subcategory are a number of unit mission transfers, together with equipment sets, to the Reserve Components from the active force. Also shown within these numbers are activations in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve versus in the active force. These transfers and inactivations are not cast-off units that the active force no longer wants, but are priority wartime units.

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1983 results from ADP programming errors which erroneously accounted for HAWK and Chapparal/Vulcan Theater Forces manpower in the Division Forces program (4,400 spaces); redistribution of estimated Commercial Activities space savings while personnel remained in support activites pending final contract determination; increases in manning FORSCOM divisions and other non-divisional combat units (6,100 spaces); increased manning of Pacific divisions (1,200 spaces); and FY 1982 undermanning. The ADP programming errors are expected to be corrected by March 1983.

The apparent decrease in active military spaces in FY 1984 is attributable to the reprogramming of communications activities from Division Forces to Centrally Managed Communications (4,200 spaces) and is not reflective of increases in force structure caused by the transition to Division 86 configuration previously discussed in Section I of this chapter.

The Army National Guard increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 represent the net effects of force structure actions, and increased paid drill strength to support improved force readiness.

The Army Reserve increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 are a part of the increases caused by the activation of five CEWI battalions.

The increase of civilian spaces in FY 1984 primarily results from an aggregation of actions to improve ammunition support (1,000 spaces), military technician restorals (700 spaces), and force modernization (100 spaces), which are partially offset by other reprogramming actions.

The following table shows active and reserve combined arms organizations programmed for end FY 1984.

Combined Arms Organizations In Divsions Forces End FY 1984

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>			
Armored	4(11)	2(6)	6(17)
Mechanized	6(16)	2(6)	8(22)
Infantry	4(10)	5(15)	9(25)
Air Assault	1(3)		1(3)
Airborne	1(3)		1(3)
	<u>16(43)</u>	<u>9(27)</u>	<u>25(70)</u>
<u>Separate Combat Brigades</u> <u>1/ 2/</u>			
Armored	1	2	3
Mechanized	1	8	9
Infantry	0	6	6
	<u>2</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>18</u>
<u>Cavalry Brigade</u>			
Air Combat	1	0	1
<u>Cavalry Regiments</u>			
Armored	3	4	7

1/ Includes four Reserve Component separate brigades that round-out two light infantry and two infantry (Mech) divisions in the Active Component.

2/ Excludes the 33rd Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) provided for school support, and three active and five reserve infantry brigades that are part of theater forces.

b. Theater Forces

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	42.8	37.2	42.0
Reserve Components			
ARNG	12.9	13.6	13.6
USAR	15.6	15.7	16.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.2	1.4

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to theater-wide and specialized units such as three active and four reserve component separate infantry brigades, and one scout group; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support in NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The decrease in active military spaces in FY 1983 results from ADP programming errors which erroneously accounted for HAWK and Chaparral/Vulcan Theater Forces manpower spaces in the Division Forces program while continuing to account for actuals in Theater Forces (4,400 spaces); inactivation of six air defense batteries in Europe and CONUS (1,000 spaces), and miscellaneous Army command reprogramming actions (100 spaces). The ADP programming errors are expected to be corrected by March 1983.

The increase of 4,800 active military spaces in FY 1984 results from increasing the readiness of the 4th PSYOPS Battalion (333 spaces), activation of a Special Forces Group and increased civil affairs unit manning (1,223 spaces), inactivation of NIKE-HERCULES air defense units and the associated activation and forward deployment of the PATRIOT air defense system. This increase supports the premise of early combat and combat support capability in the active component, and the need to meet readiness standards for early deployment.

The Army Reserve increase in FY 1984 is a part of the increased total paid strength to improve readiness.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 primarily results from increased support to force modernization (300 spaces) and restoral of military technician conversions (94 spaces), which are partially offset by other reprogramming actions.

2. Mobility Forces.

Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.4	1.4

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

C. Auxiliary Activities

1. Intelligence.

Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.3	8.8	9.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.8

Manpower in this category supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1984 results from additional support provided to NSA (75 spaces), DIA (53 spaces), and the National Foreign Intelligence Program (100 spaces); and 170 spaces to improve readiness of existing units and convert to the CEWI organization. These increases improve the intelligence support through day-to-day peacetime operations. The unit's wartime mission and deployment requirements preclude assignment to the Reserve Components.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 results from the effect of reprogramming slippage in General Defense Intelligence Program resources from FY 1983 to FY 1984.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.7	10.0	14.5
<u>Civilian</u>	4.2	4.4	4.5

Manpower in this category supports defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control system, and excludes support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in Base Operations Support).

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1984 is an accumulation of actions to improve support (100 spaces for fielding of new switching equipment, 100 spaces for AN/GSC-39 Satellite Terminals, and 100 spaces for AN/USC-28); to improve readiness of units (100 spaces); and the program transfer of communication activities from division forces (4,200 spaces). The increase is to improve the full time critical communications support and readiness which cannot be accomplished by Reserve Component units.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 reflects civilian spaces provided for substitution of military in TDA units.

3. Research and Development Activities.

Research and Development Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.6	5.4	5.5
<u>Civilian</u>	20.8	20.2	20.3

Manpower in this category directs contractor efforts and in-house programs in areas of basic and applied research and exploratory, advanced, and engineering development.

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1984 results from increased support to the Ballistic Missile Program, and decreases in the FY 1983 program due to commercial activities reductions and miscellaneous Army command reprogramming actions.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 primarily results from an increase of 200 spaces to support the Ballistic Defense Program, which was offset by a reduction of 100 spaces for proposed Efficiency Reviews (EEMI).

4. Geophysical Activities.

Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military Active</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	-

Manpower in this category is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

D. Support Activities

1. Base Operations Support

Base Operating Support Manpower
Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military Active</u>	25.3	23.4	23.2
<u>Civilian</u>	83.9	88.8	87.6

Manpower in this subcategory supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Army Forces Command, and the US Army Western Command.

Base Operating Support Manpower
Support Installation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	37.2	31.6	31.7
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
ARNG	18.0	18.9	19.0
USAR	4.0	4.2	4.4
<u>Civilian</u>	78.8	79.4	80.0

Manpower in this subcategory is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, US Army Communications Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services Command.

The decreases in active military spaces in both base operating accounts in FY 1983 result from civilian substitution for military in TDA units (1,000 spaces); the reprogramming of 100 spaces to Centrally Managed Communications; consolidation and establishment of the Army Broadcasting Service (200 spaces); reprogramming actions to meet workload changes and program description changes (1,000 spaces); Commercial Activities (CA) actual carryovers; and ADP programming errors in reporting FY 1982 actuals. The ADP errors are expected to be corrected by March 1983. The decrease in active military spaces in FY 1984 results from civilian substitution for military in TDA units.

The ARNG increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 represent the net effects of force structure actions and increased paid drill strength to support improved force readiness.

The Army Reserve increase in FY 1984 is part of the increase total paid strength to improve readiness.

The increases in civilian spaces for FY 1983 result from restoral of Commercial Activities (CA) savings and additional spaces to support AIF activities (5,800 spaces). The overall decrease in civilian spaces in the base operating accounts in FY 1984 results from decreases imposed by DoD in order to bring the Army civilian ceiling in line with ceilings established by OMB and Economies, Efficiencies, and Management Improvement (EEMI) savings.

2. Medical Support Activities.

**Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military			
Active	18.6	17.6	18.1
Reserve Components			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	7.7	8.0	8.3
Civilian	14.8	14.7	14.9

Manpower in this category supports health care activities.

The decrease in active military spaces in FY 1983 is attributable to overmanning in FY 1982, and errors in the ADP reporting system. The ADP errors are expected to be corrected by March 1983.

The increase of 500 active military spaces in FY 1984 results from providing additional spaces for increased manning of MTOE units to meet evacuation policies (300), and 200 spaces to support the occupational health program for industrial hygiene and medical surveillance. This increase is to improve medical support readiness and operations in peacetime. The active component units' mission and early deployment requirements to provide medical assistance in a theater of operations preclude assignment to the Reserve Components.

The Army Reserve increase in FY 1984 result from the activation of hospital units and paid strength growth.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 provides support to the Occupational Health Program for Industrial Hygiene and Medical Surveillance, and for support of handicapped children (200 spaces) to improve quality of life.

3. Personnel Support Activities.

**Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military			
Active	13.2	13.0	12.5
Reserve Components			
ARNG	2.4	2.6	2.6
USAR	1.7	1.9	2.0
Civilian	7.8	8.5	9.2

Manpower in this category is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, counterintelligence and investigative activities, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

The decrease in active military spaces in FY 1984 results from the inactivation of the US Army Retraining Brigade (300 spaces), and the substitution of 100 civilian for military personnel in TDA units.

The increase in the Army Reserve in FY 1984 is the result of growth in the recruiting force.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 supports the Army's Intern Program and the civilian substitution program discussed above.

4. Individual Training Activities.

Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u> <u>Active</u>	42.9	42.8	44.0
Reserve Components			
ARNG	3.7	3.8	3.8
USAR	47.3	50.7	51.2
<u>Civilian</u>	12.0	12.4	13.7

Manpower in this category supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals account.

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1984 supports force modernization (300 spaces for PATRIOT, TACFIRE, and support to nine AAH companies), and US Army Training Command training mission support to trainees (900 spaces). These increases are for modernization of priority active units and mission support to trainees in continuous day-to-day operations in peacetime. Support of day-to-day peacetime training cannot be transferred to the Reserve Components because of the nature of their drill and training assemblies.

The Army Reserve increases are the result of reorganization and growth of paid drill strength in USAR training divisions in FY 1983 and the addition of a training brigade in FY 1984.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 results from civilian substitutions for military (800 spaces); resources to support training for foreign language shortfalls (200 spaces); training support requirements for force modernization (200 spaces); and restoral of civilian end strength for military technician conversions.

5. Force Support Training Activities.

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u> Active	3.8	3.7	4.1
Civilian	1.6	1.8	2.0

Manpower in this category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

The increase of 400 active military spaces in FY 1984 supports force modernization training requirements for IFV/CFV (100 spaces), the M1 Tank (220 spaces), AAH (70 spaces), and LACV-30 (30 spaces). These increases are to support modernization of active units with new equipment training support. This mission could not be accomplished in the reserve structure because of their unique drill and training assemblies.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 supports development of the Manpower Staffing Standards Study (MS3) (100 spaces); and civilian substitution, restoral of Commercial Activities savings, and support for ammunition, ranges, and targets (100 spaces).

6. Central Logistics Activities.

Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u> Active	8.0	8.7	8.8
Civilian	79.5	86.2	89.8

Manpower in this category serves in supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and US Army Europe.

The increase in active military spaces in FY 1984 results from reprogramming of base operations support spaces by the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command to support mission/workload changes.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1983 results from 400 spaces being reprogrammed for ammunition support; 1,500 spaces for MX construction (however, 1,100 spaces were reprogrammed to support AIF activities until a decision is made on MX basing); an additional 1,100 spaces to support AIF activities; 1,600 spaces to support new equipment/force modernization issues; 600 spaces to support European supply activities; 1,000 spaces for Commercial Activities (CA) restorals; and 100 spaces for miscellaneous Army command reprogrammings.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 supports MX construction (1,400 spaces), new systems/ force modernization (900 spaces), and additional resources to reduce AIF activities backlog (1,300 spaces).

7. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Military Active	21.6	21.9	21.7
Reserve Components			
ARNG	4.2	6.1	6.8
USAR	5.2	3.0	3.0
Civilian	33.8	34.1	34.4

Manpower in this category supports joint and international activities (less management headquarters), combat development, counter-intelligence reserve activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigation, OSD activities, and foreign military sales.

The decrease of 200 active military spaces in FY 1984 results from the substitution of civilian for military personnel in TDA organizations.

The Army National Guard increases represent increased paid drill strength to support improved force readiness.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1984 results from civilian substitutions for military in TDA units (200 spaces) and support of force modernization (100 spaces).

8. Management Headquarters Activities.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active	10.8	10.3	10.3
Reserve Components			
ARNG	*	*	0.1
USAR	0.1	0.1	0.1
Civilian	15.3	15.5	15.5

* Fewer than 50 spaces

Manpower in this category is assigned to defense agencies, international military organizations, unified commands, service support-combat commands, and service support-support commands.

9. Federal Agency Activities.

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active	0.1	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	0.1	*	*

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

Manpower in this category is assigned to DoD and non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis unless they support the mission of DoD.

E. Operating Strength Deviation

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active	(0.7)	-2.5	1.2

Operating strength deviation is the number of spaces in the force structure (units) that are not filled (undermanning) or are over filled (overmanning) primarily because of the seasonal or cyclic nature of gains and losses.

The undermanning in FY 1983 is caused by a decrease in authorized end strength without a concomitant decrease in force structure. The overmanning in FY 1984 is caused by the transition of the large FY 1983 non-prior service cohort from the training base to Army units, and the desire of the Army to maintain strength to support Division 86 transition plans.

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military			
Reserve Component USAR	7.8	8.6	10.7

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization.

Increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 are the result of growth in the program.

G. Individuals.

The Individuals accounts are estimates of manpower required for transients, holdees (patients, prisoners, separatees), trainees, students, and US Military Academy cadets.

1. Transients.

Transients Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military Active	24.6	26.3	26.8

Trans. strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves.

The increase in FY 1983 results from the increase in non-prior service accessions. More non-prior service accessions will leave the training base in FY 1983 and become transients.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.1	5.3	5.3

The decrease in FY 1983 is the result of applying new Dropped From Strength (DFS) instructions in DoDI 1120.11. Under these revised instructions, soldiers will be DFS when a punitive discharge is approved by the convening authority, or when a civil (domestic or foreign) confinement sentence of six or more months begins.

3. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	67.5	71.7	61.9
Cadets	4.6	4.4	4.4
Reserve Component Trainees/ Students			
ARNG	19.6	22.1	24.2
USAR	9.8	11.1	10.0

The sharp FY 1983 increase in active military trainees is the result of more NPS accessions in FY 1983 who are required to offset the expected end of enlistment losses from the NPS input of FY 1980, the majority of whom are eligible for discharge in FY 1983. In FY 1984, NPS accessions have been programmed into the training base earlier in the year to smooth the training base load. Therefore at year-end there are less trainees than in both FY 1982 and FY 1983.

The Army Reserve increase in FY 1983 reflects the trainees required to achieve the FY 1983 manpower growth. The decrease in trainees in FY 1984 is caused by a reduction of 4,600 non-prior service accessions in FY 1984. This reduction results in a decreased input/output in Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT).

The Army National Guard increases result from the lengthening of initial entry training, as well as increased student loads required to support increases of overall ARNG strength in FY 1983 and FY 1984.

H. SUMMARY

The net result of all actions listed in this section as they apply to the active Army amounts to an increase of 2,600 from FY 1983 to FY 1984. This is shown in the following table.

DPPC	<u>NET CHANGE (000)</u>
Strategic	----
Tactical/Mobility	+1.6
Auxiliary Activities	+5.1
Support Activities	+1.3
Operating Strength Deviation	+3.5
Individuals	-9.1
NET TOTAL	+2.4

NOTE: Total does not add to 2.6K because the summary numbers are taken from data that has already been rounded.

Also, for the reasons cited within the DPPC discussions, the active structure and other increases shown cannot be performed by the Reserve Components because of early combat capability, full-time mission requirements, the unique drill and training assemblies of Reserve Component units, and the need for increased readiness to meet availability times in the TPFDL.

CHAPTER IV
NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Navy's manpower program for FY 1984. The program derives from the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy.

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1984 and FY 1985 as follows:

Navy Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	572.2	586.6
Total Selected Reserve	119.0	126.4
Drilling Reservists and Trainees	(104.5)	(111.0)
Active-Duty Reservists (TARs)	(13.6)	(14.3)
IMAs	(0.7)	(0.8)
Active Guard and Reserve (10 U.S.C. 265)	(0.2)	(0.2)
<u>Civilian</u>	312.7	316.7

B. Major Force Structure Changes

1. Total Battle Forces. In FY 1984, the Battle Force will be 526 ships, a net increase of 20 over the previous year. Of the FY 1984 number, 41 will be in Strategic Forces, an increase of one from FY 1983 as a new TRIDENT is commissioned. Mobile logistic ships and support ships in the Strategic Forces will remain at four and two, respectively, for both years.

The number of other Battle Force ships will grow from 414 to 424 between FY 1983 and FY 1984. The number of carriers will remain at 13 in both years. A net gain of seven ships will increase the number of surface combatants to 193 during FY 1984. Nine new frigates and one guided-missile cruiser will be delivered. Three FFG-7 Class guided missile frigates will transfer from Battle Forces into Mobilization Category "A," when they enter the Naval Reserve Forces in FY 1984. The attack submarine force will gain five new SSN-688 vessels, but will retire three older SSNs, resulting in a

net SS/SSN total of 98 in FY 1984. There will be six patrol combatants both years. Amphibious warfare ships will remain at 58 during FY 1983 and FY 1984. Mine warfare ships in the Battle Forces category will remain at three during both years, but mobile logistics ships will increase from 52 to 53, with the addition of a TAFS.

The number of support forces will increase by six vessels, from 43 to 49, with the introduction of six new design ocean surveillance ships (TAGOS).

Mobilization Force Category "A" ships increase by a net of three ships to 12, with the aforementioned transfer of three FFG-7s in FY 1984.

Total Ship Battle Forces

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Strategic Forces	40	41
Battle Forces	414	424
Support Forces	43	49
Mobilization Forces Category "A"	9	12
Total Ship Battle Forces	<u>506</u>	<u>526</u>

2. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces. Auxiliaries and Sealift force levels increase from 27 to 34 ships with the introduction of six TAKR/TAKRX and one new TARC. Mobilization Forces Category "B" fall from 26 to 24, with the decommissioning of two ships.

3. Naval Aviation Forces. Major growth will occur in the Navy's aviation forces between FY 1983 and FY 1984 with delivery of U.S.S. VINSON (CVN-70), requiring addition of the Navy's thirteenth air wing. A total of 83 Navy active and 16 reserve tactical squadrons will be operating during FY 1983, the active increasing to 88 in FY 1984. There will be 35 active and 13 reserve fixed-wing antisubmarine patrol squadrons operating in both FY 1983 and 1984. The Navy will add one active direct support helicopter squadron in both FY 1983 and FY 1984, increasing total active support squadrons to 18.

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management Systems

The decision to use active rather than reserve manpower to staff new units being added to the force structure is determined by several factors, foremost of which is mission. Naval ships, squadrons, construction battalions, etc., are regularly deployed in forward areas in support of our national security. Deployed units are required to be on nearly wartime footing. Thus, deployed and deploying units are manned and maintained by active duty people, augmented by reservists. Since the Naval Reserve parallels and complements the active force, Reserve force increases are planned to parallel the active force expansion.

As the Navy grows, additional active duty positions are established to meet support requirements ashore for the growing fleet as well as to provide sea-to-shore rotation in support of new positions at sea.

1. Operating Forces. Operating force manpower requirements are determined through the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document systems.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) program identifies manpower requirements for individual ships predicated on ship configuration, computed work load, required operational capabilities, and projected operational environment. It determines the level of manpower essential to the operation, maintenance, and support of a ship under stated conditions of readiness. The SMD program covered 92 percent of all ships at the end of FY 1982, with coverage to continue at that level or higher during FY 1983.

The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) program documents requirements for aviation squadrons, based on manpower staffing standards that relate work load to the operating tempo defined in the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment statements. Initial documentation has been completed for all active-duty aviation squadrons. The SQMD program schedule provides for annual updates of Fleet Readiness Squadrons and Training Squadrons, while updates for all other squadrons are scheduled for 24-30 month intervals.

2. Shore Support Establishment. The Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS) determines requirements for military and civilian manpower in the shore support establishment. By the end of FY 1984, SHORSTAMPS will cover approximately 50 percent of the shore establishment; 39 percent is presently covered. Future coverage goals based on planned resources are shown below.

<u>Percent of Coverage</u>		<u>Number of Spaces Covered (000s)</u>
FY 1983	47	251
FY 1984	50	267
FY 1985	52	278
FY 1986	54	289
FY 1987	55	294

3. Manpower Requirements and Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN). The Military Manpower/Hardware Integration (HARDMAN) Development Program has completed the fifth year of a seven-year development effort. The principal objective of this program is to develop analytical tools and methodologies capable of identifying the manpower, personnel, and training implications of any new weapon system during the concept and design phases of the Weapon System Acquisition Process (WSAP).

The various HARDMAN methodologies have successfully completed their test application on systems currently in the WSAP and are now being integrated and automated for use Navy-wide. HARDMAN will be implemented in FY 1984 and will be the Navy method for determining the manpower, personnel, and training associated with the WSAP.

4. Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS). The Navy Manpower Mobilization System is used to plan and program total wartime manpower requirements. NAMMOS requirements are reviewed annually with regard to specific functional categories, changes in the scenario and force structure, mobilization training requirements, and impact of host-nation support agreements. When the review is completed, it is possible to evaluate whether the existing manpower inventory is adequate--quantitatively and qualitatively--to meet the projected mobilization requirements.

5. Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). The Wartime Manpower Planning System is a Department of Defense-wide data base for computing, compiling, projecting, and displaying military and civilian wartime manpower demand and supply. WARMAPS estimates of Navy wartime manpower requirements and assets are based upon a set of policies and assumptions consistent with the Navy Manpower Mobilization System. The Department of Defense and the Navy use WARMAPS data to prepare and review manpower mobilization plans, the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM), budget estimates and justification, Congressional reports and testimony, and responses to Congressional and other inquiries.

B. Manpower Management Improvements

1. Sea and Air Mariner Program. This new Selected Reserve program will increase non-prior service accessions from approximately 2,000 to 10,000 per year. This increase will meet Selected Reserve E-3 manning requirements as well as previously unattainable petty officer requirements for Naval Reserve Force ships, squadrons, maintenance activities, and medical units. The program will provide recruit training for all enlistees and advanced skill training via traditional "A" schools, approved civilian vocational-technical training, and command sponsored training.

2. Civilian Manpower Information System. The Department of the Navy decision to adopt the civilian personnel data system used by the Air Force will result in a cost effective solution to the long standing problems that stem from the department's lack of an efficient, uniform automated data system for its civilian workforce. Implementation of the Navy Civilian Personnel Data System will enable more effective management of the civilian workforce and improved response to the numerous requirements resulting from recent statutory and regulatory changes. It will provide the Navy Department with a cost effective means to obtain accurate, current, consistent, and in depth information on the civilian workforce. Installation will begin in 1984 and be completed department-wide in 1986.

3. Individuals Account. Revised accounting procedures are being implemented to more accurately account for and process people in the Individuals Account. Also, management actions are in progress which will reduce temporary duty and pipeline training. One example of this is a significant reduction in training for Unrestricted Line Officers enroute to sea-duty billets. These efforts are part of an aggressive effort to properly size and manage the individuals account.

III. Significant Program Highlights

A. Overview

1. Manpower for a Growing Navy. FY 1984 continues significant expansion of the nation's naval forces. Substantial growth is programmed in the numbers of ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, bringing increased requirements for manpower. Throughout the remainder of the decade, the Navy must expand its manpower resources in order to support and operate the growing Navy. The keys to meeting the increased manpower requirement for active military are improved continuation rates, better retention, and sustained recruiting.

The Navy plans to man the expanded fleet with volunteers. Compensation and career satisfaction remain the most desirable and effective way to obtain the quantity and quality of personnel needed for the 1980s and beyond. A pay system based on pay comparability together with supplemental incentive pays and bonuses, improved training, improved living conditions, and adequate family services can make a Navy career attractive.

Planning for active military support of a growing Navy is based on a combination of related factors:

- Sustaining retention of first term and career personnel at levels comparable to FY 1982 through periodic cost-of-living adjustments which keep the military compensation package competitive with civilian opportunities.
- Successful recruiting of approximately 12,000 prior-service enlisted veterans per year.
- Accession of non-prior-service enlisted personnel at annual rates in excess of 80,000.
- Moderate increases in the number of women in the Navy (within the constraints of Section 6015 of U.S. Code, Title 10).

The Navy's various inventory projection models repeatedly predict that it can achieve required end strength under these planning factors. Economic considerations are a major factor, as demonstrated by modeling and confirmed by actual experience. Compensation issues are central to meeting expanding Navy manpower requirements; this requirement is true for civilians and members of the Selected Reserve as well as for active-duty personnel. The FY 1984 freeze on military and civilian pay raises and retired pay cost of living adjustments will make meeting the Navy's expanding manpower demands even more challenging.

To meet the Navy's expanding manpower needs only in numbers is not enough; manning a growing naval force has a qualitative dimension as well. The types of skills required depend on the composition of the naval force to be manned. Projections show there will be a significant increase in requirements in technical ratings through 1990. The quality of new recruits and the career force must match these changing needs.

The distribution of military manpower during the expansion period reflects growth not only in the number of ships and squadrons but also in the support elements of the force. The following table depicts the growth profiles as currently programmed. The right-hand column shows growth planned for each DPPC category over the five-year period ending in FY 1988. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Growth Distribution By DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 83-88</u>
Strategic	19.7	20.2	20.9	21.9	22.1	22.8	+ 3.1
Tactical/Mobility	266.4	271.9	282.4	287.9	290.1	291.1	+24.7
Auxiliary Activities	23.5	23.8	24.4	24.9	25.1	25.0	+ 1.5
Support Activities	153.1	156.7	160.2	162.2	162.6	162.8	+ 9.7
Individuals 1/	97.7	99.6	98.6	99.6	102.4	105.2	+ 7.5
TOTALS	560.3	572.2	586.6	596.6	602.4	606.8	+46.5

1/ Includes undermanning

The bulk (60 percent) of the added active-duty manpower is programmed for Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. Increasing the number of ships and aircraft dictates increases in support activities as well. Support requirements (base operating support, personnel support, individual training, logistics, etc.) account for approximately 21 percent of the growth. This category includes a significant number assigned to man the fleet readiness squadrons to support the thirteenth air wing. Relatively small increases (three percent) will occur in Auxiliary Activities (intelligence, communications, research and development, and geo-physical activities). The growth in individuals (students, transients, and trainees) reflects the numbers necessary to keep undermanning of fleet units at a minimum.

The active growth of 46,500 shown in the preceding table is to provide for crews and essential support to routinely deploying Naval units. During the time period shown in this table, the number of ships in the Strategic Forces, Battle Forces, and Support Forces increases by 51. Current and future operational requirements dictate that these ships and associated support activities be manned with full-time active personnel. It would be financially prohibitive to continually shuttle Reserve crews to a deployed ship and would result in a decreased level of readiness for the deployed ship. As can be seen in the next DPPC table, the Selected Reserve also grows significantly, and when measured by a percentage basis, grows much more than the active forces (39 percent versus 8 percent). Mobilization category "A" ships increase by 25 in the DPPC table timeframe, a result of Navy's commitment to expand the Selected Reserve in those areas where the mission can be effectively accomplished by reserve personnel.

One problem facing the Navy during the expansion period is the shortage of mid-grade surface, submarine, and air warfare officers of the Unrestricted Line. Inventory lagged below authorizations throughout the 1970s. The FY 1981 and FY 1982 improvements in compensation and quality of service life have helped stem the outflow of junior and mid-grade officers; however, the Navy cannot enjoy for some years a complete recovery from the mid-grade shortages that reached critical proportions as the 1970s ended. The current inventory reflects the improved continuation in senior grades and improved retention in junior grades experienced recently and assumes that pay comparability raises and currently funded bonus plans will continue throughout the 1980s. Officer recruiting and retention during the FY 1984 budget cycle are covered in detail later in the chapter.

An additional problem impeding the elimination of the mid-grade officer shortfall is the restrictive nature of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) 0-4 and 0-5 ceilings. When DOPMA was enacted in 1980, the 0-4 and 0-5 grade tables contained in the legislation were based on inventory achievable under poor officer continuation and not on the requirements of an expanding Navy. At the time, Congress expressed receptiveness to legislation in three to five years to increase the statutory ceilings when continuation improved and the ceilings became restrictive. The recent improvement in officer continuation caused the inventory to reach the ceilings in 1981. Further inventory growth, which is necessary to alleviate the mid-grade officer shortfall, is being constrained by the ceilings. Consequently, a proposal to increase the 0-4 and 0-5 ceilings to the approximate level of programmed authorizations is being considered.

As with the officer community, the Navy's enlisted force is faced with current manpower shortages, particularly among trained petty officers who constitute the vital supervisory and skilled experience necessary to fleet operations. The inventory of the Navy's "Top-Six" petty officers (pay grades E-4 through E-9) lagged below authorized strength throughout the 1970s, with the worst shortfalls only now being corrected. Continued attention to compensation issues and quality-of-life improvements will help ease the problem and eliminate the petty officer shortfall by the end of FY 1990.

The problem has a qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension. Certain occupational specialities--that is, Navy ratings--suffer greater shortfalls. These are the "critical ratings" vital to the operation of ships and aircraft. Career force inventories in many of these ratings currently lag 10 to 25 percent (and in some cases more) below requirements; as a result, sea-to-shore rotation for these sailors must be adjusted, keeping people at sea for unacceptably long periods.

Navy's success in growing personnel inventories by 10,900 in FY 1982, enlisted careerists (LOS 5-31+) by 14,600 and Top-Six inventories by 13,400 in FY 1982 is largely attributed to the compensation increases (including the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)) passed by the 96th and 97th Congresses. These increases not only provided a real economic restoration to competitive wage levels, but also represent a national change in atti-

tude toward the military profession as a highly regarded career. Navy's FY 1984 program is predicated on continued realization of competitive pay scales and Congressional support of requested bonuses and recruiting resources.

Expansion of the Naval Reserve is integral to expansion of the Total Force Navy. Increases in Selected Reserve manpower will be distributed among the DPPC categories previously discussed for active duty manpower as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Growth Distribution by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 83-88
Strategic	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	+ 0.1
Tactical/Mobility	68.1	71.6	73.8	75.8	78.7	79.6	+11.5
Auxiliary Activities	5.4	5.8	6.5	7.0	7.4	7.4	+ 2.0
Support Activities	30.1	35.3	39.7	44.3	48.9	48.9	+18.8
Individuals	1.7	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.1	+ 4.4
TOTALS	105.8	119.0	126.4	133.6	141.7	142.6	+36.8

The Navy FY 1984 budget submission programs Selected Reserve growth to the full NAMMOS determined requirement by the end of FY 1987. The growth is programmed for higher priority units to achieve full funding in the earlier years and the lower priority units to be fully funded in the later years. Reserve force ships and squadrons received highest priority with full funding in FY 1984 followed by ship and squadron augmentation units, combat and combat support units such as Special Warfare units, SIMA's, and Mobile Construction Battalions. Auxiliary Activities, which includes intelligence, communications, research and weather units, are incrementally increased to reach full funding by the end of FY 1987. Augmentation for Support Activities is incrementally funded to reach the full requirement by the end of FY 1987, but at a slower rate.

The table below displays the growth rate programmed by Defense Planning and Programming Categories:

Percent of Reserve Requirements Funded by DPPC

Defense Planning and Programming Categories	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88
Strategic	82	89	100	100	100	100
Tactical Mobility	89	93	96	98	100	100
Auxiliary Activities	75	81	90	97	100	100
Support Activities	64	78	86	92	100	100

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of the Navy's manpower resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees are directly related to readiness posture. Over half of the Navy's civilians work in industrial fund activities, which are primarily engaged in depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, missiles, and associated equipment.

Many of the civilians perform essential readiness support in supply centers, ship repair facilities, and air stations. The remainder of the Navy's civilians provide vital support in training, medical, engineering, development, and acquisition, all of which have a longer-range effect on readiness. The Navy civilian end strength for FY 1984, 312,660, reflects a net increase of 3,262 above FY 1983. The majority of this growth reflects the continuation of the readiness improvements begun in FY 1981 which significantly reduced the backlog of ship overhaul deferrals; improved aircraft maintenance; made a more responsive supply system; and expanded civilian manning of Military Sealift Command Support Ships.

B. Active

1. Enlisted

a. Enlisted Recruiting. The Navy achieved its "One Navy" recruiting goal in FY 1982. While the total number of accessions required was lower in FY 1982 than in FY 1981, Navy was able to increase the numbers of new contracts attained in FY 1982. As a result, the Delayed Entry Pool (DEP) posture was larger entering FY 1983 than entering FY 1982. September 1982 was the thirty-fourth consecutive month in which the Navy attained its recruiting goal. The Navy has had noteworthy success in the prior service market, as well as in achieving qualitative goals. The 13,000 prior-service veterans recruited in FY 1982 represented an increase over FY 1981 levels. Navy veterans, of whom 82 percent were petty officers available for immediate assignment to the Fleet, accounted for 77 percent of the prior-service accessions. With respect to quality, the Navy exceeded its target of 73 percent non prior-service (NPS) male high school diploma graduates (HSDG) by 4 percent and its 62 percent NPS male Mental Group I-IIIU goal by 3.8 percent. The Navy was 0.8 percent below its 12 percent NPS male Mental Group IV ceiling and all MG IV recruits were high school diploma graduates. The Navy MG IV attainment was well under the Congressionally mandated ceiling for FY 1983 of 20 percent MG IV NPS males.

The Navy's recruiting success in FY 1982 is attributable to adequate resource allocation, sound management, the national economic situation. However, the FY 1982 success should not cause undue optimism. While the Navy anticipates achieving its FY 1983 goals, it will be more difficult to achieve the FY 1984 and beyond goals which will be required to meet the planned enlisted end strength growth. To accomplish this requires a sustained recruiting effort. Congressional budget cuts against recruiting resources in FY 1982 and FY 1983 combined with improvements in the economy and a declining pool of young males could affect the ability of Navy to continue meeting accession goals.

Another pivotal indicator of recruiting success is the status of the Delayed Entry Program pool. In FY 1982, the Navy's new contracts increased to 110,474 (from 105,162 in FY 1981). This results in an increase in the Delayed Entry Pool thereby greatly enhancing the Navy's potential for meeting FY 1983 accession goals. A large DEP is an invaluable aid to recruiters. Consequently, the Navy is programming personnel

and fiscal resources to provide for continued attainment of annual accession goals and to increase the DEP to approximately half the objective requirement. This initiative will make possible attainment of Navy manpower needs through more efficient recruiting and should lead to improved accession quality, reduced attrition, and lower replacement and training costs.

The Navy is improving its quality goals for FY 1983. While the goal for Mental Group I-IIIU will remain at 62 percent, Navy has adopted a numerical goal for NPS High School Diploma Graduates. This goal (66,431 total male and female) will result in attaining 77 to 80 percent HSDG's in FY 1983. By setting these goals, the Navy should not only meet its trainable quality requirements as determined by mental group but should improve upon survivability, as determined by HSDG status as well. Additionally, the Navy plans to continue to increase the Delayed Entry Program again in FY 1983 if at all possible.

Enlisted Strength Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 82</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 83</u> <u>Goal*</u> (TARS)	<u>FY 84</u> <u>Goal*</u> (TARS)
End strength Accessions	481,300	481,200	498,100 (10.6)	509,700 (12.2)
Prior Service:	13,000	13,000	12,006	12,006
Non-Prior Service:	79,784	79,784	84,068 (674)	82,554 (643)
Male	71,423	71,423	75,458 (588)	72,599 (557)
HSDG (%)	52,139 (73.0)	54,963 (77.0)	57,000 (441)	57,000 (433)
MGI-IIIU (%)	44,996 (63.0)	46,634 (65.3)	46,908 (370)	45,737 (351)
Female	8,361	8,361	9,606 (86)	9,955 (86)
HSDG (%)	7,525 (90)	7,806 (93.4)	9,126 (82) (75)	9,457 (82) (95)

*Includes Navy Reserve (TAR) enlisted personnel.

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
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY (FISCAL YEAR) 1984
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
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b. Enlisted Retention. Retention improvement is the foundation of the Navy's program to man a growing force. Navy continued the positive retention trend started in FY 1981 showing moderate retention improvement in all terms of service. Net reenlistment rates were higher than they have been for several years. The FY 1982 overall results were encouraging signs for eliminating the petty officer shortage and, at the same time, building for the expanded size of the force in late 1980's. FY 1982 first term retention of 50.3 percent exceeded the goal of 47 percent. Second term retention was 4 percent short of the 67 percent goal, however, while third term retention was 95.3 percent against a goal of 98 percent. Attainment of our objective in FY 1983, for all terms, will be more difficult if the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program reductions imposed by the FY 1983 DoD Appropriations Act are sustained through FY 1984.

c. Enlisted Attrition. First-term attrition for FY 1982 experienced a 10.6 percent increase over FY 1981 (11.5 percent compared to 10.4 percent). There were two main reasons for the increase of first-term attrition during FY 1982: Project Upgrade 82, a special discharge program used to eliminate marginal performers, discharged 25.9 percent more personnel than a similar discharge program held in FY 1981 (if the figures from Project Upgrade 82 had been excluded, end-of-year attrition would have been 9.6 percent). In addition, as a result of the CNO's "Get Tough" policy on drug abuse, the Navy discharged a total of 2,331 first-termers during FY 1982 due to alcohol or drug involvement, compared to 585 first-termers during FY 1981.

d. Enlisted Desertion. The desertion rate continued to decline in FY 1982 for the fifth consecutive year. The 17 percent improvement over FY 1981 (18.0 per 1000 for FY 1982 compared to 21.7 per 1000 for FY 1981) indicates efforts to correct the desertion problem are having a positive effect.

2. Officers

a. Officer Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1984 budget period are as follows:

	Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals		
	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
Plan	7,515	7,512	8,141
Actual	7,028 ^{1/}		

1/ End strength constraints caused a delay of commissioning 580 FY 1982 accessions to FY 1983.

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from regular and reserve officer commissioning sources. Most regular officers are commissioned from the US Naval Academy (USNA) and the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC). In FY 1982, the USNA and NROTC supplied 904 and 780 officers, respectively.

The Navy also recruits officers via reserve officer programs. Continued emphasis on officer recruiting, improved training, and an uncertain economy were factors in achieving 100 percent (4,578) of the FY 1982 reserve officer recruiting goal.

Despite the success in meeting overall officer requirements, the Navy continued to experience a shortfall in recruiting Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidates (NUPOCS) for submarines and surface ships in FY 1982. Although 25 percent of officer recruiter assets were dedicated solely to the NUPOC program, only 204 applicants were recruited, against a goal of 269. However, the Navy is becoming more competitive with civilian industry entry-level salaries for engineers, mathematicians, and science majors as a result of Congressional actions such as the nuclear accession bonus. Such initiatives are expected to improve NUPOC program recruiting in FY 1983.

High quality officer candidates and development of new sources of such candidates are needed to meet growing fleet requirements for nuclear trained officers. Proposed legislation to establish a two year NUPOC scholarship program and a four year Nuclear Enlisted Commissioning Program is being considered.

The following data portray the Navy's relative success in officer accessions by program:

Major Officer Program Attainment
(Percent of Goal)

Program	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate	44	49	76
Nuclear Power Instructor	31	57	70
Aviation Officer Candidate	97	103	103
Naval Flight Officer Candidate	102	105	105
Surface Warfare Officer	91	103	108
Supply Officer	90	104	100
General Unrestricted Line	105	102	100
Civil Engineer Corps Officer	79	101	102
Physicians	77	141	93
Nurses	100	100	100

Future goals for officer programs remain high. However, as long as military compensation initiatives continue to keep Navy careers competitive in the national economy, the economy improves at no more than the projected rate, and adequate resources are devoted to the effort, the prognosis for future Navy officer recruiting is favorable.

b. Officer Retention. FY 1982 marked a significant improvement in overall officer retention. Large increases were attained in the aviation and submarine communities. These increases can be attributed to compensation gains, particularly bonuses, and the economic slowdown in the civilian sector. However, mid-grade shortages still exist in the

submarine and pilot communities. An encouraging retention indicator is that total officer resignations submitted decreased by 365 (19%) in FY 1982.

Most encouraging is the improvement in pilot retention. In FY 1982 pilot retention rose to 49 percent, from 42 percent in FY 1981. The increase is largely attributed to increased compensation, particularly the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) that took effect on July 1, 1981. Ninety percent of the aviators in the critical sixth through ninth years of aviation service have obligated for the bonus. Seventy percent made four-year commitments. With the success of the AOCP program, the pilot shortfall was reduced by 20%. The bonus program is essential through FY 1987 to correct the current pilot shortage of 1,172.

Submarine officer retention is improving. In FY 1982, submarine officer retention rose to 39 percent, from 33 percent in FY 1981. This increase is attributed to accession increases and compensation gains (nuclear bonuses, increases in Sub Pay, and Sea Pay). Although retention was higher, the submarine community ended FY 1982 with a shortage of 980 officers. Extended sea tours and the ready market in civilian nuclear industry for their expertise combine to draw many of these officers from naval service. Although the number of submarine officers submitting resignations in FY 1982 was down 14 percent from the previous year, a critical shortage of O-4 and O-5 submarine officers exists. Inventories in the year groups currently at these grades are abnormally small due to earlier inadequate accessions and poor retention. This condition is projected to persist through this decade. We must retain the majority of the officers in these small year groups past the point of retirement eligibility.

Steady improvement in surface warfare officer retention has occurred since FY 1980. However, a subcategory of the surface community, the surface warfare nuclear power officers, is experiencing poor retention in addition to its recruiting difficulties. The surface nuclear power community achieved only a 21 percent retention rate in FY 1982, but the projections for FY 1983 are much better. Private-sector demand for this group has been difficult to overcome.

The following data show relative success in retention among the Navy's Unrestricted Line communities.

Unrestricted Line Officer Retention Rates
(Percent)

	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	1/	Steady-State Goal 2/
Surface Warfare	39	42	43	44		45
Surface Nuclear	42	33	21	45		45
Pilot	30	42	49	56		55
Naval Flight Officer	71	65	73	73		60
Nuclear Submarine	36	33	39	42		40

NOTES

1/ Projected rates as of October 20, 1982.

2/ The rate required once inventory is filled.

Improving retention will be critical throughout the 1980s and will remain the central manpower focus. The improved FY 1982 rates are an important beginning to alleviate officer shortages and to enable force structure expansion. The Navy is programming an increase of 7,680 more officers by FY 1987. These requirements can be attained through the synergistic effects of sustaining competitive pay levels and continuing to focus on retention issues.

3. **Navy Women.** FY 1982 marked steady progress toward reaching the Navy's goal of 45,000 enlisted women and 6,400 female officers on active duty by FY 1985.

In FY 1979, the Navy's Enlisted Women's Utilization Study developed a methodology for determining the maximum number of women that could be used effectively without adversely affecting sea/shore rotation Navywide and still provide a career path and upward mobility for the women. The study showed that the Navy can use about 45,000 enlisted women and projected that goal would be reached in FY 1985.

	<u>End Strength: Enlisted Women</u>					
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Actual</u> <u>Plan</u>					
End Strength	5,723	29,806	34,348	37,024	40,965	42,744
Percentage of all Navy enlisted	1.1	6.5	7.3	7.7	7.8	8.4

The study was updated in July 1982 and, while the end strength goal of 45,000 remains the same, the interim goals were adjusted down somewhat to provide for a more realistic growth pattern. The Navy did not meet the revised FY 1982 goal by 1,681 women, but the number of enlisted women on active duty rose from 34,348 (7.3 percent of the active-duty enlisted force) to 37,024 (7.7 percent).

Progress also continued during FY 1982 to increase the number of enlisted women in non-traditional skills (occupations other than medical, administrative, and service).

	<u>Enlisted Women</u> <u>Traditional/Non-traditional Skills</u>						
	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Actual</u> <u>Plan</u>						
Traditional Percentage	11,623 56	12,829 52	14,660 49	17,496 51	19,745 53	20,274 49	20,825 49
Non-traditional Percentage	4,173 20	5,389 22	6,521 22	7,762 22	8,779 24	10,100 26	11,585 27
Non-designated Percentage	5,141 24	6,633 26	8,625 29	9,090 26	8,500 23	10,100 25	10,334 24

For the Navy to reach its goal of 45,000 enlisted women, it must be able to recruit and retain women in the non-traditional skills. The goal is to have 31 percent of the enlisted women in non-traditional skills by the end of FY 1985. At the end of FY 1982, 24 percent of the enlisted women are in these skill areas.

Growth was also attained in FY 1982 in the number of female officers:

	<u>End Strength: Female Officers</u>				
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
		Actual			Plan
End Strength	3,185	4,877	5,345	5,740	5,946
Percentage of Navy Officers		4.3	7.7	8.2	8.5
					8.6
					8.8

As these figures show, the number of female officers increased by 395 between FY 1981 and FY 1982. As a proportion of all officers, women increased, from 8.2 to 8.5 percent. The current goal for female officers is 6,400 by the end of FY 1985. This goal is based on studies of each officer community, which have determined the number of women who may be effectively utilized given current legal constraints on their assignment.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent possible, assigning them to legally acceptable jobs commensurate with their expertise and capabilities. Under the provisions of Section 6015 of the U.S. Code, Title 10, the Navy may not assign women permanently to ships or aircraft having a combat mission. Consequently, 13 of the Navy's 99 enlisted occupational specialties are closed to women because these are found almost exclusively on board combat ships and aircraft. In addition, two other enlisted occupational specialties are presently closed to women because of a lack of a viable career path. Because of their combat relationship, two officer communities, Submarine Warfare and Special Warfare, also are closed to women. However, women are assigned to non-combatant ships and to aircraft in force support and training squadrons and are now deploying regularly to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. Beginning in FY 1982, women were permanently assigned to Diego Garcia; 57 were stationed there at the end of FY 1982.

As of the end of FY 1982, 2,294 enlisted women were on board 22 ships, compared to 1,458 on board 17 ships in FY 1981. In FY 1981, 150 female officers were serving in 29 ships; by the end of FY 1982, the number had risen to 187 on 30 ships. Current plans call for 5,000 enlisted women and 200 female officers to be at sea by FY 1985. The number of women in aviation also continued to increase. At the end of FY 1982, 60 women were pilots versus 49 in FY 1981 and eight women have become Naval Flight Officers since they were admitted to this program in FY 1981. About 15 percent of enlisted women were in aviation occupations.

C. Reserve

1. General. The Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) established a Selected Reserve (SELRES) manpower requirement of 117,615 for fiscal year 1984. At the present strength level, Naval Reserve Force combat ships and squadrons will be manned at 92 percent of requirements, combat service support at 84 percent, and other support activities as low as 79 percent.

The FY 1983 Authorization for the Selected Reserve was 105,500. The authorization represented a continuance of the FY 1982 end strength of 94,000 expanded by the inclusion of 11,500 TAR average strength. The FY 1984 authorization request is 112,600 average strength and 118,990 end strength. The proposed increase of 13,200 end strength includes 1,800 TARs, 3,800 additional Sea and Air Mariners, 7,200 drilling Reservists in units, and 300 IMA's. Details of the components by training categories and unit and individuals are as follows (end strength):

<u>CATEGORY A</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Unit	91,790	98,944	105,238
Individual Mobilization Augmentee	700	800	1,100
<u>CATEGORY F</u>			
Trainees	550	4,750	4,750
<u>CATEGORY D</u>			
Individual Mobilization Augmentee	350	650	750
Full-time Support (TAR)	12,038	13,846	14,532
End Strength	105,828	118,990	126,370

The increase in IMAs supports increased medical requirements of the Rapid Deployment Force. A total of 800 Category A and 300 Category D Medical IMAs will be funded in FY 1984 in addition to 350 Category D General IMAs. The increase in TARS supports the NRF, SIMAs, C-9B leasing, and base support. The drilling Reserve increase includes 2,000 SELRES in support of the NRF, SIMAs, squadrons, and staffs. The balance of the increase including 3,800 Sea and Air Mariners and 5,200 drilling Reservists is a result of Navy initiatives designed to support growth to NAMMOS requirements by FY 1987 utilizing an expanded Reserve Enlistment program to increase attainability.

As discussed previously in this chapter, the Sea and Air Mariner program will expand by 8,000 per year the number of non-prior service accessions into the Naval Reserve. The program will employ vocational-technical training, an expansion of traditional "A" schools, and non-traditional command sponsored training to enable the Naval Reserve to satisfy its E-3 requirements as well as previously unattainable petty officer requirements for NRF ships, squadrons, SIMAs, and expanded medical units.

2. Enlisted Retention. To analyze retention within the Selected Reserve, it is important to review retention data for those people who have been affiliated with a unit for less than one year separately from that for those who have been affiliated for more than one year. Many Selected Reservists are non-obligors who may cease to participate at any time. The breakdown by length of affiliation allows reserve units to direct special retention efforts toward newer affiliates.

Retention by Percent

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>Goal</u>	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
		<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Less than one year	80	84.7	85	85
More than one year	85	86.8	88	88

3. Incentive Programs. Two bonus programs are presently employed to upgrade enlisted quality in the Selected Reserve:

- Reenlistment Selected Reserve: A bonus of \$900 or \$1,800 for either a three-year or six-year reenlistment of SELRES personnel with fewer than nine years of service.
- Selective Affiliation for Selected Reservists: A bonus directed toward active personnel in the "4X6" program, who entered the Navy under an enlistment agreement requiring a total six-year obligation, the first four years of which are served on active duty. These people are eligible for a bonus if they affiliate in the Selected Reserve at a point between 4 and 5 1/2 years of initial obligated service. The individual payment equals \$25 for each month of remaining obligated service.

4. Officers. Local commands conduct Naval Reserve officer recruiting. In the past accessions have been limited, since the number of Reserve officers available exceeded the number of available SELRES billets. The increase in programmed billets will permit additional recruiting of SELRES officers above the loss rate. Retention data are not available for prior years.

5. Introduction of Frigates. In connection with the FY 1981 Appropriations Act, the Congress directed certain changes to the Naval Reserve Force mission, ship manning, ship maintenance, and ship operation.

The Navy will transfer eight KNOX-Class (FF-1052) and 16 PERRY-Class (FFG-7) frigates to the NRF by the end of FY 1988 as follows:

Reserve Frigate Introduction Schedule

<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Frigates Added 4	2	3	2	4	4	5
Total Number 4	6	9	11	15	19	24

Since the active-duty manning of the ships is to be reduced to approximately 50 percent of the total crew, a portion of the maintenance requirement will be transferred from the ships to co-located Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities-Naval Reserve Maintenance Facilities (SIMA(NRMFs)). Therefore, supporting the NRF frigates' increased demand for organizational level maintenance as well as performing intermediate level maintenance will require an increased SIMA (NRMF) capability. Most of the people recruited for the surface TAR program (which is being expanded to accommodate TAR manning of 50 percent of the active-duty crew billets on each ship) will perform their shore-duty tours at the SIMA(NRMFs).

The Chief of Naval Reserve (CNAVRES) will assume responsibility for overseeing preparation of employment schedules and approving NRF frigate operating schedules. He will also share responsibility for developing the ships' readiness training programs for the combined active/ Selected Reserve crews. CNAVRES also will monitor material and personnel readiness of the ships, as well as their funding. Operating tempo of the NRF ships will be limited to the level necessary to ensure proper crew training, operational reliability, and safety.

This plan assigns the Naval Reserve an increased role in the Navy's wartime antisubmarine warfare mission and provides the NRF with assets to augment wartime convoy escort forces. The plan increases the authority of the Chief of Naval Reserve to ensure that NRF frigates are responsive to reserve readiness training for mobilization. The plan further involves the Naval Reserve to a much greater degree in the role of fleet operations through the expanded use of TAR and Selected Reserve personnel in both the NRF frigates and supporting SIMA(NRMF)s.

6. Modernization of the Naval Air Reserve. In response to the President's direction to provide more capable Reserve components, the Naval Air Reserve is embarking on an ambitious plan to improve its force structure. By pursuing a program of horizontal integration, or the concurrent incorporation of hardware in both Reserve and active components, overall readiness is significantly enhanced. By FY 1984, horizontal integration will be initiated in the case of the E-2C and A-7E communities. In addition, the FY 1984 introduction of the F/A-18 into the Naval Reserve marks the first opportunity to operate a front line aircraft before its fleet-wide employment. A modernized inventory of Reserve aircraft will facilitate better opportunities for training while providing a capable force in being. The net result will be increased operational readiness through a modern Naval Air Reserve Force now and for the future.

D. Civilian

End Strength. The FY 1984 Navy Civilian end strength request is for 312,660, which is 3,262 greater than the FY 1983 level. The increase is in direct readiness-related functions such as supply centers, military sealift ship manning and fleet activities.

Supply staffing increases will result in improved inventory management and more responsive, timely, efficient provision of supplies to the fleet. Military sealift increases provide for additional civilian mariners to man an expanded Military Sealift Command fleet of support ships as well as for essential management and support of this expanded fleet. Fleet operating bases and stations will also receive additional civilians to enhance their ability to maintain a high level of fleet operational readiness. These increases represent a continuation and expansion of the readiness improvements begun in FY 1981 which have resulted in a significant reduction in the backlog of ship overhaul deferrals, improved aircraft maintenance, a more responsive supply system, and an expanded, civilian-manned fleet of military sealift support ships. Other increases include staffing for the supervisors of shipbuilding, ordnance industrial facilities, facilities administration, and construction oversight.

E. Commercial Activities Program

The Navy continues to support strongly the Administration's effort to achieve significant economies and efficiencies throughout the Federal Government. This is especially critical in the Navy, where substantial increases in readiness are required to meet defense commitments. While the magnitude of those increases is such that a sizeable increase in total defense spending is required, the Navy strives constantly to ensure that goods and services are obtained at the least cost to the taxpayer.

Under the Commercial Activities (CA) Program, the Navy is conducting cost studies of functions using OMB Circular A-76 procedures to determine whether those functions are more cost-effective when performed in-house or by contract. Prior to FY 1982, results have been less than expected primarily due to a lack of trained personnel to develop performance work statements and conduct cost studies.

As trained personnel have gained experience, the results have improved significantly. In FY 1982 the Navy completed 252 cost studies involving 5,487 civilians and 396 military positions. These studies resulted in a conversion of 111 functions to contract performance involving 2,060 civilian and 264 military positions with a projected annual cost advantage of \$15.9 million.

In compliance with the FY 1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act, conversion of security guard and firefighter positions has been halted and a six month moratorium on new studies is being observed. The budget request complies fully with the direction of the Armed Services Conference not to reflect anticipated contracting-out end strength savings in advance. All positions previously deleted for FY 1983 and FY 1984 have been restored to the civilian manpower estimates.

Two CA functions evaluated during FY 1982 at Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, are good examples of the Navy's effort. The data entry function was retained in-house, at a savings of \$42,000 annually. Thirty-six civilian personnel are involved in this function. The cold storage function at NSC Norfolk was contracted at an annual savings of \$961,000. This function had previously been performed by 47 civilian personnel.

Cost Comparison Studies
In House or Contract Decisions

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Planned</u>			<u>Number of Activities to be Converted to Contract</u>			<u>End Strength Involved in Activities to be Converted to be Converted Mil Civ Total</u>			<u>Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government</u>	
	<u>Civ.</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>		
FY 82: 252	5,487	396	5,883 ^{1/}	111			264	2,060	2,324	\$15,944,000	

^{1/} Includes 1,158 civilian and 86 military in firefighting and guard services not converted to contract, although cost effective, due to prohibitions in the FY 1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act.

F. Wartime Manpower Requirements versus Supply

Upon mobilization, the Navy's peacetime force (military and civilian) would require substantial augmentation. The following table reflects the Navy mobilization requirements (military and civilian) as determined by the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) and supply for full mobilization through M+180 days.

WARTIME MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
VERSUS SUPPLY
(000s)

FY 84
(M+180)

Total Requirements

Structure, overhead and casualties (military and civilian)	1,257
---	-------

Supply

Peacetime Component

Military (structure and overhead)	586
Civilian	303

Mobilization Increment ^{2/}

Selected Reserves ^{2/}	99
Available Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) ^{2/ 3/}	180
Civilian	70
Reassigned Military	11
Reassigned Civilian	1
	1,161

Shortfall

96

^{1/} Includes indirect hire civilians.

^{2/} Projected strength adjusted for yield.

^{3/} Individual Ready Reserve, retirees, Fleet Reserves and Standby Inactive (S-2) Reserves.

Shortfalls will be filled by new accessions. By FY 1989, this shortfall could be reduced substantially provided all planned programs are approved, fully funded, and totally successful.

1. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) Projections. The following paragraphs discuss the current and projected inventories of the various PIM pools.

(a) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR's steady decline in strength since May 1981 is caused by fewer numbers of people attriting from the active force. Retention of active duty personnel has increased because of substantial pay incentives and the current state of the economy. In order to help recruit and retain IRR personnel, an IRR bonus was authorized for FY 1981, but due to a delay in implementation, only 600 IRR reenlistments were attained. The program was not authorized for FY 1982, but proposed legislation is being considered to reinstate the IRR bonus in FY 1983.

Other proposed legislation is being considered to increase the Military Service Obligation from six to eight years, which could provide a sizeable increase in the IRR by FY 1989.

Actual and projected strengths of the IRR as of the end of FY 1982 are shown below:

	<u>IRR</u> (000s)	
<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
77.3	77.4	85.6

The IRR is projected to experience a modest growth rate after FY 1983 to 102,500 by FY 1988.

(b) Standby Reserve. The Standby Reserve is being managed to place the maximum number of eligible reservists in the Ready Reserve. Continued annual screening is expected to steadily decrease the strength of the Standby Reserve. Actual and projected strengths are shown below:

	<u>Standby Reserve</u> (000s)	
<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
16.6	16.7	16.1

(c) Recalled Retirees. Upon mobilization retired members of the Regular Navy, Naval Reserve and members of the Fleet Reserve will be recalled. Most will be assigned to CONUS shore stations to fill M+1 month through M+6 months mobilization billets and to free active assets for reassignment. Approximately 56,000 retirees are planned for recall in the event of mobilization.

(d) Pretrained Individual Manpower Management System (PIMMS). PIMMS was established to increase the quality of the pretrained personnel data base in order to expedite mobilization assignments. Present plans include an automated billet/personnel matching system which will automatically preassign pretrained individuals to suitable mobilization billets. PIMMS is expected to be fully operational in FY 1984.

2. Civilian Mobilization Manpower Requirements

The Navy bases its plans for mobilization on the assumption that an adequate civilian work force will be available when needed to accomplish the Department of Defense work load.

Upon mobilization, non-theater requirements for civilian manpower increase to reflect the support requirements associated with the mobilization activities of the total military force structure. Accordingly, by M+180 days, the requirement for civilian manpower above authorized peacetime levels will increase by 69,861. The time phased civilian requirements, as determined by the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) are as follows:

M+30	M+60	M+90	M+180	TOTAL
24,480	19,942	21,791	3,648	69,861

Our supply projections to fill these requirements are understated for they do not consider the fact that many civilian employees will be subject to call-up as reservists, retired military, and draftees. To alleviate this problem, Navy obtains data from existing Department of Defense computer systems and combines it with the Navy civilian personnel data system to predict workforce losses due to call-up of reservists and retired military. The first test of this program was conducted as part of the PROUD SABER 83 mobilization exercise. The outcome was successful. It defined not only total losses within the sample civilian workforce, but also a picture of what occupations, and which organizational units, were most severely affected. The PROUD SABER 83 test was restricted to one geographic area; the Navy now plans to expand the process to its entire workforce. Based on the sample data obtained, it appears that the combined effect of the draft, reserve call-up, and retired military recall will have a detrimental impact on the Navy civilian workforce.

Based on all of the above, the Department of the Navy has the capability in peacetime to accurately quantify the workforce changes required to mobilize. The options available for addressing these manpower requirements include interaction with the Department of Labor (i.e., preplacing job orders during peacetime), reassignment of staff from non-critical positions to essential jobs, construction of accelerated training programs, direct emergency recruitment by Navy staff based upon planning developed prior to mobilization, and recall of recently retired staff. The exact extent to which each option will be used is dependent on further analysis of which Navy civilian occupations will be most affected by mobilization. Further analysis will also be required in the areas of competition with private industry for shortage category occupations (e.g., engineering) and quantification of the impact of a draft.

IV. Navy Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC)

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustments in overall Navy strength. The summary tables which follow display Navy active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower by DPPC over the period FY 1982 through FY 1984. Following these tables, each subcategory is discussed separately.

Two factors complicate discussion of the FY 1982 to FY 1983 changes. First is the transfer of TARs to the SELRES starting with FY 1983. Second is the seasonally fluctuating operating strength deviation (undermanning) in the force structure. When it is necessary to ensure a correct representation of manpower changes between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the effects of these factors will be explained in the context of planned force structure increases.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 1/ Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>20.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	17.2	17.9	18.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.5	1.8	1.9
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>255.2</u>	<u>266.4</u>	<u>271.9</u>
Land Forces	3.6	3.6	3.7
Tactical Air Forces	62.9	64.9	66.5
Naval Forces	188.4	197.4	201.2
Mobility Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.7</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>23.8</u>
Intelligence	7.6	8.4	8.5
Centrally Managed Communications	6.1	7.2	7.3
Research and Development	5.1	6.0	6.0
Geophysical Activities	1.9	1.9	1.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>148.7</u>	<u>153.1</u>	<u>156.7</u>
Base Operating Support	67.2	65.5	66.6
Medical Support	10.5	11.3	12.4
Personnel Support	7.5	7.8	7.8
Individual Training	28.2	29.2	30.0
Force Support Training	13.2	15.9	16.1
Central Logistics	6.1	7.0	7.2
Centralized Support Activities	6.2	6.6	6.7
Management Headquarters	8.6	8.7	8.9
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>443.2</u>	<u>462.6</u>	<u>472.6</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>	-	-6.5	-6.6
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>109.8</u>	<u>104.2</u>	<u>106.2</u>
Transients	30.3	25.6	26.6
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdées	7.4	5.3	6.0
Students, Trainees	67.5	68.7	69.1
Cadets	4.5	4.5	4.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>553.0</u>	<u>560.3</u>	<u>572.2</u>

1/ TARS included in FY 1982.

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NAVY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 1/ Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
		<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>60.0</u>	<u>68.1</u>	<u>71.6</u>
Land Forces	1.6	2.0	2.0
Tactical Air Forces	3.1	6.2	6.6
Naval Forces	54.3	58.2	60.8
Mobility Forces	1.0	1.8	2.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.8</u>
Intelligence	3.9	3.9	4.2
Centrally Managed Communications	1.8	1.0	1.1
Research and Development	0.6	0.3	0.3
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>25.8</u>	<u>30.1</u>	<u>35.3</u>
Base Operating Support	10.1	12.3	13.4
Medical Support	3.9	6.8	10.4
Personnel Support	0.8	0.8	0.8
Individual Training	0.1	0.4	0.2
Force Support Training	1.0	0.6	0.6
Central Logistics	5.0	4.6	4.9
Centralized Support Activities	1.5	1.5	1.8
Management Headquarters	3.4	3.0	3.0
Federal Agency Support	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>92.7</u>	<u>104.1</u>	<u>113.1</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	*	0.4	0.7
<u>Active Guard and Reserve (10 U.S.C. 265)</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>5.0</u>
Transients	-	0.2	0.2
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.1	1.0	4.8
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>94.0</u>	<u>105.8</u>	<u>119.0</u>

1/ TARS are counted in the Selected Reserve beginning in FY 1983.

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

NAVY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.5	2.7	2.7
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>6.8</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.3	0.4	0.4
Naval Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5
Mobility Forces	5.8	5.5	5.9
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>33.1</u>	<u>33.8</u>	<u>33.8</u>
Intelligence	1.2	1.4	1.5
Centrally Managed Communications	1.5	1.6	1.6
Research and Development	29.4	29.8	29.7
Geophysical Activities	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>256.5</u>	<u>266.4</u>	<u>269.3</u>
Base Operating Support	75.8	76.6	77.4
Medical Support	3.5	3.8	4.0
Personnel Support	1.3	1.7	1.7
Individual Training	3.2	3.3	3.4
Force Support Training	1.6	1.6	1.7
Central Logistics	155.9	163.6	165.0
Centralized Support Activities	6.3	6.7	6.9
Management Headquarters	8.9	9.1	9.2
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Total	<u>298.9</u>	<u>309.4</u>	<u>312.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the fundamental objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category are associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communication/ADP support are also included.

Due to the deployed status of all ship and squadron units in the Strategic Category, active duty manpower must be utilized to support the planned growth.

Navy Strategic Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.6	19.7	20.2
Reserve Components	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.6	2.8	2.8

Navy Strategic manpower requirements increase from FY 1982 to FY 1983 to crew SSBNs completing overhaul and a new TRIDENT submarine. The FY 1984 increase is for another new TRIDENT and TRIDENT pre-commissioning crews, partially offset by reduced crews of SSBNs entering overhaul.

B. Tactical/Mobility

The Tactical/Mobility manpower requirements are those associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units.

The active duty growth in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the increase in the number of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements. As was discussed previously in this chapter, Selected Reserve forces are also expanding in support of fleet requirements.

1. Land Forces. Navy Land Forces include doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments, and air stations.

	<u>Navy Land Forces</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.6	3.6	3.7
Reserve Components	1.6	2.0	2.0

2. Tactical Air Forces. The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	62.9	64.9	66.5
Reserve Components	3.1	6.2	6.6
<u>Civilian</u>			
	0.3	0.4	0.4

After adjusting for undermanning and a decrease in TAR personnel, no force structure active manning changes are programmed for FY 1983 for Navy Tactical Air Forces. The increase in FY 1984 results from the addition of five additional squadrons and crew requirements for the carrier FORRESTAL which is completing it's Service Life Extension Program.

The difference in Reserve manpower between FY 1982 and FY 1983 was the TAR adjustment and an increase of 300 to improve the manning of aircraft carriers. The increase from FY 1983 to FY 1984 is a result of the Navy's plan to build toward NAMMOS requirements by FY 1987. Increases occur in aircraft carriers, squadrons, and squadron augment units.

3. Naval Forces. This subcategory includes manpower for anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	188.4	197.4	201.2
Reserve Components	54.3	58.2	60.8
<u>Civilian</u>			
	0.5	0.5	0.5

After adjusting for a decrease in TAR personnel and undermanning, active growth of 3,700 is programmed for Naval Forces in FY 1983. This growth supports not only the squadron scheduled to be added in

FY 1983, but also the pre-commissioning crews for additional ships and squadrons to be added in later years. During 1983 manning levels for existing aircraft squadrons were increased to improve fleet manning.

The addition of 20 ships and one support squadron to Naval Forces in FY 1984 plus the requirements for pre-commissioning crews (e.g. 1,500 for the USS IOWA (BB-61)), require additional personnel in FY 1984. Fleet manning levels were also increased for existing ships and squadrons.

The increase in Reserve strength between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is primarily a result of the TAR adjustment. Additionally, the actual FY 1982 strength was slightly below the programmed level.

The Reserve increase during FY 1984 consists of an increase of 800 TARs to phase-in TAR manning of NRF frigates and their supporting Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities and 1,800 drilling Reservists to build toward NAMMOS requirements by FY 1987 and improve the manning of units in this category.

4. Mobility Forces. This subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.4	.4	.4
Reserve Components	1.0	1.8	2.2
<u>Civilian</u>			
	5.8	5.5	5.9

The increase in Reservists is to build toward meeting the NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987 and will improve manning of units in this category.

Civilians in this category are predominately the mariners who operate the Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet of support ships. The increase in FY 1984 is a direct result of an increase in the number of MSC ships scheduled for operation during the year.

C. Auxiliary Activities

The Auxiliary Activities category includes manpower associated with Department of the Navy programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence. This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense (the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), including intelligence communications).

Navy Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.6	8.4	8.5
Reserve Components	3.9	3.9	4.2
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.4	1.5

The increase in Reservists is toward meeting NAMMOS requirements.

2. Centrally Managed Communications. This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communications System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications systems, communications security, and other related communications units.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.1	7.2	7.3
Reserve Components	1.8	1.0	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.6

After adjusting for undermanning, programmed active growth between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is about 130. This growth is due to increased needs at existing communication activities. Fifty of these people are needed to support expanded operations at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

3. Research and Development. The Navy's R&D community comprises headquarters, laboratories, RDT&E project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. The bulk of manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active Reserve Components	5.1 0.6	6.0 0.3	6.0 0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	29.4	29.8	29.7

4. Geophysical Activities. The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active Reserve Components	1.9 0.2	1.9 0.2	1.9 0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.0	1.0

D. Support Activities

The Support Activities category includes strength associated with base operating support for combat and support installations. Also included are medical and personnel support; individual and force-support training; logistics, management headquarters, and federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Active manpower growth for Support Activities is critical to ensure adequate full-time support ashore for the growing fleet. Reserve manpower is utilized when possible and, in fact, the Selected Reserve growth in this category is greater than the active growth, especially for Medical Support Manpower.

1. Base Operating Support (BOS). Manpower in the BOS subcategory provides operation and maintenance of installations for both combat and support forces. Base Operating Support for combat forces covers strategic, tactical, and airlift and sealift commands, including base communications and air traffic control. Support forces BOS includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Navy Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	67.2	65.5	66.6
Reserve Components	10.1	12.3	13.4
<u>Civilian</u>	75.8	76.6	77.4

After adjusting for a decrease in TAR personnel and undermanning, a force structure active increase of 1,500 was programmed for FY 1983. The majority of this increase is for increased medical manning and additional manpower for aircraft maintenance. The FY 1984 increases also consist of medical and aircraft maintenance manning increases, offset somewhat by a decrease in active manpower support for Reserve base operations and training due to an increased reliance on TAR personnel. A discussion of overall Navy medical growth follows in the next section, Medical Support.

The FY 1982 Reserve requirement was exceeded by approximately 3,300. The apparent increase of 2,200 between between FY 1982 and FY 1983 is a result of overmanning. The true increase is 5,900 TAR personnel. The number of drilling reservists in the Base Operating Support area is being reduced. The increase from FY 1983 to FY 1984 is a result of a continued phase-in of TAR manning in operations and training at Reserve bases.

Civilian increases in FY 1984 provide additional support for: family service centers; child care facilities; TRIDENT submarine base facilities; upgraded physical security; improved inventory accountability; increased facility administration; and construction oversight.

2. Medical Support. Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities.

Navy Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.5	11.3	12.4
Reserve Components	3.9	6.8	10.4
<u>Civilian</u>	3.5	3.8	4.0

The Medical Support growth in both FY 1983 and FY 1984 as well as the previously discussed Base Operating Support Medical growth correct long standing shortfalls in the capability to provide casualty care in support of Navy and Marine Corps operational forces. A result of increasing contingency capabilities is to increase the overall quality of Navy health care.

The increase in Reservists from FY 1982 through FY 1984 builds to meet NAMMOS requirements by FY 1987 and will improve manning of the units in this category.

The civilian increases in FY 1984 are primarily related to the first of a three-year expansion of the Navy Occupational Health Program to increase hazard identification, medical surveillance, and the recording of personnel exposure data.

3. Personnel Support. This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Navy Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.5	7.8	7.8
Reserve Components	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.7	1.7

4. Individual Training. This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	28.2	29.2	30.0
Reserve Components	1.0	0.4	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.2	3.3	3.4

The increase of active manpower provides additional training staff for more students and recruits in training. Additional staff is also provided for new ROTC units.

The decrease in Reservists reflects increased use of active duty people as instructors in the flight training program.

5. Force Support Training. Force Support Training manpower supports units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.2	15.9	16.1
Reserve Components	1.0	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.6	1.7

The manpower increases in active Force Support Training reflect increased squadron manning, introduction of the thirteenth air wing, and manpower growth associated with introduction of F/A-18 aircraft and SH-60B helicopters.

6. Central Logistics. Manpower in this subcategory is associated with supply, maintenance, operations and logistic support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

Navy Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.1	7.0	7.2
Reserve Components	5.0	4.6	4.9
<u>Civilian</u>	155.9	163.6	165.0

The increase in active manpower are additional officers to administer the Military Construction Program and projects for shore facility repair and maintenance and additional people at logistic support activities.

The increase in Reservists is to fill requirements identified by NAMMOS.

The FY 1983 civilian end strength increases are a reflection of the levels approved during the Congressional review of the FY 1983 budget. Civilian changes for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are discussed separately by the type of operation on the following pages. The following table summarizes Navy manpower by type of logistic operation during the period FY 1982 through FY 1984.

Central Logistics Manpower by Type of Operation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military			
Active			
Supply Operations	1.6	2.0	2.0
Maintenance Operations	3.5	3.6	3.6
Logistic Support Operations	1.0	1.4	1.5
Total	<u>6.1</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.2</u>
Selected Reserve			
Supply Operations	1.9	1.7	1.8
Maintenance Operations	2.1	2.4	2.5
Logistic Support Operations	1.0	0.5	0.6
Total	<u>5.0</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.9</u>
Civilian			
Supply Operations	21.7	23.1	24.3
Maintenance Operations	119.9	125.8	125.6
Logistic Support Operations	14.3	14.7	15.1
Total	<u>155.9</u>	<u>163.6</u>	<u>165.0</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a. Supply Operations. Included are Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points and procurement operations activities (SUPSHIPS) that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition. The civilian increases for FY 1983 and FY 1984 provide for continuation of a major Navy initiative to identify and correct increasingly high inventory adjustments at the Naval Supply Centers. This initiative will result in more responsive, timely, and efficient logistics support for the fleet. Additional increases are also budgeted for SUPSHIPS to improve oversight and support of private shipyard workload.

b. Maintenance Operations

Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARFs). The air rework facilities perform depot-level maintenance of aircraft and components, manufacture critical nonavailable parts, and provide technical assistance to intermediate maintenance organizations. The NARF civilian manning levels provide the necessary workforce to execute the funded aircraft maintenance rework program.

Naval Shipyards. The Naval shipyards provide logistic support for assigned ships and service craft, including work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting ships and craft. Shipyards also provide for manufacturing research, development, and test work. The majority of the FY 1983 civilian increase in the maintenance operations category is the Naval Shipyards which grow from 71,700 to 76,700 and reflect the approved, funded work-load scheduled for accomplishment during FY 1983.

Ordnance Activities. Ordnance activities receive, renovate, maintain, store, and issue ammunition, explosives, expendable ordnance items, weapons, and ordnance material. These activities provide technical, engineering and logistics support for combat systems, components, and support systems and equipment, as well as proofing, testing, and evaluating underwater weapons. They manage underwater acoustic ranges and range equipment and provide engineering support for weapon system acquisition.

Maintenance Support Activities. The maintenance support activities plan, design, test, and deliver combat direction system computer programs for the operating forces. These activities also support fleet computer program development and maintenance and provide technical assistance to the shore establishment.

c. Logistics Support Operations. Logistics support comprises a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service and technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, Facilities, and Electronics Systems Commands. Civilian increases in this category are primarily related to support for increased oversight of contracted commercial functions and military construction contract execution requirements.

7. Centralized Support Activities. This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, Reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Active</u>	6.2	6.6	6.7
<u>Reserve Components</u>	1.5	1.5	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	6.3	6.7	6.9

The increase in Reservists is to meet requirements identified by NAMMOS.

FY 1984 civilian increases support upgrading and improvements in foreign counter intelligence special operations, military/civilian pay systems, financial and personnel management, and accounting systems.

8. Management Headquarters. This subcategory includes management headquarters manpower required to support Defense Agencies; international military organizations; and unified, combat, and service commands.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.6	8.7	8.9
Reserve Components	3.4	3.0	3.0
<u>Civilian</u>	8.9	9.1	9.2

The increase of active manpower results from increased NATO and JCS requirements in international and unified commands (40) and increased requirements for service support - combat commands (80) and service support - support commands (110).

9. Federal Agency Support. The Federal Agency Support subcategory includes Navy manpower assigned to other federal departments and agencies. Normally, such cross assignment is made on a reimbursable basis.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	1.0	1.0
Reserve Components	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50.

E. Operating Strength Deviation (Undermanning). Undermanning accounts for the personnel not available for assignment to force-structure units as a result of seasonal fluctuations in the transient and trainee account. Undermanning at the end of the year relates closely to the size of the Individuals account and is directly dependent upon the scheduling of PCS moves and accessions.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Active Military	N.A.	-6.5	-6.6

F. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Ready Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the active force upon mobilization or shortly thereafter. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force and will train in that billet during peacetime.

Approximately 56 percent of the IMAs will be in Training/Pay Category "D", which means they will not receive drill pay but will be paid for 12 days annual Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA). The remaining 44 percent of IMAs will be in training/pay category "A" and will receive both drill and ACDUTRA pay.

The majority of the IMA positions will be in the Medical/Dental programs. Those requirements are programmed as follows:

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Category A</u> ^{1/}			
Officer	-	200	-
Medical Officer	-	50	60
Medical Enlisted	-	450	740
<u>Subtotal:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>700</u>	<u>800</u>
<u>Category D</u>			
Officer	0	150	350
Medical Officer	-	30	60
Medical Enlisted	-	170	240
<u>Subtotal:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>350</u>	<u>650</u>
Total IMAs:	0	1,050	1,450

^{1/} Allocated among appropriate DPPC categories in the summary table.

The increase in IMAs reflects NAMMOS requirements.

G. Individuals

Active-duty manning is characterized by seasonal variations. Personnel are continuously entering and departing the Navy and still others are not attached to force structure units for reasons such as travel, illness, instruction, holding status awaiting separation, or correctional custody. To offset manpower time not available for assignment to units due to such factors and thus maintain authorized average strength in the force structure throughout the course of the fiscal year,

the Navy maintains the Individuals account. The account comprises people in transient, patient, prisoner, holdee, trainee, student, or Naval Academy midshipmen status. In one sense, the Individuals account may be considered a necessary "cost of doing business." Failure to allow adequate end strength for the account causes undermanning in force structure units.

The Individuals account is sized according to several factors. The number of students is related to overall end strength and the implicit training requirements (discussed in detail in the Military Manpower Training Report). The major portion of the transient strength requirement is projected by multiplying the average time to execute a move by the total number of moves scheduled in each year's Permanent Change of Station move program. Requirements for patients, prisoners, and personnel awaiting separation are derived from actual monthly data from the previous year and projected total end strength.

1. Transients

Navy Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	30.3	25.6	26.6
Reserve Components	-	0.2	0.2

The decrease in FY 1983 reflects the Navy's commitment to reduce the transient account in accordance with Congressional direction. The FY 1984 increase results from increased force levels and does not result from any growth in the factors used to estimate the account.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdées

Navy Patients/Prisoners/Holdées Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.4	5.3	6.0

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

More people than expected were imprisoned in FY 1982 because a more stringent drug screening program and stricter enforcement of standards of conduct were implemented. FY 1984 estimates have been increased over those for FY 1983 as a result of the FY 1982 experience.

3. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen

Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans.

Navy Trainee/Student/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Active</u>			
Trainees/Students	67.5	68.7	69.1
Midshipmen	4.5	4.5	4.5
Total	70.0	73.2	73.6
<u>Reserve Component</u>			
Trainees/Students	1.1	1.0	4.8

The increase of both active and Reserve student/trainee manpower reflects substantial growth in recruit and initial skill training due to increases in new accessions. Accession plans increase from 94,800 in FY 1982 to 97,200 in FY 1983 and 104,100 in FY 1984. The Sea and Air Mariner program requires additional accession training and skill training via traditional "A" schools, approved civilian vocational-technical training and command-sponsored training for about 3,800 reservists.

CHAPTER V
MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Marine Corps active and reserve military and civilian manpower program, presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1984 and FY 1985, depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from year to year.

The Marine Corps is unique among the four services because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of "...not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein... organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet..." Further, the Act states that the Marine Corps "...shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform other such duties as the President may direct." In addition, the Marine Corps furnishes guards for U.S. embassies as a result of a memorandum of agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability and that is well suited to meet assigned USCENTCOM missions.

To support its missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains a Fleet Marine Force posture as follows: one Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) composed of a command element, a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing and a force service support group located on the East Coast of the United States; one MAF forward deployed in the Pacific area; and a third MAF stationed on the West Coast of the United States.

The Marine Corps Reserve provides the initial and primary source of trained units and individuals for augmentation and reinforcement of the active forces when additional capability beyond that available in the regular component is required. The Marine Corps Reserve is structured as a Division/Wing Team that includes a force service support group. The unit structures and equipment types found in the Marine Corps Reserve complement those found in the active component, thus enhancing the Marine Corps Reserve's augmentation and reinforcement capabilities.

Although the National Defense Act of 1947 specifies that the Marine Corps will have a minimum of three wings and divisions with supporting units, it does not specify the size, composition, or manning of these units. These factors, as well as the nature, size, and composition of the supporting establishment, are matters of Marine Corps determination. As has been true since the Vietnam era, the manpower levels requested in FY 1984 and FY 1985 are less than required to support all contingency plans fully. The Marine Corps request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1984 and FY 1985 is as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Active Military	197.3	199.0
Marine Corps Reserve	43.4	44.2
Civilian Personnel	21.6	21.7

Historically, except during wartime or mobilization, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements. Inappropriateness in peacetime of some functions (such as graves registration), availability of personnel, and fiscal constraints all militate against fully manning the structure. The force structure is selectively manned to maximize combat capability while maintaining the minimum necessary acceptable support to the combat forces. Economy in management of base resources is facilitated by Fleet Marine Force augmentation personnel who fulfill a significant portion of the base operating support workload requirements. Additionally, on-the-job and field skill training programs which currently provide approximately 17 percent of Marine Corps' initial skill training reduce Individual Training manpower requirements. The number of Marines receiving formal school training, the preferred method, is continuing to increase.

The extent to which the active forces are selectively manned can be shown by the total number of people that would be required to fully man the force structure represented in the Unit Identity and Status Reporting System (UNITREP). The Joint Chiefs of Staff use this system to report the readiness of authorized forces. To man Marine Corps units and tables of organization fully in FY 1983 would require a strength of about 211,000, considerably more than the 194,600 currently authorized.

While most Fleet Marine Force units are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements during peacetime, selected units are reduced to zero manning. Unmanned units are not eliminated from the structure, however, because they will be activated and manned by reassigned active duty people or mobilized Individual Reservists in time of emergency.

B. Major Force Structure Changes

From FY 1983 to FY 1989 the Marine Corps will make several significant changes to its structure that will increase tactical mobility and firepower to meet the potential threat and requirements involved with USCENTCOM missions. In the area of ground combat and combat support, the artillery regiments in each division will reorganize to increase artillery pieces, both towed and self-propelled. TOW anti-tank guided missile platoons will join the infantry regiments and three new light armored assault battalions will form. In FY 1984 the structure changes planned include adding two TOW platoons, reorganizing one direct support artillery regiment, restructuring eleven infantry battalions, establishing the remaining units of the first light armored vehicle battalion, adding one 155mm(sp) battery and one 155mm (towed) general support battalion and establishing permanent structure for two Marine amphibious unit (MAU) headquarters. Several previously unmanned FSSG units are being manned. Aviation growth is concentrated in ongoing activation and equipping of Forward Area Air Defense and HAWK anti-aircraft missile units that are necessary to insure Fleet Marine Forces are provided a minimally acceptable level of air defense.

The Marine Corps Manning Plan is given in the following tables:

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PLAN

	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 83-88
Strategic *	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Tactical/Mobility	116.3	118.5	120.3	122.8	125.1	125.7	+9.4
Auxiliary Activities	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	+0.1
Support Activities	43.4	44.1	44.0	43.8	43.9	43.9	+0.5
Undermanning	-2.0	+0.7	-0.3	+0.2	-0.1	-0.6	-
Individuals	35.2	32.2	33.2	32.5	32.5	32.5	-
TOTALS	194.6	197.3	199.0	201.1	203.3	203.3	+8.7

* Fewer than 50 spaces

MARINE CORPS RESERVE MANPOWER PLAN

	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 83-88
Strategic *	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Tactical/Mobility	36.4	37.1	37.4	37.7	37.9	38.4	+1.8
Support Activities	.7	.8	.9	1.1	1.3	1.4	+ .7
Individuals	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	-
IMA'S	.9	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	+ .6
TOTALS	42.6	43.4	44.2	44.7	45.0	45.6	+3.0

* Fewer than 50 spaces

The three Marine divisions, wings and Force Service Support Groups (FSSG) which make up the active Fleet Marine Forces, are either forward deployed (Okinawa/Japan) or provide forward deployed units (unit deployment battalions/ squadrons to Okinawa/Japan or Marine

Amphibious Units (MAU) to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific). Air alert and other peacetime contingency commitments require additional elements of the Fleet Marine Force to be operationally ready at little or no notice. Increased manning of the existing units on contingency deployments plus manning associated with the introduction of the new equipment and enhancement of supporting forces occur throughout the Five Year Program. Accordingly, these units provide capabilities which cannot be realized in the Reserve Component because of the day-to-day commitment. On the other hand, the Marine Corps does transfer active component units to the Reserve when feasible and consistent with mission accomplishment. For example, the Marine Corps plans to transfer the following active component units to the reserves during FY1984.

One Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
Two Longshoreman Platoons
Two Salvage Platoons
Two Bridge Platoons
One Marginal Terrain Vehicle Company

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management System

The first step in developing manpower requirements is to determine the general forces needed to accomplish Marine Corps roles and missions in the national military strategy. A "planning force" is then constructed within the Joint Strategic Planning System in terms of MAFs. The planning force is the force level necessary to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The UNITREP readiness requirement is derived from the force structure requirements necessary for the accomplishment of the wartime mission. The requested authorized strength represents Marine Corps decisions, in light of fiscal and manpower constraints and readiness requirements.

The infantry battalion structure and the number of such battalions, together with mission requirements, form the basis for determining the type and quantity of other combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to form the Marine division. The objective is to form a ground combat element consisting of infantry, light armored vehicle, tank, assault amphibian vehicle, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and command and control units, and to integrate this force with aviation and combat service support elements to produce Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) for amphibious or other combined arms operations.

Design of the infantry battalion begins with analysis of the capabilities that are essential to accomplish the missions and functions of the Marine Corps. The analysis involves research on new weapons technology, equipment experiments, war games using manual and computer simulation techniques, field tests, and military judgment.

Manpower needs for Marine aviation units derive from the support the ground combat forces require. Computer simulated war games, historical data, and military judgment are used to estimate the number of sorties required daily to support an infantry battalion in combat. Each aircraft type has a specific sortie capability that, when divided into the sortie requirement, determines the number of each type of aircraft required. The crew ratio (crews per aircraft in wartime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors dictate the manpower required to fly and maintain each aircraft. Consideration of the necessary span of control, the geographic distribution of supported forces, and the available assets establish the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. The number of aircraft per squadron provides the basis for determining the additional command and control and support manpower required in each squadron. Squadrons are then task organized into Marine aircraft groups and wings according to specific mission requirements.

The Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) of the Fleet Marine Force are composed of specialized units, such as supply, maintenance, engineer, motor transport, landing support, dental, and medical battalions, which are essential to the combat service support of the MAF. When the size of the forces and the density of equipment of the task organized MAGTF have been established, the combat service support required is determined using criteria that incorporate maintenance, service, and supply concepts.

Determination of the manpower requirement for support activities is more complex because of the great variety of activities performed, the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist, and the interdependence of the military, civilian, and contractor portions of the work force. Specific details of the total force manpower requirements for support activities are contained in the discussion of the appropriate DPPC in Section IV of this chapter.

Total force manpower requirements of all organizations are critically examined on a regular cycle. Structure and manning reviews are conducted at both the Headquarters Marine Corps and field levels, and are verified by Headquarters Marine Corps on-site survey teams. This procedure assures that the structure and related manpower requirements support the national strategy and that the constrained manpower levels permit the Marine Corps to meet its assigned missions at an identified level of risk. Marine Corps active force increases between FY 1983 and FY 1984 reflect improved manning of the total structure. This is necessary to improve readiness, meet operational commitments, and to support assigned missions as they relate to deployable forces. Accordingly, the reserve forces can not perform these necessary functions because of the daily requirements involved.

The peacetime Marine Corps active component (AC) consists of operating deployable forces and other units in support of these operating forces. Selective programming actions are required to equitably distribute affordable assets between the operating forces and the support establishment. This occurs because the AC is fiscally constrained, which does not

permit full manning or equipping of its forces during peacetime. The Marine Corps Reserve Component is maintained to provide wartime support upon mobilization to the fiscally constrained, active operating forces. In implementing this total force concept, employment roles for the active Selected Marine Corps Reserve, upon mobilization or Presidential callup, are as follows:

Provide trained units to selectively augment and reinforce the Active forces in order to field three MAF's at full wartime structure.

Provide a MAB or, if augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, a fourth DWT.

Provide a nucleus for reconstitution of a Fourth Division, Wing, and FSSG.

B. Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives with those designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. These improvements include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets and the unit deployment program.

Expansion of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific by the Marine Corps improves tour stability and promotes unit integrity. Many one year unaccompanied tours are being converted to three year accompanied tours. During FY 1982, the Marine Corps changed ninety-five billets to accompanied tours and plans to change an additional 200 billets per year in FY 1983 and FY 1984. A total of over 5,800 billets will be converted to accompanied tours by 1992. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station moves will be reduced as a result of this action.

The Marine Corps unit deployment program, designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence, permits Marines assigned to tactical aviation squadrons and infantry battalions to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours. Additionally, Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, deploys units for a period of approximately six months to the Mediterranean.

To support the unit deployment program, the Marine Corps is developing a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term manpower resources among all units in the active structure and particularly in the Fleet Marine Force. Inventory projection and tour optimization models implemented in FY 1982 provide improved readiness through a procedure that reconciles first-term requirements with first-term assets in a manner consistent with approved manning policies.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management.

III. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General. The Marine Corps requested an FY 1983 end strength of 194,600. During FY 1982, economic factors and the cumulative effects of continued improved recruitment and retention resulted in higher end strength. In light of this favorable accession and retention climate, the FY 1984 request is 197,300. This increase in end strength supports continued improved manning of Fleet Marine Force units.

2. Enlisted. The Marine Corps' FY 1982 enlisted end strength was 173,405, 99.9 percent of the programmed level of 173,426. Enlisted recruiting and retention plans are shown in the following table.

Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 1982</u>		<u>FY 1983</u>	
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>(Current Year)</u>	<u>(Budget Year)</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	2,700	3,564	3,232	3,200
Non-Prior Service	37,858	38,057	40,500	41,600
Male	35,658	35,745	38,500	39,800
(HSDG)	(26,744)	(30,041)	(28,875)	(29,850)
Female	2,200	2,312	2,000	1,800
(HSDG)	(2,200)	(2,312)	(2,000)	(1,800)
<u>Retention</u>				
First Term	7,247	6,963	9,180	9,180
Career	8,753	8,088	7,320	7,320

The Marine Corps achieved 102.6 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals. The Marine Corps recruited 10,789 three-year, 27,036 four-year, and 232 six-year enlistees. Future enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 70 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1982 85 percent of non-prior service enlistees were high school diploma graduates. High school diploma graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, trainability, and amenability to

discipline. The Marine Corps remains committed to a goal of 75 percent male high school graduate non-prior service accessions. The goal for female non-prior service accessions is 100 percent high school graduates.

An aggressive career planning effort coupled with current economic factors has significantly improved retention. Additionally, the expanded reenlistment bonus program spurred retention and has been effective in reducing critical skill shortages. Continued favorable retention trends are reflected in the higher FY 1983 and 1984 retention plan numbers. Because reenlistment bonuses are now targeted at specific occupational specialties, the reenlistment bonus program will even more effectively address critical shortages.

3. Officer. Active officer procurement objectives are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Plan	1,905	1,975	1,844
Actual	1,922	-	-

Officer strength as a result of these procurement plans increases to 19,470 in FY 1983 and 19,757 in FY 1984. This increased strength will permit the Marine Corps to provide the necessary leadership for combat forces and training programs, while continuing to retain the most promising officers, maintain a normal promotion flow, and support the requirement for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Overall officer retention and pilot retention, in particular, have improved. The improvement in pilot retention can be attributed to increased compensation, which includes the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay, and various management initiatives maximizing the amount of time junior pilots spend in flying duties.

4. Women in the Marine Corps. Women Marines are assigned to billets commensurate with their capabilities to the maximum extent practicable. Such use is based on both the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the necessity to provide women with rewarding careers. The Marine Corps does not classify women in combatant Military Occupational Specialties and restricts the numbers of women who may be assigned to deployable combat units. Current policy is that enlisted women Marines will not exceed 10 percent of the authorized strength of an FMF unit where they may be assigned. In such FMF units, women may be assigned in numbers not to exceed 10% of the unit's authorized strength in any MOS by grade group cell. Women are not assigned to infantry regiments or artillery and other combat support battalions. The Marine Corps continues this classification and assignment policy based upon the intent of 10 U.S.C. 6015 (which prohibits the assignment of women to ships or aircraft assigned combat missions).

	<u>Female Marine Strength</u> Total (Enlisted/Officer)		
	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Active	8,435 (7875/560)	8,712 (8144/568)	8,835 (8260/575)
Reserve Component	1,118 (1060/58)	1,059 (1040/55)	1,028 (967/61)

Enlisted Women in
Traditional/Nontraditional DOD Occupational Groups

	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982
Infantry/Gun Crew	27*	2*	0	0
Electronic Equipment Repair	139	207	243	304
**Communication/Intelligence	408	518	578	733
Other Technical	145	136	141	183
**Support & Admin	2,238	2,510	2,958	3,511
Mechanic Equipment Repair	354	392	421	482
Craftsmen	143	170	179	177
**Service Supply	624	719	925	1,055

Remainder are in individuals category.

* Combat Engineer Billets which were later excluded because of a lack of career progression.

** Considered traditional fields by USMC

More women are serving in all fields in which they may be effectively used. Increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 woman Marine strength reflect a continued effort to realize the intent of DoD equal opportunity programs, which are concerned, in part, with expanding the number of women in the military consistent with unique service mission requirements. Increases also reflect improving retention and successful recruiting of women Marines.

B. Marine Corps Reserve

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The active Marine Corps Reserve is divided into two categories: Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve. The primary source of units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

The SMCR units form a Division Wing Team (DWT) with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Also included within the SMCR are individuals who are not members of the Division, Wing or FSSG but are preassigned to mobilization billets which must be filled on or shortly after M-Day. The IRR consists of individuals who have some period of obligated service remaining on their contracts and individuals who have completed their military service agreements and elected to remain in the IRR. The IRR provides qualified individuals to fill shortfalls in active operating forces and reserve units and provide for expansion of the supporting base as necessary to meet wartime contingency requirements.

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the reserve component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment active and reserve forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

SMCR unit wartime requirements call for 42,975 personnel. The wartime requirements provide personnel to man fully the fourth DWT and ancillary mobilization manpower requirements. Without considering active force mobilization requirements, the SMCR wartime requirements will be met by 35,693 Selected Reservists (excludes reservists at initial training), 4,584 active duty support personnel, and 2,698 Individual Ready Reservists. The end FY 1982 IRR strength was 46,672. IRR strength is projected to increase to approximately 52,032 by the end of FY 1984. The strength of the Standby Reserve will be approximately 1,500 at the end of FY 1984.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY 1984 is 40,300. This strength supports the force structure contained in the UNITREP and ancillary personnel support requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

Recruiting goals and attainment for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Non-Prior Service)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Plan	7,952	7,952	7,952
Actual	8,916	-	-

For FY 1982, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve attained 105 percent of the planned end strength of 38,540. Continuing improvements in the gain-to-loss ratio during FY 1982 and 964 non-prior service accessions above goal enabled the SMCR to end FY 1982 with a total paid strength of 40,461.

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Prior Service)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Plan	5,848	5,848	5,848
Actual	4,783	-	-

For FY 1982, the SMCR attained 82 percent of the prior service enlistment goal. This marked the fifth consecutive year that the goal was not attained. The downward trend must change if the SMCR is to maintain the prior/non-prior service ratio needed to have the expertise, maturity, and grade manning required by the structure. By mid FY 1983, a full-time support reserve prior service recruiting force will be fully established with the primary mission to reverse this unacceptable trend.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are the same as for the active force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of three years or more.

C. Civilian Manpower

The Marine Corps employs civilians to meet the manpower requirements of support activities to the maximum practicable extent consistent with the need to use military people by reason of law, security, discipline, rotation, and operational readiness. The civilian work force is closely integrated with military manpower to accomplish workload requirements. Accordingly, reducing civilian strength without concomitantly reducing workload would require an offsetting increase in military manpower or contractual services.

The civilian strength of 21,618 requested by the Marine Corps for FY 1984 is constrained by funding availability; therefore, it does not represent total requirements. Marine Corps requirements for FY 1984 total 23,357 or 1,739 civilians more than that requested. The additional 1,739 civilians are required for readiness and sustainability of the FMF (64%), quality of life (35%) and safety (1%).

D. Commercial Activities (CA) Program - Marine Corps

Cost Comparison Studies Completed FY 82

Number of Studies Completed	End Strength Involved in Studies Completed			Number of Activities Converted to Contract	End Strength Involved in Ac- tivities Converted	Projected Annual Cost Advantage to Government	
	Civ.	Mil.	Total				Civ.
5	135	0	135	2	17	0	\$169,437.00

The limited effort during FY 1982 is mainly a function of the continued lack of personnel resources at the field activity level to conduct studies.

IV. Marine Corps Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display, by DPPC, the actual Marine Corps manpower distribution for FY 1982 and manpower requirements for FY 1983 and FY 1984.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	*	*	*
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>113.1</u>	<u>116.3</u>	<u>118.5</u>
Land Forces	84.4	88.1	90.3
Tactical Air Forces	28.1	27.6	27.6
Naval Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
Intelligence	0.8	0.8	0.8
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*
Research and Development Activities	0.7	0.8	0.9
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>45.5</u>	<u>43.4</u>	<u>44.1</u>
Base Operating Support	22.0	20.5	20.7
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	4.7	4.7	4.7
Individual Training	9.0	8.6	8.8
Force Support Training	3.0	3.0	3.3
Central Logistics	0.7	0.8	0.8
Centralized Support Activities	2.6	2.4	2.4
Management Headquarters	2.3	2.3	2.3
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.3	1.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>160.1</u>	<u>161.4</u>	<u>164.3</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>	-	-2.0	+0.7
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>32.2</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>32.2</u>
Transients	7.0	7.9	7.8
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.6	0.6	0.6
Students, Trainees	24.9	26.6	23.8
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>192.4</u>	<u>194.6</u>	<u>197.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>36.1</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>37.1</u>
Land Forces	30.4	30.7	31.2
Tactical Air Forces	5.7	5.7	5.8
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Base Operating Support	-	-	-
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	-	-	-
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	0.5	0.7	0.8
Management Headquarters	-	-	-
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>36.6</u>	<u>37.3</u>	<u>38.4</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	3.5	4.3	4.3
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u> ^{1/}	<u>40.0</u>	<u>41.7</u>	<u>42.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to due to rounding.

^{1/} Does not include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) shown in following table.

MARINE CORPS INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES (IMA)
END STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	0.2	0.3	0.3
Land Forces	0.1	0.2	0.2
Tactical Air Forces	-	*	*
Naval Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	0.2	0.2
Intelligence	*	0.2	0.2
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	0.3	0.5	0.6
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	-	-	-
Management Headquarters	*	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Total	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>1.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to due to rounding.

* Less than 50.

MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1983 FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1984 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	-	-	-
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development Activities	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>21.3</u>	<u>21.6</u>
Base Operating Support	15.0	15.8	15.7
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2
Force Support Training	*	*	*
Central Logistics	2.8	2.9	3.0
Centralized Support Activities	1.4	1.5	1.6
Management Headquarters	0.6	0.7	0.7
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
Total	<u>20.2</u>	<u>21.3</u>	<u>21.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to due to rounding.

* Less than 50.

A. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Marine Corps Tactical/Mobility Forces include Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. About 116,500 Marines (59 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1984. Tactical/Mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military people are included in these units.

With the exception of reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces. Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting Force Service Support Groups. Additionally, this category includes helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays Land Forces for FY 1982 to FY 1984.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Military			
Active	84.4	88.1	90.3
Reserve Components	30.4	30.7	31.2

Actual active force strength in FY 1982 largely reflects the temporary undermanning on 30 September 1982 associated with the seasonal fluctuation of recruiting input. The strengths in FY 1983 and FY 1984 provide for the addition of force structure, primarily for air defense, artillery, and the light armored vehicle units.

Manpower is being added to existing air defense forces to provide a minimally acceptable level of air defense for active force units. Therefore, these additions cannot be placed in the Reserve Component because of the active support commitment.

The artillery increases support reorganization of existing active units which are transitioning to the M-198 howitzer and adding self-propelled artillery in order to bring all regiments up to the same level of capability by the end of the program period. Therefore, this evolution does not involve Reserve forces and cannot be completed by adding personnel to the Reserve Component.

A light armored vehicle unit will be added in FY 1984. The Reserves cannot satisfy this requirement because it is an active force commitment requiring continuous full time manning.

TOW missile platoons will be added to each infantry regiment in order to provide necessary anti-tank capability to the active operational forces and to improve their readiness posture. This is an on-

going process started in 1983 which adds two more platoons in FY 1984. Reserve forces cannot be used to fulfil the requirement because this supports an active force commitment on a daily basis.

Reserve increases in FY 1982, FY 1983, and FY 1984 reflect realignment of the Reserve helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Tactical Air Forces category in order to parallel the active forces. Additionally, Reserve Component numbers reflect strength improvements resulting from exceeding the FY 1981 non-prior service recruiting goals and continued improvements in the gain-to-loss ratio. Increases also reflect programmed growth necessary to meet wartime requirements and to support mobilization. These increases are primarily associated with manning reserve Force Service Support Group units previously in cadre status.

2. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical Air Forces manpower includes air crews and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with reserve component support, Marine security detachments in aircraft carriers, and various command, control, and support functions.

The Tactical Air Forces manpower requirement is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	28.1	27.6	27.6
Reserve Components	5.7	5.7	5.8

Active force decreases reflect decreased manning of support squadrons and reduced manpower requirements in the fighter/attack communities. The reserve manpower program will support nine fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance, and expeditionary support.

Decreases in Reserve Tactical Air Forces reflect realignment of the reserve helicopter, observation, and air defense units to the Land Forces category in order to parallel the active forces. The slight increase in FY 1984 reflects manning for increases in aerial refueling aircraft.

3. Naval Forces. The Marine Corps request for Naval Forces includes people assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in Tactical Air Forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 82 (Actual)</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

B. Auxiliary Activities

The Marine Corps program for the Auxiliary Activities category totals approximately 1,700 active military people, most of whom are in either Intelligence or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Activities category.

1. Intelligence. The manpower in the Intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The manpower program also provides for a small number of people (less than 50) who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 82 (Actual)</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8

The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Marine general intelligence specialists assigned to DIA also gain valuable training and experience while supporting the national intelligence effort. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Research and Development. Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 82 (Actual)</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active	0.7	0.8	0.9

Most of the Marines who perform this function are assigned to the Development Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command located at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, is a tenant activity at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts include the development of the organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force in amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other services to avoid duplication. Marines assigned to research and development activities conduct studies that identify required operational capabilities, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to developmental activities of the other services.

3. Other Auxiliary Forces. In FY 1984, fewer than 50 Marines will be in the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category support the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communications Agency. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

C. Support Activities

1. Base Operating Support. The following table displays the total manpower request for this category and provides detail regarding the sub-categories of Combat Installations and Support Installations.

Marine Corps Base Operating Support (End Strength in Thousands)			
	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
	Total of Sub-Categories		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	22.0	20.5	20.7
Civilian	15.0	15.8	15.7
<u>Combat Installations</u>			
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.6	15.7	15.8
Civilian	10.7	11.2	11.1

Support Installations

Military

Active	5.4	4.8	4.8
Civilian	4.3	4.6	4.6

Civilians in this sub-category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and provide for improved safety and quality of life.

The FY 1982 actual military strengths included Marines temporarily attached in a restricted or limited duty status and a number of Marines who entered the initial skill training pipeline during the prime summer recruiting months. A portion of those individuals were assigned to Marine Corps bases for their training. Such personnel will be used as replacements in base or co-located Fleet Marine Force units upon completion of training. The small decline in active military strengths in the Combat Installations sub-category reflects conversion of Morale, Welfare and Recreation spaces to civilian billets. The decrease in civilian strength in FY 1984 reflects efficiency savings.

Base Operating Support manpower constitutes an essential adjunct to Fleet Marine Force readiness by providing the administration, operation, and maintenance of the base structure in which combat forces are housed, supported, supplied, and trained. Manpower in the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category is assigned to operate the installations at which Fleet Marine Forces are based. The Support Installations sub-category includes manpower assigned to operate logistic and training bases.

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Combat Installations using a fixed/variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the Base Operating Support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the Tactical/Mobility Forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to Base Operating Support-Combat Installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training. Increases to this category are necessary to enhance the daily support provided to the deployed forces.

The Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category also includes Marines assigned to security duties with Marine barracks located at major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and to meet other assigned responsibilities.

The determination of manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Support Installations is based on an analysis of the functional and work load requirements of bases in this sub-category. Since such bases do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units, computation of the variable support element is excluded.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower at all combat and support installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. A full-scale, on-site manpower survey is conducted at each installation at least once every three years and authorized manning levels are reviewed annually. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to ensure that the approved manpower, grade, and skill levels are appropriate. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. Manpower survey efforts have improved support organizations by consolidating duplicative functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

2. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Military			
Active	4.7	4.7	4.7
Reserve Components	-	-	-
Civilian			
	0.2	0.2	0.2

Marine Corps requirements in this category include recruiting and examining services, support to disciplinary commands, and other personnel support. The program in this category is actually level.

3. Individual Training

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Military			
Active	9.0	8.6	8.8
Civilian	0.2	0.2	0.2

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other service and Marine Corps schools. The Individual Training manpower requirements in excess of school capabilities are trained through alternative methods such as on-the-job or field skill training. During FY 1983, approximately 12 percent of those Marines undergoing initial skill training will be trained through such alternative methods. The decrease in non-formal school training from FY 1982 to FY 1983 is the result of the opening of several formal schools effective 1 October 1982. This is a continuation of the Marine Corps' training philosophy of offering the preferred formal courses of instruction to as many entry-level Marines as is possible. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1984 Military Manpower Training Report. The increase in Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower in FY 1984 is a result of the fielding of new equipment, formalizing and expanding initial skill training as well as a projected increase in student throughput. Instructor and support personnel requirements are a function of student throughput. The billets for all instructor and support personnel at Marine Corps and Joint Service Schools are fully manned since training is done on a daily/continuous basis. A reduction in (or failure to increase) these type billets will require the Marine Corps to reduce the number of personnel that would receive initial skill training. Without additional instructor and/or support personnel coupled with an increase in student load, a backlog of students awaiting initial skill training occurs and billeting and messing facilities become overtaxed. Excessive delays due to reduction in class capacity will increase personnel shortages in FMF units and subsequently reduce unit readiness because of manpower shortages.

4. Force Support Training. Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Training Group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower requirement for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.0	3.0	3.3
Civilian	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50 spaces

5. Central Logistics. The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services. Increased civilian strength in FY 1984 is associated with manning of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS).

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.8	0.8
Civilian	2.8	2.9	3.0

6. Centralized Support Activities

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.6	2.7	2.4
Reserve Components	0.5	0.7	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	1.5	1.6

The Marines in this category provide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations truce teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, and Marine Corps support to OSD and DUS. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records, the Marine Corps Automated Services Center, which maintains the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System, and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the JUMPS system for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and activation of a centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

7. Management Headquarters. The following table displays the manpower requirement in the Management Headquarters category.

Marine Corps Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
Military			
Active	2.3	2.3	2.3
Civilian	0.6	0.7	0.7

The manpower requirement for this function is associated with three sub-categories of Management Headquarters. Marines serving at NATO, NORAD, and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters activities are categorized under International Military Organizations. Marines assigned to Unified Commands are also so categorized. The Service Support-Combat Commands sub-category includes the Fleet Marine Force and major Navy operational command headquarters. Manpower requirements for Marine Corps and Navy departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters are categorized under Service Support-Service Commands.

All of the sub-categories of Management Headquarters include requirements external to the Marine Corps. Marines so assigned perform two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations.

8. Federal Agency Support. The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency Support.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.2	1.3	1.3

Federal Agency Support manpower consists almost exclusively of the Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion, which furnishes security guards for Foreign Service Posts around the world for the Department of State.

D. Operating Strength Deviation

	Operating Strength Deviation (End Strength in Thousands)		
	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	N/A	-2.0	+0.7

The Marine Corps' internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning for 30 September is expressed as operating structure deviation, or undermanning factor. This undermanning is shown as a single minus entry in the Active Military Manpower Requirements DPPC table for FY 1983. For FY 1984, the figure is positive because improvements in accession management reduced the seasonal fluctuation.

E. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)

	Individual Mobilization Augmentees (End Strength in Thousands)		
	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve	0.4	0.9	1.0

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are individual SMCR members not assigned to the 4th DWT. IMAs are preassigned to active force billets that must be filled on or shortly after M-day. These individual Selected Reservists are assigned to Training/Pay Categories A, B, C or D, depending on the amount of training required in peacetime to insure immediate and effective performance of duty upon mobilization.

IMAs will possess premobilization orders for execution upon statutory authorization and notification for execution by the assigned operational sponsor. Each IMA will attend drill periods at their respective gaining command, as determined by the training category code, and will spend 14 days on active duty each year in the mobilization designee billet.

F. Individuals

The following table displays the Individuals accounts.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)			
	FY 82 (Actual)	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	7.0	7.9	7.8
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.6	0.6	0.6
Trainees/Students	<u>24.9</u>	<u>26.6</u>	<u>23.8</u>
Total	32.2	35.2	32.2
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students	3.5	4.3	4.3

The strengths shown in the Individuals accounts are estimates of the number of people who will be in transient, trainee/student, or patient/prisoner/holdee status at the end of a fiscal year. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. The Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces and shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

The low FY 1982 actual patient/prisoner/holdee numbers compared to FY 1981 reflect a change in accounting for Appellate Leave or In Hands of Civil Authorities in excess of six months (IHCA+6). DoD Instruction 1120.11 directed that these personnel not be counted within end strength. The manning spaces associated with Appellate Leave and IHCA+6 are distributed into the FMF and non-FMF structure.

The increased trainee/student request in FY 1983 reflects the impact of strength increases that have been partially offset by training efficiencies in recruit and specialized skill training. Although the number of trainees/students will increase because of higher end strength and increasing sophistication of equipment, lower attrition from training and more efficient utilization of available training assets will reduce the overall impact of increased numbers of trainees/students. The lower student/trainee request for FY 1984 is a result of a more evenly-spread entry level training plan caused by improvements in accession management and a larger delayed entry pool.

CHAPTER VI
AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

A. Summary and Authorization Request

The FY 1984 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1984 and FY 1985 is as follows:

<u>Air Force Manpower Program</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>
Active Military Reserve Components	612.6	636.4
ANGUS	104.1	106.1
USAFR	69.9	74.0
Civilian	249.7	252.6

The Air Force manpower program for FY 1984 and FY 1985 reflects continued application of the Total Force Policy to accomplish assigned missions. Active military manpower continues to build in FY 1984 after reversing, in FY 1981, a declining trend which began in FY 1969. Civilian manpower builds in FY 1984 as a result of increased in-house capability in depot maintenance and supply activities.

B. Major Force Structure Changes

The table below displays the manpower program by DPPC for FY 1983 through FY 1988.

<u>Manpower Program By DPPC</u> (End Strength in Thousands)						
DPPC	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Strategic	72.9	73.5	75.3	81.3	84.7	87.7
Tactical/ Mobility	142.8	148.1	154.7	160.2	165.9	174.1
Auxiliary Activities	51.3	53.0	53.9	54.1	54.2	54.4
Support Activities	267.3	273.6	282.3	287.5	290.8	293.6
Operating Strength Deviation	-7.1	-7.5	-8.1	-8.1	-7.7	-8.7
Individuals	65.2	71.9	78.4	80.8	76.4	82.4
Totals	592.5	612.6	636.4	656.3	663.4	683.5

The mission and associated force structure of the Air Force are the primary determinants of resource requirements. Consequently, the size and composition of the force structure to be supported provide the base for the majority of manpower requirements. From a manpower requirements standpoint, the most important force structure characteristics are the numbers and types of aircraft, missiles, and other system authorized. Projected builds between FY 1984 and FY 1988 are required to support major weapon system builds such as B-1, GLCM, MX, ALCM, KC-10, C-5, and the associated training, maintenance, and support forces required to sustain the increased force level. In addition, the Air Force continues with its efforts of modernization and fully equipping its 26 active tactical fighter wings in addition to modernizing the Air Reserve Force (ARF) tactical fighter aircraft. Due to fiscal constraints, completion of the 26 wing build has now slipped to FY 1988.

The tables below display the ANG and USAFR manpower programs by DPPC for FY 1983 through FY 1988.

ANG Manpower Programs by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88
Strategic	20.9	21.4	21.6	21.6	22.1	22.7
Tactical/ Mobility	62.9	64.4	65.9	66.9	67.8	67.9
Auxiliary Activities	12.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6
Support Activities	3.3	3.3	3.6	4.2	5.6	6.9
Individuals	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Totals	101.8	104.1	106.1	107.7	110.5	112.5

USAFR Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88
Strategic	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Tactical/ Mobility	41.8	43.7	45.7	46.9	47.3	48.5
Auxiliary Activities	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.4
Support Activities	11.3	12.2	13.6	15.3	15.9	17.8
Individuals	10.8	11.2	12.0	12.4	13.1	13.5
Totals	66.6	69.9	74.0	77.1	80.0	82.4

The manpower requested for FY 1984 supports the following Air Force force structure:

Strategic Offensive Forces. B-52 and FB-111 bomber forces total 241 Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) and 56 PAA respectively. KC-135 aircraft will remain at 615 PAA. Minuteman missiles continue at 1,000 PAA while Titan II missiles will decrease by 9 as they continue to be deactivated.

Strategic Defensive Forces. The force will consist of five active and ten Air National Guard (ANGUS) interceptor squadrons. The Air Force began, in FY 1978, the phased transfer of military long-range radars used in the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system to joint use USAF/FAA radars. As of the end of FY 1982, the Air Force has transferred 14 radars to the FAA, incorporated 22 new or existing FAA radars, and retained 10 military radars in the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). The JSS program allowed the Air Force to close 27 radar sites and replace the five remaining SAGE regional control centers in CONUS with four Regional Operations Control Centers (ROCCs). In Alaska, starting in FY 1983, the JSS/ROCC program combined with the SEEK IGLOO Radar Replacement program will eliminate military personnel assigned at the 13 remote locations. The E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) augments this surveillance capability. In FY 1983, the modernization of active F-106 squadrons continues with the conversion of the units to F-15 squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces. The active tactical fighter force consists of 26 organizationally structured wings, which the Air Force plans to bring to full equipage by the end of the 1980s. In FY 1984, the Air Force is continuing its tactical fighter force modernization with the addition of two F-16 tactical fighter squadrons.

By end FY 1984, a 14 plus wing equivalent Air Reserve Force structure composed of 43 fighter squadrons augments the active force. The USAFR also contributes half of the aircrews for the KC-10 through collocated associate programs. The active force will have two 12 PAA squadrons of KC-10s by the end of FY 1984.

Other changes programmed in the tactical aircraft force structure in FY 1984 include an increase in E-3A AWACS aircraft to 28 PAA, providing a significant command and control capability, and an additional six EF-111 tactical electronic combat aircraft.

Airlift Forces. Although strategic airlift forces remain at 234 PAA C-141 aircraft and 70 PAA C-5 aircraft, the "stretched" C-141B program was completed and the Air Force began modifying the C-5 in FY 1982. These modifications increase C-141 cargo volume capacity by about 30 percent and provide an air refueling capability that reduces our dependence on foreign enroute basing structures. The C-5 wing modernization program will extend wing life by 30,000 hours.

Air Force Reserve (AFR) associate units provide the ability to more fully use existing bases and aircraft by providing reserve air crews and maintenance personnel to active C-141, C-5, and C-9 units. C-5 associate crew ratios continue to increase to allow the AFR to assume a greater role in strategic airlift.

II. Manpower Requirements Determination

A. Manpower Management System

The most fundamental task in effective manpower management is the systematic determination of manpower requirements. Despite the use of

recognized techniques for quantifying and aggregating total manpower needs, manpower management remains a difficult task. Greatly complicating the task is having to fund and manage a force structured for peacetime against which wartime missions and taskings are assigned. As a consequence, the funded manpower levels are derived from a force structure that represents the resources available to the Air Force, rather than those desired in an unconstrained environment.

Air Force Management Engineering Program (MEP). An important aspect of manpower management is determining accurately the manpower requirements for forces deployed, operated, and maintained to carry out assigned Air Force missions. The annual application of manpower standards against force structure work load estimates determines the numbers, kinds, and distribution of manpower authorizations.

In FY 1959 the Air Force established the MEP to develop and maintain manpower standards and provide management advisory services (MAS). Manpower standards and guides are developed using industrial engineering work measurement techniques and computerized simulations such as Logistics Composite Modeling (LCOM). MEP policy emanates from the Directorate of Manpower and Organization (AF/MPM), while the Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA) approves all standards, provides technical/procedural guidance, and administers the Air Force-wide MEP schedule. AFMEA has ten Functional Management Engineering Teams (FMETs) that develop and maintain manpower standards for Air Force common functional areas (supply, security police, etc.) that encompass over 70 percent of total authorized manpower. In addition, about 150 command METs develop/maintain command unique and single point standards and guides and perform on-site work measurement and coordination for FMET studies.

Cumulative results of the MEP through FY 1981 reflect 69 percent of Air Force authorizations placed under a standard, about \$800 million in combined savings from standard applications and MAS, a return on investment of \$3 for each dollar spent, and 95,000 authorizations deleted or redistributed. The remaining Air Force authorizations (31 percent) are covered by manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower; however, they are less structured than standards and are based on staff estimates, manpower surveys, and contractor estimates rather than on formal work measurement techniques. The Air Force prefers guides where standards development is not practical, for example, when it is inexperienced with new systems or when standards would be short-lived because a system or activity is approaching phase-out.

The MEP continues to emphasize incorporating productivity improvements into the standards development process. Activity in this area ranges from refinement of present procedures to testing of new concepts. Initiatives include: designing standards to enhance their maintainability, improving the wartime manpower determination process, and designing studies to meet the specific needs of Air Force functional managers.

This program has progressively improved and enjoys increased credibility because of experience gained over the years and through constant refinement of methodology. Annual application of manpower standards and guides provides an accurate, objective, and consistent basis to forecast future manpower requirements based on projected work loads. When mission or force adjustments cause work load changes, this system assures that manpower requirements will also be revised in accordance with the changed mission or force levels and resultant work loads.

This system supports the fundamental task of programming, which is to translate Air Force approved plans and requirements into time-phased resource packages including people, money, and materials. The Air Force accomplishes this task by systematically costing force levels, supporting programs, and modernization efforts in terms of money and manpower. Programming actions, therefore, provide the resource detail necessary as a bridge between the approved plans and the annual Air Force Budget submission.

B. Manpower Management Improvements

The Air Force will undertake a major initiative, through its Management Engineering Program, to accomplish functional reviews of in-house activities. A concerted effort will be made during the 1980's to increase productivity and reduce operating costs by eliminating unnecessary and inefficient work practices.

Under this initiative, Air Force functions will be analyzed for ways to increase operating efficiency without decreasing effectiveness. To gain efficiencies, prime emphasis will be on removing unnecessary work requirements and enhancing operations through streamlined procedures and state-of-the-art equipment. Work requirements levied on Air Force functions, from all levels, will be investigated to ensure validity and currency. Further, during the review process, wartime taskings will be studied to ensure that peacetime economies are not taken at the expense of our war fighting capability.

These reviews will commence in Spring 1983, after an intense training period, and are expected to be very beneficial. Top level support and cooperation in all functions will maximize gains.

III. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General. Military manpower increases 20,100 between FY 1983 and FY 1984. In the tactical force, 3,300 authorizations are added for modernization and training, largely to support increases in the F-16 and GLCM force structure. In addition, the Air Force is increasing support for wartime readiness initiatives in strategic programs, pre-positioned equipment, increased bare base equipment, chemical-biological protection equipment maintenance, WRM munitions, as well as new programs such as European Distribution System (total of all programs +2,300) a new strategic bomber and B-52 flying hour increase (+1,100); and expanded

command, control, and communications (+1,800). Other programs with manpower impact include Research and Development enhancement (+900), additional intelligence programs (+1,400), and numerous smaller increases that support increased program levels (+2,300). To obtain a quality force as well as support the increased end strength, 8,200 spaces are added to the training area. The additional training manpower supports increased personnel accession levels, new weapon systems training, and initiatives to eliminate engineering shortfalls. These increases are partially offset by decreases for phasing down Titan II (-300) and manpower savings from implementation of the Joint Surveillance System (-900).

2. Enlisted. The actual number of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1982 and the accession goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below:

Enlisted Accessions and Reenlistments

	FY82		FY83		FY84	
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Current</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Year</u>
<u>Accessions</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>		<u>Goal</u>	
Prior Service	6,151	6,151	4,000		6,000	
Non-Prior Service	67,538	67,538	61,000		70,100	
Male	58,793	58,793	52,000		60,000	
(HSDG)	(*)	(54,936)	(*)		(*)	
Female	8,745	8,745	9,000		10,100	
(HSDG)	(*)	(8,352)	(*)		(*)	

*The AF does not set High School Degree (HSDG) goals.

Reenlistments

First Term	-	27,060	20,700	19,100
Career	-	44,403	39,900	40,000

The Air Force achieved its FY 1982 enlisted non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) recruiting objectives. Additionally, the trend in the quality of non-prior service enlistees continued to improve as indicated in the high school diploma graduate rate and combined Mental Category I and II rates relative to FY 1981. This improvement is encouraging and reflects a year in which recruiting resources were adequate. However, increased civilian competition, the projected 10 percent decline in the available 18-year-old youth market by FY 1987 and 20 percent by FY 1992, and anticipated improvements in the economy are causes for concern in view of increased enlisted requirements.

The Air Force FY 1984 prior service goals are comparable to the FY 1982 program which resulted in the largest number of accessions (6,151) in the history of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The majority of FY 1984 prior service enlistments are required in chronic, critical, hard-to fill skills. The use of direct duty assignments in lieu of retraining options is designed to reduce training costs and increase experience levels, but

it will require increased recruiting resources to ensure accomplishment. All in all, prior service recruitment will continue to be an extremely difficult program.

In FY 1982 the Air Force had the best enlisted retention in recent history. First term (57 percent) and second term (81 percent) reenlistment rates were all-time highs. The career rate of 95 percent was the highest since FY 1977. Even with continued high retention, the programmed force expansion will result in a net reduction in enlisted experience levels. This decline will be most pronounced in critical sortie generating skills where shortages of mid-level NCOs already exist. Both recruiting and retention were positively influenced in FY 1982 by attainment of pay comparability with the private sector, increased bonus levels, and a declining economy. If the economy improves, it is essential that pay comparability not be allowed to lag if we are to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of high quality personnel in this environment.

3. Officer

Officer Accession Plan

<u>FY 82</u>		<u>FY 83</u>		<u>FY 84</u>	
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>		<u>Goal</u>	
8,855	8,858	9,271		10,111	

The officer procurement program supports undergraduate flying training (pilot and navigator) and the broad range of essential combat sustaining, scientific and engineering, management, and medical requirements. The Air Force did not achieve some of its FY 1982 officer accession requirements because of continued difficulties recruiting scientific, engineering, and critical physician specialties. The market for these professional skills is highly competitive and accession of these specialists is particularly difficult in the All-Volunteer Force environment. In FY 1982, the Air Force achieved only 41 percent of its total engineering officer recruiting objective. Numerous actions, such as the realignment of recruiting resources, new accessions programs, and recruiting incentives have been initiated in an effort to achieve scientific and engineering procurement objectives. The majority of these requirements are for specific engineering disciplines, such as electrical and aeronautical. These disciplines are also those most needed by civilian industry and command the highest initial salary offers. The Air Force is approximately 850 engineering officers below requirements; this directly affects the ability of the research and development community to perform its mission. The Engineering and Scientific Career Continuation Pay Authority authorized by Congress, however, has had a positive impact on the retention of skilled engineers and scientists. At the end of FY 1982, the Air Force was short 926 pilots and 535 navigators. Pilot shortages are projected to continue beyond FY 1988, while navigator shortages are expected to be eliminated by FY 1985. In FY 1982, the Air Force achieved only 63 percent of the requirement in critical physician specialties.

4. Women. The total number of women in the Air Force increased to 63,927 at the end of FY 1982, approximately 11.1% of the active duty force. Continued increases are programmed in the number of women in the force through FY 1988. Current FYDP goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 for the utilization of women based upon anticipated accession, retention and attrition rates are as follows:

	<u>Projected Female End Strengths</u>	
	FY 83	FY 84
Planned Total	65,900	69,200

The above projections are slightly higher than the number estimated in last year's report. The higher projection reflects current retention and attrition data. By FY 1987, the Air Force anticipates the number of women will increase by nearly 12,600, approximately 20% more than were assigned at the end of FY 1982.

The Air Force has identical enlistment, commissioning, and job entry standards for both men and women. Female officers are assigned to all career fields and enlisted female personnel to all but five of 230 enlisted skills. Women are precluded from assignment to combat-related specialties or positions on the basis of Section 8549 of Title 10, United States Code, and associated Air Force policy. This restriction affects only 10 percent of the positions in the Air Force. The Air Force uses approximately 30 percent of the women in the Air Force in jobs considered nontraditional.

5. Congressional Support

With the increased emphasis on national defense and the projected force build-up, the Air Force solicits continued strong Congressional support for adequate recruiting and advertising resources, and pay and entitlements commensurate with the unique demands of military life. Also, a positive public attitude toward national defense coupled with a recognition of the opportunities available in the military must be transmitted to our youth. Toward this end, the Air Force solicits a strong statement of support from members of Congress to solidify public backing and to encourage youth toward military service.

B. Air Reserve Forces Military Manpower

1. Air National Guard Manpower

a. General. The ANG has programmed an increase of 2,323 between FY 1983 and FY 1984. Of this increase 966 are part-time Guardsmen and 1,357 are full time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. The part time Guardsmen are required to support force structure changes such as F-4 and F-16 PAA increases, to increase our Aeromedical Evacuation Capability, to support an increase in the number of chaplains assigned to the ANG and to provide manning for new tactical control and communications equipment. The AGR increases are required to support an expansion of the F-4, RF-4 and C-130 training missions assigned to the ANG and to provide manning for force structure changes, increased aircraft maintenance requirement, and new missions and equipment.

b. Enlisted. The actual number of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1982 and the accession goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below.

Enlisted Accession Plan

	<u>FY 82</u>		<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Non-Prior Service	6,641	5,526	6,800	6,800
Prior service	8,238	8,743	8,100	8,080
<u>Male</u> <u>HSDG</u>		3,448 (85.6%)		
<u>Female</u> <u>HSDG</u>		1,201 (80.2%)		

The Air National Guard exceeded its prior service goal, however the non-prior service goal was not met. Emphasis was placed on filling critical skills and recruiting into valid UMD vacancies.

c. Officer. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1982 and the accession goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below:

Officer Accession Plan

	<u>FY 82</u>		<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	1,186	1,097	1,255	1,463

Officer gains fell short of the goal during FY 1982. Because of recruiting difficulties in the prior service area, the USAF/ANG referral program has been revised and updated. New "Palace Front" guidelines were developed and "Project Capture" has been expanded to include officer leads.

d. Retention rates for the Air National Guard enlisted force for FY 1982 and goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below:

Air National Guard Retention Rates

	<u>FY 82</u>		<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	50%	47.7%	55.0%	55.0%
Career	*	69.1%	*	*
Total	65%	67.7%	65.0%	65.0%

*Goals not set in this area, goals are set for first term and total only.

The overall retention rate exceeded the FY 1982 goal of 65 percent. First term retention improved but consistently remained two percent below the goal throughout the year.

2. Air Force Reserve Manpower-Selected Reserve

a. General. United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR) programmed end strength floor increase by 3,280 between FY 1983 and FY 1984. This increase includes 721 for force structure growth and modernization, including the first reserve F-16 unit, additional KC-10 and C-5 aircrews, addition of a TF coded A-10 unit and an additional C-130 unit. The largest single increase is 892 for medical personnel to help reduce the wartime shortfall. A significant increase of 834 aerial port personnel supports wartime surge requirements for the growing strategic airlift force. Civil engineering authorizations increase by 316 to redress wartime shortfalls. Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) funded authorizations are increased by 400 to provide wartime augmentation to active force organizations that have greatly increased wartime workloads. Small increases in full-time personnel and in other support skills have been made to accommodate mission and personnel program changes.

b. Enlisted. In the Air Force Reserve emphasis was on matching accessions to critical skills and wartime readiness authorizations. The Air Force Reserve exceeded its goals for both prior service and non-prior service personnel and continued to obtain very high quality recruits. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1982 and the accession goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below, followed by retention data:

Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 82</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 82</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 83</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 84</u> <u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	7578*	8513	7474	9620
Non-Prior Service	2788*	3097	3285	3379
Male		1971		
Female		1126		
Overall HSDG		2963		

*Quota reduced in June 1982 due to increased retention and participation.

c. Officer. The Air Force Reserve does not have accession goals for officers. The AFR receives officers from the active force and from the non-EAD commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1982 and the estimated requirement for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below:

Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Req</u>
Accessions	3165	2295	2490
			2002

d. Retention. Retention rates for the Air Force Reserve enlisted force for FY 1982 and goals for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are shown below:

Air Force Reserve Retention Rates

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Retention</u>			
First Term	58%	64%	60%
Career	80%	80%	80%

e. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). The Air Force Reserve manpower program for FY 1983 and FY 1984 continue to reflect the importance of a growing IMA program. Authorizations are to support wartime needs of the active force organizations.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	10,102	9,933	10,832
Officers	7,383	6,854	7,603
Enlisted	2,719	3,079	3,229

3. Pretrained Individual Manpower. Goals are not set for the pretrained manpower pool. The Air Force places first priority on the Selected Reserve because their current experience, training and immediate availability make them a more viable resource. Nevertheless pretrained individual manpower is an important mobilization resource and the Air Force will continue to support initiatives that provide for additional personnel with usable wartime skills without adversely affecting the readiness of the Selected Reserve.

Pretrained Individual Manpower

	<u>FY 82 Actual</u>	<u>FY 83 Est Resources Available</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Total	310,467	292,764	292,559
Officers	149,105	136,004	135,859
Enlistees	161,362	156,760	156,700

4. The following chart displays full-time military support for the ANG and the AFRES.

Fulltime Military Support

	<u>FY 82 Actual</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
ANG	3,076	4,249	5,577
AFRES	454	479	514

C. Civilian Manpower

Air Force civilian manpower authorizations grow by 3,502 between FY 1983 and FY 1984. This growth is in support of a broad range of defense range of defense tasks including supplying and maintaining aircraft and other weapons systems, conducting vital world-wide command control communications, research and development, medical care and maintaining and operating our bases. Our personnel management practices are geared toward sustaining civilian employee morale and productivity as they carry out the mission.

One area where the Air Force uses civilians extensively is in wholesale logistics activities (management, distribution, maintenance, contracting) at the Air Force's five Air Logistics Centers (ALCs). The ALC's civilian workforce is engaged in a large number of commercial activities as well as management functions which are integral to the Air Force Logistics Command mission.

The Air Force contracts for nearly half of its total depot maintenance workload. DoD pioneered the use of a depot maintenance decision tree to bring essential workloads in-house for accomplishment on an exception basis to OMB Circular A-76. This circular contains a national defense exclusion criteria which recognizes the need for organic accomplishment of certain critical workload. The decision tree process uses these criteria to assess whether specific workloads have the characteristics which warrant organic accomplishment. If the workload does not meet these criteria it is contracted out. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has recently directed that the Air Force take the lead in developing a revised decision tree for use by all three Services.

The five Air Logistics Centers are postured to perform the most volatile, highest-surging depot maintenance workload in wartime. A continuous flow of work is placed on contract to make room for new work or to properly posture our deliberately-constrained organic industrial base. The Air Force depends on contract accomplishment to a greater extent than any other Service, and is committed to the proper management of this vast and growing industrial resource.

Contract decisions for depot maintenance are typically made at several points through a system's operating life cycle, including its initial introduction into the operational inventory; during development and testing; during workload peaks throughout its operating life; and at the end of its life. Some systems, such as the KC-10, are developed for contract support throughout their operating life.

The Air Force continues to increase timeliness and quality in staffing civilian positions. The key element is an Installation Staffing Plan at each base civilian personnel office that provides a single employment document in operating the dynamics of the total employment situation with meeting the goals of mission and special employment programs. We have also established an Air Force-wide computerized skills bank; eliminated unnecessary procedural requirements to improved timeliness; automated tracking of the time required to fill positions; reassessed and revitalized training activities; and placed special emphasis on staffing activities in the program evaluation process.

The Air Force has consistently supported the principle of pay comparability for civilian employees. This principle is established in law, however, other laws and practices conflict within, causing us to depart from comparability in many situations. For example, there are four major provisions of the current blue collar pay law, which negate the principle of comparability and, hence, need change:

- The step rate structure for nonsupervisory/leader rates which result in pay above the local prevailing rates.
- Exclusion of wage data from state and local government.
- The requirements to pay uniform percentage night shift differentials of 7½% and 10% for second and third shifts.
- The Monroney Amendment which requires the government to establish "local" prevailing rates using wage data imported from different areas of the country when there is a "dominant" Federal industry in a particular locality, e.g., aircraft overhaul and repair.

We believe that civilian pay, retirement, health benefits, and PCS travel entitlements are eroding to the point where the objectives of fiscal economies may be more than offset by the adverse effect on civilian recruitment, retention, mobility and efficiency. Some recent changes to the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) will achieve economies and may improve program administration. Other changes, however, will cause inequities to employees, retirees and their survivors. In addition,

there are various proposals being considered which would drastically alter the retirement system, or virtually discontinue it for future employees. Next to pay, the CSRS is the most powerful recruitment and retention benefit for Air Force civilians. Changes to the CSRS must, of necessity, be based on sound financing. It is equally important, however, that any change take into consideration the short and long range impact on Federal public service employment. Air Force employees are very much concerned about changes to the CSRS. They are also concerned about the erosion of the next most powerful recruitment and retention benefit - the Health Benefits Program - where recent changes have resulted in reduced benefits and costs have increased.

Another area requiring attention is our need to have a civilian force that is mobile to the degree required to meet mission requirements. For several years, however, the Air Force and other Federal agencies have experienced difficulty in inducing civilians to relocate. Although recent regulatory changes have improved some civilian PCS entitlements, legislation is needed to increase household goods weight limitation to 18,000 pounds; permit the use of the actual expense method for shipment of household goods instead of using the commuted rate system; and change the tax law so that PCS reimbursement are not taxed as income (which it is not).

Civilian pay and benefits need to be addressed not just in terms of fiscal restraint, but in terms of the effect on maintaining the high quality civilian force we must depend on to meet mission requirements.

D. Commercial Activities (CA)

The Air Force uses a mix of military (active, reserve, and National Guard), federal civilian employees, and contractors to satisfy mission requirements. This practice helps provide sufficient military personnel to meet wartime commitments while taking advantage of the experience and continuity provided by civilian employees and the economies often generated by contracting.

Guidance for determining whether to accomplish commercial activity (CA) workload in-house or by contract is provided in OMB Circular A-76. Generally, A-76 reaffirms the Government's policy of reliance on the private sector for goods and services. While recognizing that certain functions are inherently governmental in nature and others must be performed in-house for national defense reasons, the Circular directs all other CA workload be reviewed to determine the most cost-effective method of operation.

The Air Force has established an aggressive program to implement A-76. First, determinations are made as to the work load that military members must perform based on military essentiality. Criteria for military-essential positions include combat and direct combat support duties, maintenance of favorable overseas rotation indices, and career progression requirements. Additionally in-house positions are retained that must be manned by Air Force military or civilian employees, because of inherent management responsibilities or to comply with applicable statutes or regulations. All remaining CA work load is considered eligible for contract. From these eligible work loads, the Air Force develops a cost-comparison program for each fiscal year by identifying candidate activities that will be cost studied for possible contract performance.

The FY 1980 cost comparison program, announced to Congress in March 1979, and the first conducted using revised A-76 guidelines, considered approximately 195 candidates and 4,700 associated manpower authorizations. The FY 1981 program, announced to Congress in December 1980, considered about 111 activities with 1,600 authorizations while the FY 1982 program addressed 4,300 authorizations. The FY 1982 program, announced in February 1982, in addition to those FY 1980 and FY 1981 studies not yet completed, has been slipped to FY 1983.

Air Force experience with revised A-76 guidelines began with the FY 1980 cost-comparison program. Since cost studies will cover two or more Fiscal years from start to finish, it is more meaningful to summarize results over several years rather than just one. As of 31 December 1982, 259 studies had been completed, resulting in 173 activities going contract and 85 remaining in-house. Cost advantages generated by the 173 contract decisions exceed \$203 million while the 85 activities remaining in-house will generate over \$39 million in cost avoidance. The program, under the revised guidelines, has thus far resulted in 32 percent of the activities remaining in-house compared to 19 percent in FY 1979. This pattern may reflect a trend toward more competitive in-house bids resulting from increased pressure to ensure in-house calculations are based on the most efficient estimates to perform the statement of work. Also, new "performance-oriented" work statements, which in effect become mission statements for each activity after the cost comparison, have enabled in-house bids to concentrate on performance rather than on conformance with past procedures.

COST COMPARISON STUDIES COMPLETED
In-House Vs Contract Decisions
(FY80-FY83)

	Number of Studies Completed	Number of End Strengths Involved			Activities To Be Converted	End Strengths			Projected Cost Advantage (\$Millions)
		Civ.	Mil.	Total		To Be Converted	Civ.	Mil.	
FY80/									
FY81	164	3,263	799	4,062	124	2,654	617	3,271	179
FY82	85	1,173	92	1,265	45	643	52	695	22
FY83	10	137	25	162	4	23	16	39	2
Total	259	4,573	916	5,489	173	3,320	685	4,005	203

E. Wartime Manpower Requirements Versus Supply.

Currently, the Air Force determines the total support force manpower required to support the national strategy through an annual exercise in which each major command identifies resources needed to achieve its wartime objectives. The exercise begins with Secretary of Defense guidance to the services that prescribes the wartime scenario at an established level of risk. Through a series of modeling techniques, the Air Force quantifies the support force manpower it needs to meet deployed, strategic, and war-sustaining requirements. Against this total requirement, the Air Force reviews those support assets that could be obtained from host

nations and where ever possible seeks to use host nation resources rather than U.S. forces. The recent agreement by the Federal Republic of Germany to provide reserve forces, civilian personnel, and infrastructure is an example of such an arrangement. The remaining requirements are compared to the authorized Air Force manpower levels. The resultant shortfalls or functional mismatches serve as the basis for program adjustments. While the Air Force cannot afford to fund all wartime requirements in the Active Force during peacetime, it recognizes the inherent danger in underfunding peacetime levels to such an extent that readiness might be impaired. The Air Force goal is to seek peacetime funding levels that will permit effective responses to potential contingencies.

Although substantial progress has been made in documenting wartime support force manpower as outlined above, the Air Force is also developing an enhanced process to more accurately compute its wartime manpower requirements. This enhanced process is based on current year operations plans developed by our major commands (MAJCOMs) and a subsequent projection to the outyears by HQ USAF aided by the Air Force Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team (AFWMPRT). The basic process calls for the development of support force manpower requirements by the MAJCOMs identified as an addendum to real-world operations plans. This process results in the establishment of an Air Force requirements plan that is reviewed and approved by functional managers within HQ USAF. Then, using computer modeling, AFWMPRT extrapolates current-year requirements plan data to the first and last years of the budget Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The resulting product is known as the Program Force Sizing Plan. After HQ USAF approval, this data is sent to the MAJCOMs for their use in developing manpower requirements packages to be used in program development.

This enhanced wartime manpower planning process will improve the quality of the Air Force statement of wartime requirements. The process will provide MAJCOMs relief from having to make outyear projections of their wartime requirements because they will be working with current operations plans. Furthermore, this data will identify wartime manpower shortfalls in combat support activities, influence decisions concerning manpower resource realignments, and provide information for evaluating potential contract candidates. The accompanying chart displays wartime manpower requirements for FY 1984.

**WARTIME MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
VERSUS SUPPLY
(000s)**

	<u>FY 84</u>	
	<u>M+10</u>	<u>M+60</u>
Total Requirements <small>(Structure, deployments, casualties)</small>	752	883
Supply		
Force Structure Yield 1/	734	782
Pretrained Individual Supply 2/	-	98
Shortfall	18	3

1/ Consists of Active component, Guard and Reserve Units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Individuals and Training Output
 2/ Consists of the Individual Ready Reserve and Retired Personnel

The Air Force is continuing to use simulation modeling techniques such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) to evaluate and validate direct combat wartime requirements. Moreover, the Air Force has developed procedures to provide for the development of wartime manpower standards for base operating support functions. The Air Force goal remains to improve readiness by insuring an appropriate military and civilian manpower resource distribution by skill, the most effective component mix between Active and Reserve Forces, and the proper balance between combat and combat sustaining forces.

IV. Air Force Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display Air Force Manpower by DPPC for the period FY 1982 through FY 1984. A more detailed description of each DPPC explaining significant growth areas follows the DPPC tables. In review of this year's report, it is important to remember the Air Force continually reviews its requirements and seeks optimum methods of performing its functions. The Air Force goal remains improved readiness at minimum cost by insuring the most effective balance between active and reserve components as well as the proper balance between combat and combat sustaining forces.

The Guard and Reserve form the first and primary source of augmentation in an emergency requiring a fast and sizable expansion of the active force. Much of the Air Force increase displayed in the FY 1984 President's Budget is based upon validated peacetime workload requirements for which the active manpower provided will also satisfy wartime requirements.

Where appropriate, the Air Reserve Forces are sharing proportionately in the FY 1984 growth (e.g., Aerial port +800, Medical Service Units +600). However, increasing Air Reserve Forces is not appropriate in all cases. The Air Force has been a strong proponent of the Total Force policy and much of its capability already resides in the Air Reserve Forces. There are limits, however, to how much support we can reasonably expect to obtain from the Reserve Forces. Significant training requirements in some specialties and peacetime labor intensive missions may preclude using the Reserves as a viable source of manpower. The Active Forces must maintain an adequate rotational base to support the forward deployed forces. The FY 1984 increase is primarily in support of mission/functions which must be performed by the Active Force for the above reasons, e.g., B-1B, B-52, forward deployed tactical fighter force structure, GLCM, communications and intelligence, R&D and the training and transient pipeline to support these activities. After considering all the variables, the Air Force has determined that the workload to be performed by the increased personnel requested in our FY 1984 budget is best performed by active military manpower, since it represents daily, peacetime workload in support of active force missions, and provides the necessary military personnel to respond to immediate contingency and wartime requirements.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 Actual	FY 83 FY 84	FY 84 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	74.4	72.9	73.5
Offensive Strategic Forces	56.0	54.4	55.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	7.7	7.1	6.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance	10.7	11.4	11.9
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	135.8	142.8	148.1
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Force	97.4	103.4	108.0
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	38.4	39.4	40.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	50.1	51.3	53.0
Intelligence	14.8	15.4	16.0
Centrally Managed Communications	16.4	16.4	16.7
Research and Development	11.0	11.3	12.0
Geophysical Activities	8.0	8.2	8.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	260.0	267.3	273.6
Base Operating Support	155.2	160.0	163.8
Medical Support	14.5	14.6	14.7
Personnel Support	6.6	6.3	6.6
Individual Training	21.0	21.9	22.9
Force Support Training	25.6	26.1	27.0
Central Logistics	4.6	4.8	4.9
Centralized Support Activities	14.5	15.1	15.0
Management Headquarters	17.9	18.2	18.3
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	520.3	534.4	548.2
<u>Operating Strength Deviation</u> (As of 30 Sept)		~7.1	-7.5
<u>Individuals</u>	62.5	65.2	71.9
Transients	15.7	16.0	17.1
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.6	0.6	0.6
Students, Trainees	41.7	44.1	49.8
Cadets	4.5	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	582.8	592.5	612.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ANGUS)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82 Actual	FY 83 FY 84	FY 84 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	21.1	20.9	21.4
Offensive Strategic Forces	11.0	10.8	10.9
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.4	9.4	9.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	63.2	62.9	64.4
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	45.6	45.4	46.5
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	17.6	17.5	17.9
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	11.4	12.3	12.6
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	10.9	11.8	12.1
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	3.0	3.3	3.3
Base Operating Support	0.5	0.5	0.5
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	0.5
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	1.9	2.2	2.2
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	98.7	99.4	101.7
<u>Individuals</u>	2.0	2.4	2.4
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdées	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	2.0	2.4	2.4
Cadets	-	-	-
Total	100.7	101.8	104.1

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAFR)
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82 Actual</u>	<u>FY 83 FY 84</u>	<u>FY 84 Budget</u>
Strategic	2.5	2.7	2.7
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.1	2.0	2.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.5	0.7	0.7
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
Tactical/Mobility	<u>41.7</u>	<u>42.1</u>	<u>44.0</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Force	7.8	10.2	10.5
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	33.8	32.0	33.5
Auxiliary Activities	3.0	3.2	3.6
Intelligence	1.5	1.6	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	0.1	0.1	0.2
Research and Development	0.8	0.8	0.9
Geophysical Activities	0.7	0.7	0.7
Support Activities	<u>16.0</u>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>18.0</u>
Base Operating Support*	8.6	8.6	9.0
Medical Support	3.3	3.5	4.1
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	0.9	1.2	1.2
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	0.8	0.7	0.8
Centralized Support Activities	0.9	1.5	1.5
Management Headquarters	0.9	1.0	1.0
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
Subtotal-Force Structure	<u>63.2</u>	<u>65.0</u>	<u>68.3</u>
Individuals	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.2	1.6	1.6
Cadets	-	-	-
Total	<u>64.4</u>	<u>66.6</u>	<u>69.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*BOS in the USAFR includes Civil Engineering, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Combat Logistics Support Authorizations.

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
 (Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82 Actual</u>	<u>FY 83 FY 84</u>	<u>FY 84 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	7.6	7.3	7.5
Offensive Strategic Forces	3.5	3.3	3.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.1	3.0	3.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.0	1.0	1.2
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	28.8	29.4	29.6
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	15.8	16.3	16.3
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	13.0	13.2	13.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	20.8	21.6	22.0
Intelligence	1.8	1.9	2.0
Centrally Managed Communications	4.3	4.4	4.4
Research and Development	13.6	14.2	14.5
Geophysical Activities	1.1	1.2	1.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	190.8	187.8	190.6
Base Operating Support	87.4	87.3	86.5
Medical Support	3.1	3.1	3.2
Personnel Support	1.5	1.8	1.8
Individual Training	5.2	5.2	5.2
Force Support Training	1.8	1.9	1.9
Central Logistics	73.5	69.3	72.7
Centralized Support Activities	9.4	10.2	10.2
Management Headquarters	8.8	9.0	9.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Total**	247.9	246.2	249.7

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

** Includes approximately 29,000 Air National Guard and Reserve technicians.

A. Strategic. Air Force Strategic Forces are subdivided into Offensive, Defensive, and Control and Surveillance forces.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	316	272	241
FB-111	56	56	56
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	487	487	487
<u>Missiles</u>			
Titan II	53	44	35
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANGUS KC-135	104	104	104
USAFR KC-135	24	24	24

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Active</u>			
Reserve Components	56.0	54.4	55.0
ANGUS	11.0	10.8	10.9
USAFR	2.1	2.0	2.0
<u>Civilian</u>			
	3.5	3.3	3.3

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1984, we have 16 B-52 squadrons, five FB-111 squadrons, 32 active force and 16 Reserve Force KC-135 tanker squadrons, four Titan missile squadrons, and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

The FY 1983 active military manpower decrease is primarily due to a decrease in the B-52 Bomber force, while the increase in FY 1984 is due to the acquisition of the B-1 and an increase in the B-52 flying hour program.

2. Defensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Interceptor Squadrons</u>			
Active Force	5	5	5
ANGUS	10	10	10

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.7	7.1	6.6
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	9.4	9.4	9.8
USAFR	0.5	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	3.0	3.0

FY 1984 Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Alaskan Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Air National Guard for surveillance and control and limited defense. To perform this mission in FY 1983, the Air Force will employ a force of two active F-15 squadrons, three active Air Force and three Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, and seven Air National Guard F-4 squadrons. The ground environment systems include five Regional Operations Control Centers and 60 surveillance radar sites (including USAF/FAA joint use). Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

FY 1984 active military decreases reflect the continued implementation of the manpower-saving Joint Surveillance System.

ANGUS increase between FY 1983 and FY 1984 is tied to the expansion of the F-4 ADTAC RTU at Kingsley Field, Oregon and the conversion of two F-106 units to F-4s units - location pending public announcement.

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.7	11.4	11.9
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.0	1.2

Control and Surveillance Forces include the following aircraft in FY 1984: one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 27 EC-135 post attack command and control system aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers; and four E-4A/B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; three ballistic missile early warning sites; five Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; eight SPACE-TRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and Surveillance Forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

The FY 1984 active military increase is due primarily to increased manpower requirements for the Consolidated Space Operations Center and increase in the Defense Support Program.

The FY 1984 civilian increase is due to increased manpower requirements for the Consolidated Space Operations Center.

B. Tactical/Mobility. Air Force Tactical and Mobility Forces are discussed in the following sections.

1. Tactical Air Forces. The following tables show Air Force Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wings	26	26	26
Tactical Fighter Squadrons	79	80	81
Reconnaissance Squadrons	6	7	7
Special Operations Force Squadrons	3	3	3
Airborne Warning and Control Squadrons	3	3	3
Airborne TACCS Squadrons	9	9	9
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	2	2	2
Electronic Combat Squadrons	2	2	3
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANGUS Fighter/Attack Squadrons	33	35	35
ANGUS Reconnaissance Squadrons	8	7	7
USAFR Fighter/Attack Squadrons	9	10	10
USAFR Special Operations Squadrons	2	2	2
ANGUS Airborne TACS Squadrons	5	4	4
ANGUS Electronic Combat Squadron	1	1	1
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	2	2	2

1/ Associate squadrons provide aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	97.4	103.4	108.0
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	45.6	45.4	46.5
USAFR	7.8	10.2	10.5
<u>Civilian</u>	15.8	16.3	16.3

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance, tanker/cargo, the new Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, missile operations crews, and weapon systems security, GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control Systems, the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering deployable heavy repair (RED HORSE) squadrons, and tactical intelligence squadrons.

FY 1983 active military increases are a result of growth of authorized tactical aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile program, and associated maintenance requirement for combat readiness/capability. These increases are partially offset by savings in maintenance as a result of force modernization. Active military increases in FY 1984 are due principally to the increases in tactical combat/training aircraft and the continued growth of manpower authorizations for European Ground Launched Cruise Missile beddown.

USAFR increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of its Tactical Fighter Force, including the conversion of F-105 Squadrons with increases in A-10, F-4, and KC-10 PAA, and the introduction of the F-16.

ANGUS increases in FY 1984 are the result of the addition of 14 F-4 and six F-16 aircraft.

2. Mobility Forces. The following tables show Air Force Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Active Force			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	14	14	14
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons	3	3	3
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	8	8	8
Reserve Forces			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	35	34	34
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	6	6	6

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel (maintenance personnel only in Strategic Airlift Squadrons) for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military			
Active	38.4	39.4	40.1
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	17.6	17.5	17.9
USAFR	33.8	32.0	33.5
Civilian	13.0	13.2	13.2

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, aeromedical airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations and Air Force special mission forces.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1984 are primarily due to strategic aerial port and operational support airlift increases to meet wartime shortfalls.

ANGUS manpower increases in FY 1984 reflect growth in Aeromedical Crews. USAFR manpower decreases in FY 1983 and increases in FY 1984 reflect changes in force structure.

C. Auxiliary Activities. Auxiliary Activities are subdivided into Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development Activities, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.8	15.4	16.0
Reserve Component			
USAFR	1.5	1.6	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.9	2.0

This category includes manpower for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and Air Force support to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The Air Force Intelligence Service and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

FY 1984 active military, USAFR, and civilian increases reflect a growth in analytical efforts in support of the national intelligence program.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.4	16.4	16.7
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.9	11.8	12.1
USAFR	0.1	0.1	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.4	4.4

* Less than 50

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

The FY 1984 active military increase is due to enhancement of satellite communications equipment.

ANGUS FY 1984 manpower increases are tied to new equipment/modernization and efforts to enhance the readiness of communications units.

3. Research and Development

Air Force Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.0	11.3	12.0
Reserve Component			
USAFR	0.8	0.8	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	13.6	14.2	14.5

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

The increases in active military and civilian manpower in FY 1984 are due to increases in Test and Evaluation Support.

4. Geophysical Activities

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.0	8.2	8.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.5	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.2	1.2

The manpower in this category supports active and reserve weather service activities, meteorological and navigational satellite/space programs, and Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities. The active military build in FY 1984 is the result of growth in satellite control facilities and the launch support group.

D. Support Activities. Support Activities are subdivided into Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. However, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps manpower providing food, transportation, and supply type services to divisions and ships are integral with those units for operational purposes and are counted as mission manpower. The Air Force accounts for this manpower in BOS and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These organizational differences preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Base Operating Support. BOS has two subcategories: Combat Installations and Support Installations.

a. Base Operating Support - Combat Installations.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	111.7	116.1	117.9
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.5	0.5	0.5
USAFR	8.2	8.3	8.6
<u>Civilian</u>	49.1	49.3	48.6

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, air-field and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1983 and FY 1984 are primarily due to growth in authorized tactical aircraft in Tactical Air Forces and the build of the Ground Launch Cruise Missile Forces.

USAFR manpower increases in FY 1984 reflect requirements to reduce manpower shortfalls to operate eleven bases and an increase in civil engineering areas.

FY 1984 civilian manpower decreases are primarily due to expected economies and efficiencies achieved through increased productivity.

b. Base Operating Support - Support Installations

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Support Installations.
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active Reserve Component	43.5	44.0	45.9
USAFR	0.4	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	38.2	38.0	37.9

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as base hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, laundries, and commissaries.

FY 1984 military increases are the result of builds to support growth throughout the Air Force. Growth in the Tactical Air Forces is the primary cause for increases in Base Operating Support Manpower at support installations.

2. Medical Support.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active Reserve Components	14.5	14.6	14.7
USAFR	3.3	3.5	4.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.1	3.1	3.2

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

The USAFR increase in FY 1984 is due to additional medical support for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

3. Personnel Support.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active Reserve Components	6.6	6.3	6.6
ANGUS	0.5	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.8	1.8

The Air Force operates over 1,000 recruiting offices and contributes manpower to 69 Military Entrance Processing Stations. Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities, personnel processing, and the Air Force Aerial Demonstration Team are also included in this category.

The active military increase in FY 1984 is due to growth in recruiting activities.

4. Individual Training.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.0	21.9	22.9
Reserve Component			
USAFR	0.9	1.2	1.2
<u>Civilian</u>	5.2	5.2	5.2

Manpower required to conduct training is included in this category. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Increases in FY 1984 active military are primarily due to growth in recruit training units.

Detailed justification of training requirements is presented in the FY 1984 Military Manpower Training Report.

5. Force Support Training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.6	26.1	27.0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.9	1.9

Manpower in this category includes Air Force strategic, tactical, and mobility mission support training. Tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training are also included.

FY 1984 active military increase is due to training program growths in both Strategic and Tactical Air Forces. In addition there is steady growth Air Force wide in training programs.

6. Central Logistics.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.6	4.8	4.9
Reserve Component			
USAFR	0.8	0.7	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	73.5	69.3	72.7

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily of the Air Force Logistics Command.

Civilian manpower decrease in FY 1983 is due to the end fiscal year overstrength for FY 1982 while the increase in FY 1984 is in support of the increase flying hour program for B-52s.

7. Centralized Support Activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.5	15.1	15.0
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	1.9	2.2	2.2
USAFR	0.9	1.5	1.5
<u>Civilian</u>	9.4	10.2	10.2

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs and includes Air Force support to OSD, JCS, unified commands, and international military organizations. Manpower supporting foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affair, and various Air Reserve Force activities is also included.

8. Management Headquarters.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.9	18.2	18.3
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.1	0.1	0.1
USAFR	0.9	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	8.8	9.0	9.1

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters including the Departmental Headquarters Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Systems Command Product Divisions. Air Force manpower supporting international military headquarters and unified command headquarters is also included in this category.

9. Federal Agency Support.

Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.3	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAFR	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50.

This category includes manpower supporting other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

E. Operating Strength Deviations. The internal manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Traditionally, high school graduates are more available in the summer months, and hence the Air Force strength tends to decline through the Spring in anticipation of the prime recruiting months of June, July, and August. Thus, although the Air Force meets overall military end strength levels by the year end, some airmen will still be in the training pipeline as opposed to filling required manpower positions in field units.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Acti: Military	N/A	-7.1	-7.5

Changes in FY 1984 are the result of a larger accessions program.

F. Individuals. The Individuals accounts contain manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets.

1. Transients

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.7	16.0	17.1

Transient manpower is required to maintain unit manning at authorized levels while military members are in travel and leave-enroute status during PCS moves. The active military increase for FY 1984 reflects a greater number of projected PCS moves to support the higher end strength in FY 1984.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining.

3. Trainees and Students

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	41.7	44.1	49.8
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	2.0	2.4	2.4
USAFR	1.2	1.6	1.6

This category accounts for people undergoing training. The active military increase in FY 1984 is the result of increased trainees/students projected from higher accession rates.

4. Cadets

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.5	4.4	4.4

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

I. Introduction

This chapter contains the manpower programs of the following organizations:

Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Staff
- Field Activities
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Audiovisual Agency
Defense Communications Agency
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Defense Inspector General
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Investigative Service
Defense Legal Service Agency
Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Mapping Agency
Defense Nuclear Agency
Defense Security Assistance Agency
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.
US Court of Military Appeals

These organizations, collectively called the defense agencies for the purposes of this report, perform specialized functions supporting the entire Department of Defense. The National Security Agency is excluded from this report for security reasons.

II. Manpower Programs

The combined manpower programs of the defense agencies are shown in the following table. All military strength displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are included in service strength in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Defense Agencies Manpower Programs
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	7.7	8.1	8.2
Civilian, Direct Hire	80.4	84.7	86.4
Indirect Hire	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Total	89.9	94.6	96.4

The FY 1982 data shown throughout this chapter are actual strength, while manpower space authorizations are shown for FY 1983 and FY 1984. Actual civilian strength is typically below authorizations because vacated positions cannot be refilled immediately. This accounts for all apparent FY 1982 to FY 1983 civilian increases in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

The mission and associated manpower program of each agency are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined defense agency manpower program is displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

1. Staff. OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability and specialized expertise necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department. OSD staff manpower levels are shown in the following table.

OSD Staff Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	1.2	1.2	1.2
Total	1.7	1.7	1.7

2. Field Activities of OSD. Field activities perform designated services for DoD activities. These programs are more limited in scope than those of a defense agency. These organizations are described below.

a. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support to the OSD staff and to the other OSD field activities.

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
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY (FISCAL YEAR) 1984
(U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE
AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON DC FEB 83

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
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b. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program, including the dissemination of internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of this program.

c. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages payment for medical care in nonmilitary facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

d. The Tri-Service Medical Management Information System (TRIMIS) Program Office centrally manages the development and application of standardized automated systems to improve the effectiveness and economy of health care in the military services.

e. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) aids communities which have been affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial growth.

f. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas.

The combined manpower program of the field activities of OSD are shown in the following table.

Manpower Program
Field Activities of OSD
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	11.3	12.3	12.7
Total	11.5	12.6	13.0

Over ten thousand of these civilians are teachers, aides and administrators employed world-wide by DoDDS. The programmed growth is in response to enrollment predictions.

B. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

OJCS provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to aid them in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. OJCS manpower levels are as follows:

OJCS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	1.0	1.1	1.1
Civilian	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>

C. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages high-risk basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise by adversaries and offer potential for major increases in U.S. defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA uses the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industry, educational and research institutions, and individuals. The following table shows DARPA's manpower program.

DARPA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

D. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

The DAVA mission is to provide audiovisual production, acquisition, distribution and depository services and certain other audiovisual services which can be performed more efficiently on a centralized basis. DAVA's manpower program is shown in the following table.

DAVA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.1	0.1	0.1
Civilian	0.5	0.5	0.4
Total	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>

E. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for engineering and management of the Defense Communications System and system architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems. DCA provides engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Communications Network. They also procure leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

DCA's manpower program is shown in the following table.

DCA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	1.5	1.6	1.6
Civilian	1.6	1.7	1.7
Total	3.1	3.4	3.4

F. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is responsible for assisting Department of Defense procurement authorities world-wide in achieving sound contract pricing by evaluating proposals submitted by contractors for proposed contracts, verifying the propriety and acceptability of costs charged to flexibly priced government contracts, and deterring contractors' inefficient practices. The agency also provides contract audit services to about 30 other Federal agencies at contractor locations where DoD has a continuing audit interest, or where it is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view.

DCAA's manpower program is as follows:

DCAA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Civilian	3.5	3.7	3.7

Contract audit work load is generated by procurement and contract administration activities. The approved funding level for the DoD procurement and research and development programs directly affects the work load of DCAA. Other factors affecting contract audit work load are DoD procurement policies, the implementation of existing Cost Accounting Standards (Public Law 91-379), reviews required under Public Law 87-653 (The Truth in Negotiations Act), new or expanding programs of non-Defense agencies, and audits performed for the military departments in connection with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.

G. Defense Inspector General (DIG)

The Office of the Defense Inspector General was established by law in FY 1983. The resources of the Defense Audit Service, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Review and Oversight, Defense Logistics Agency's Inspector General, and certain elements of the Director of Audit Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), were all transferred to the new agency.

DIG Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military		*	*
Civilian	.5	.9	1.0
Total	.5	.9	1.0

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

H. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The primary mission of DIA is to produce finished, all-source foreign general, military, scientific and technical intelligence. DIA provides DoD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Estimates. They determine information gaps and validate intelligence collection requirements, provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities and manage and operate the Defense Attache Service. DIA manages the production of general military intelligence by the military services, unified and specified commands, and produces or manages the production of all DoD scientific and technical intelligence. DIA serves as the J-2 of the Joint Staff and manages and coordinates all DoD intelligence information systems programs and the interface of such systems with the intelligence community and DoD systems.

The DIA supports the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, military departments, the National Security Council, various other departments of the Executive Branch, and congressional committees. The table below shows DIA manpower levels.

DIA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	1.9	2.0	2.1
Civilian	2.7	2.9	3.2
Total	4.6	4.9	5.3

The increase in both military and civilian manpower in FY 1983 reflects the continuing need for intelligence analysis capabilities including analytical manpower, information processing and support personnel, data systems engineers and managers and the first growth in attaches in over a decade. The increase in FY 1984 includes information processing personnel, analytical manpower, support services manning, attaches for the Third World, intelligence planners, education and training manpower and technical personnel.

I. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS conducts personnel security investigations, law enforcement investigations for DoD Components and other investigations directed by the Secretary of Defense. It also administers defense industrial security programs on behalf of the DoD and other Federal departments and agencies.

The following table shows the manpower program of the DIS.

DIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.1	*	*
Civilian Only	3.1	3.5	3.5
Total	3.2	3.5	3.5

*Fewer than 50 spaces

The civilian increase in FY 1983 is to handle increased investigative workload, reduce investigative backlog and improve case completion time.

J. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

The Defense Legal Services Agency consolidates the functions of the OSD legal staff with the legal staffs of the defense agencies. The legal staffs of the defense agencies and OSD field activities remain with their current organizations while operating under the supervision of the DoD General Counsel/Director DLSA. Manpower levels for DLS are shown below:

DLS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	2		
Civilian	53	56	56
Total	55	56	56

K. . Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the military departments, other defense components, federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, general supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA is the largest of the defense agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities. The manpower required for DLA's extensive operations is displayed in the following table.

DLA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	1.0	1.0	1.0
Civilian	47.7	49.0	49.9
Total	48.7	50.0	50.9

L. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other DoD components through the production and worldwide distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapons systems. It serves as Program Manager and coordinator of all DoD MC&G resources and activities and carries out statutory responsibilities for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data.

DMA manpower levels are shown below.

DMA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	8.3	8.6	8.6
Total	8.7	9.0	9.0

The civilian increase in FY 1983 is to provide increased support to the cruise missile program.

M. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. It also manages DoD nuclear weapons testing and nuclear weapons effects research programs. DNA manpower levels are shown in the following table.

DNA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	0.6	0.7	0.7
Total	1.1	1.2	1.2

DNA's civilian increase in FY 1983 is due primarily to establishment of a World Wide Military Command and Control System site, increases in nuclear weapons effects projects (laser development, underground testing, hardening of space-based radar, LOAD system, ELF and ULF communications, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects), and the acquisition of a new computer.

N. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs. Its manpower levels are as follows:

DSAA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

O. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

USUHS provides education in health sciences to individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

Manpower levels of the growing University are as follows:

USUHS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Military	0.7	0.7	0.8
Civilian	0.6	0.7	0.8
Total	1.3	1.4	1.6

The increase in military end strength from FY 1982 to FY 1984 is due to growth in the student body by 76 students and by 40 additional faculty and staff members. The civilian end strength increased by 92 positions between FY 1982 and FY 1984 to complete the planned staffing of the University and by 77 reimbursable positions to handle growth of outside-funded research projects.

P. US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA)

The US Court of Military Appeals serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

The manpower levels of the US Court of Military Appeals are shown below.

USCMA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Civilian Only	42	49	49

III. Manpower Requirements By DPPC.

The following tables show the combined military and civilian manning programs of the defense agencies, arranged by DPPC.

DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1982 Actual	FY 1983 FY 1984	FY 1984 Budget
Strategic	0.4	0.4	0.4
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
Tactical/Mobility	-	-	-
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
Auxiliary Activities	3.6	3.8	3.9
Intelligence	1.9	2.0	2.1
Centrally Managed Communications	1.1	1.2	1.2
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
Support Activities	3.8	4.0	3.9
Base Operating Support	-	-	-
Medical Support	*	*	*
Personnel Support	*	*	*
Individual Training	0.5	0.5	0.6
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	1.0	1.1	1.0
Centralized Support Activities	0.6	0.6	0.5
Management Headquarters	1.7	1.8	1.8
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
Subtotal-Force Structure	7.8	8.2	8.2
Individuals	-	-	-
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdées	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	-	-	-
Cadets	-	-	-
Total	7.8	8.2	8.2

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Military strengths in agencies are also included in Service tables. NSA is excluded due to security reasons.

* Fewer than 50.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
 (Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1982 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1983 <u>FY 1984</u>	FY 1984 <u>Budget</u>
Strategic	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.5	0.6	0.6
Tactical/Mobility	-	-	-
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
Auxiliary Activities	<u>11.9</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>12.9</u>
Intelligence	2.7	3.0	3.3
Centrally Managed Communications	0.9	1.0	1.0
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	8.1	8.4	8.4
Support Activities	<u>69.8</u>	<u>73.3</u>	<u>74.7</u>
Base Operating Support	6.0	5.4	5.5
Medical Support	0.4	0.3	0.3
Personnel Support	10.5	11.6	11.6
Individual Training	0.4	0.5	0.6
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	41.2	42.9	43.7
Centralized Support Activities	7.5	8.2	8.7
Management Headquarters	3.8	4.3	4.3
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
Total	<u>82.2</u>	<u>86.5</u>	<u>88.3</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

NSA manpower is excluded due to security reasons.

CHAPTER VIII

DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE ARMED FORCES

I. Background

The 1980 DoD Worldwide Survey of Non-Medical Drug Use and Alcohol Use Among Military Personnel confirmed that abuse of alcohol and marijuana, particularly among the 18-25 year old age group, was the most prevalent drug abuse problem in the Armed Forces. Although abuse rates varied considerably among the Services, the concentration of abuse was primarily among the junior enlisted portion of each Service. Each Military Department has reemphasized existing programs in response to the survey results.

II. DoD Initiatives

Three major Department of Defense initiatives have been targeted to reduce this drug abuse. The first of these is development of the capability to detect marijuana by urinalysis, supported by favorable court rulings concerning the evidentiary use of urinalysis results. The second is a concerted effort to reduce drunk driving among military personnel. The third is a long-term effort to change the life styles of those who abuse drugs and alcohol.

A. Urinalysis

A 1975 United States Court of Military Appeals ruling held that the results of urine tests for drug abuse could not be used to support either disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or to characterize an administrative discharge as less than honorable. In 1980, the Court of Military Appeals clarified the law concerning evidentiary use of body fluids by ruling that under specific circumstances results of such tests could support disciplinary action. In December 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum outlining those conditions.

The DoD policy states that military members may be ordered to provide urine samples for drug urinalysis as part of a military inspection, as the result of a search or seizure action when a probable cause exists that evidence of drug abuse will be found, and in conjunction with certain medical treatment. In these cases, positive findings of drug abuse may be used to take disciplinary action and to establish the basis for an administrative discharge. The results of such mandatory testing may also be used to refer a service member for treatment and rehabilitation.

Mandatory urinalysis may also be ordered to determine a service member's competency for duty, to determine whether a service member requires counseling or treatment for drug abuse, in conjunction with a rehabilitation program, as part of a mishap or safety investigation, or any other time when a commander wishes to determine whether drug abuse is a factor in an individual service member's behavior. Under these

circumstances, the results of urinalysis may be used to refer the member to a DoD drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation program, but may not be used as evidence against the member in disciplinary action under the UCMJ or to support characterization of service in a discharge proceeding. Administrative actions such as removal of a security clearance, however, may be taken.

In the Spring of 1981, chemists at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) developed a process by which urine samples screened positive for cannabinoid metabolites (by-products of marijuana) could be confirmed using gas liquid chromatography (GLC). This was a major development for two reasons. Not only did it provide field commanders with a biochemical means to detect marijuana use, but it incorporated the process into the existing laboratory system. The capability to detect cannabis brings to seven the number of drugs detectable through urinalysis in the DoD system.

While the detection and deterrence of illicit drug abuse is of major importance to the Department of Defense, it is of equal importance that non-users not be misidentified as users. To this end the drug testing system has been designed so that any errors which occur are in favor of the individual being tested. Administrative safeguards as well as redundant laboratory procedures have been designed to ensure the integrity of laboratory findings. All samples which are intended to support disciplinary action or characterization of discharge are handled under strict chain of custody procedures.

Each urine specimen submitted for drug urinalysis is subjected to two independent chemical methodologies prior to being reported as positive for the presence of a drug. Urine specimens are screened by either a radioimmunoassay process or an enzyme immunoassay procedure. Those found positive by either of these relatively inexpensive and automated chemical tests are then tested by gas liquid chromatography (GLC). The GLC process is a more labor intensive procedure, but it provides highly accurate confirmation of the screening result.

A third major development in drug urinalysis was Service evaluation of portable urinalysis equipment for on-site testing capability. A one-year field evaluation of this equipment was begun in November 1981. The main criterion for the evaluations was the requirement that all positive findings by portable equipment were to be confirmed by GLC in a DoD laboratory.

An important factor in the ability of an on-site device to deter drug use is the degree to which results are perceived to be accurate. There must, therefore, be a high degree of confirmation of field positives by the laboratory GLC process. Preliminary results indicated that only about one-half of the portable positives could be subsequently confirmed by GLC. Initial suspicions that the portable equipment was inaccurate have proven unfounded. Rather, the device, which uses an enzyme immunoassay process and reacts to the presence of a number of cannabinoid metabolites, is more sensitive than the GLC confirmation procedure developed by the AFIP.

Thus, individuals who have low quantities of marijuana by-products in their urine may indicate positive on the portable device, but negative by laboratory confirmation. Under current DoD policy, such samples must be considered negative. A similar situation may occur in a laboratory setting if a sample tests positive by radioimmunoassay, but cannot be confirmed by GLC. However, in these cases the only result reported is negative; the screening result is not revealed. This incompatibility between the sensitivities of the portable equipment and the laboratory confirmation process must be resolved before the full deterrent potential of on-site detection can be realized. Two conferences sponsored jointly by the Department of Defense, the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office and the National Institute on Drug Abuse were held in 1982 to discuss the technical aspects of the DoD drug urinalysis program. Conference participants included recognized national authorities in the field of forensic toxicology. The primary purpose of these conferences was validation of legal sufficiency of the DoD laboratory system by the scientific community as well as to seek refinements to the state-of-the-art methodology in use in the military laboratories. Conferees will continue to work with the AFIP and military laboratory officials to improve the compatibility of the portable equipment and the GLC.

B. Drunk Driving

Drunk driving, not cancer or heart disease, is the leading cause of death in the military. A major effort has been initiated within the Department of Defense to combat this problem. In a major policy memorandum, the Secretary of Defense announced that all driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions by civil or military courts or punished by Article 15 of the UCMJ will result in a one-year prohibition from driving on a military installation. This action is applicable not only to military members but to dependents and civilian employees as well.

The Secretary also directed each Military Department to conduct an intensive, sustained public education campaign against drunk driving. These programs are to place special emphasis on the high risk of apprehension and the adverse consequences of such irresponsible behavior. Additionally, the Secretary asked the Chairman of the President's Commission on Drunk Driving to seek passage of a national minimum drinking age. Further, he directed that a detailed policy directive on drunk driving be issued by April 1983.

C. Health Promotion

The third major initiative is designed to change the lifestyles of drug and alcohol abusers. The bulk of drug abuse in the military can be attributed to lifestyles associated with the youth culture of the nation. Alcohol abuse, especially drunk driving, exists to a great extent because society tolerates it. The Department has undertaken a long-term project to change the values, norms, and attitudes of the military community so that the culture will promote mental and physical well-being, conditions antithetical to drug and alcohol abuse. While this will be a difficult task, it is essential for the long-term solution to the drug and alcohol abuse problem.

The promotion of healthy lifestyles to discourage drug and alcohol abuse is only one aspect of a health-promotion program now being planned in the Department. As used in the planning process, health promotion includes all activities that enhance individual mental and physical well-being and the well being of the community.

A successful health promotion effort must have as a goal the change of attitudes and habits, especially toward eating, smoking, drug and alcohol use, exercise, recreation, stress management, sleeping and other behavior critical to physical and mental health. Changing lifestyles also requires some fundamental changes in the values and norms of the military community. Attitudes are themselves largely a reflection of the values and norms of the society within which people live. Although the military is part of the larger U.S. society, it has traditionally had distinctive cultural features that set it apart to a significant degree. The values and norms of this subculture can be changed to exert social pressure for more healthy lifestyles and social support for those who need such support for maintaining healthy lifestyles.

Normative pressures of the military community will influence individual attitudes and lifestyles to the degree that there is cohesion within that community. Therefore, a cohesive military community is essential if the health promotion effort to change lifestyles is to be successful. A community is a social system wherein relationships among group members are based on a subjective feeling of moral obligation to each other rather than a legal obligation or rationally motivated adjustment of interests. Relationships are characterized by a high degree of emotional depth, moral commitment and social solidarity. The military departments have several initiatives underway to create more cohesive communities.

III. Conclusion

Drug and alcohol abuse prevention efforts within the Department of Defense are intended to reduce the prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse. During 1983, the results of the second biennial survey of military members will provide some measure of the success of these efforts in the past two years. Additionally, results of a similar survey of civilian personnel and dependents in the overseas DoD school system will provide an indication of prevalence among these groups. Further, efforts will continue to develop a comprehensive program evaluation of the Services' drug and alcohol abuse treatment and rehabilitation programs in conjunction with the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse. The Department of Defense office of drug and alcohol abuse policy will also continue to work closely with The National Institute on Drug Abuse to improve drug abuse identification technology and to seek development of a non-biochemical test for performance impairment. The Department of Defense has no place for those who persist in abusing drugs and alcohol. Help will be given to those who have unwisely become addicted to these substances, but firm and swift disciplinary action will be taken against those who continue abuse. The American public has a right to expect the military to provide a challenging, healthy lifestyle.

CHAPTER IX

COST OF MANPOWER

I. Introduction

DoD outlays for manpower will be \$101 billion in the President's Budget for FY 1984. This chapter discusses the makeup of those costs. The personnel support costs shown in Table XI-1 is an estimate based upon the best available data at the time this report went to press. This page may be reissued when supporting data is available.

II. Description of Defense Manpower Costs

A. Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories used in this chapter are described below:

1. Military Personnel Appropriations, one for each Service, fund active military pay, cash allowances, matching Social Security contributions (FICA), enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, and the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind).

2. Defense Family Housing Costs are incurred to lease, construct, and maintain family housing for military personnel. This category also includes funds to pay civilians who operate and maintain family housing. Since pay for all DoD civilians is counted under another category, "Civilian Costs," in this chapter, the Defense Family Housing cost category here excludes civilian costs to avoid double counting and does not reflect the total Defense Family Housing appropriation.

3. Military Retired Pay Appropriation funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD; funding is not appropriated or managed with respect to the Service from which annuitants retired. The amount funded in this appropriation depends on the retired military population and is independent of the current force. The budget does not reflect future retirement costs for members of the current force.

4. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations, one for each of the six reserve components, fund inactive duty drills, active duty for training, ROTC, full-time reservists for administration and training, the Health Professions Scholarship Program, and management and training for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

5. Civilian Costs. Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded by specific appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations according to function performed. Civilian costs include

compensation for both direct and indirect hire employees. Also included are DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance for civilian employees. Nearly 90 percent of DoD civilian costs are paid from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations or from industrially - funded activities largely financed by O&M funds. Much smaller percentages of civilian costs are paid from the RDT&E, Military Construction, and Family Housing appropriations.

6. Personnel Support Costs are incurred in carrying out the following functions:

- Individual Training
- Medical Support (including CHAMPUS)
- Recruiting and Examining
- Overseas Dependents Education
- Base Operating Support (50 percent of total BOS)
- Other Personnel Support

Direct personnel costs are not included in personnel support costs, since they are included in previously defined cost categories.

B. Cost Trends

Table IX-1 shows trends in manpower costs, including payments to retired military personnel, and the associated strengths for the President's FY 1984 budget and selected historical years.

TABLE IX-1
DEFENSE MANPOWER COST 1/
(Outlays, \$Billions)

	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	Actual FY 76					FY 1984 President's Budget Request	
					FY 78	FY 80	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	
Total Defense	49.5	77.3	77.6	87.9	103.0	132.8	182.9	208.9	238.6	
Manpower Costs										
Direct Manpower Costs										
Military Personnel Appropriations	12.3	19.0	22.1	23.3	25.1	18.4	38.5	40.7	42.6	
Def. Family Housing Costs 2/	.5	.4	.7	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.6	2.4	2.6	
Military Retired Pay Appropriation 3/	1.2	2.1	5.1	7.3	9.2	11.9	14.9	16.1	16.8	
Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations	.7	.9	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.4	3.8	4.6	5.1	
Civilian Costs 4/	7.5	10.6	14.1	16.4	18.9	21.4	25.2	26.6	26.7	
Subtotal: Direct Manpower Costs	22.2	33.0	43.7	49.7	56.3	65.5	84.2	90.4	93.7	
Personnel Support Costs 5/	1.7	2.8	2.9	3.8	4.2	4.8	6.1	6.5	6.9	
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	35.8	46.6	53.5	60.5	70.3	90.3	96.9	100.7	
<hr/>										
End Strengths (000s)										
Regular Employees										
Active Military	2,687	3,547	2,161	2,081	2,061	2,050	2,108	2,127	2,165	
Civilian 4/										
Direct Hire	997	1,233	1,013	959	935	916	945	969	986	
Indirect Hire	140	119	94	86	81	75	83	87	86	
Total	1,137	1,352	1,108	1,045	1,016	990	1,028	1,056	1,076	
Total	3,824	4,899	3,269	3,126	3,078	3,041	3,136	3,138	3,237	
<hr/>										
Others										
Selected Reserve 6/	953	922	925	823	788	850	966	1,002	1,027	
Retired Military	435	651	1,012	1,132	1,243	1,328	1,391	1,423	1,454	

1/ Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.

2/ Excludes civilian pay portion of this appropriation which is included under civilian costs.

3/ For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members are not reflected in the budget.

4/ The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations -- e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E. Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower costs and strength data.

5/ Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately. Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and a miscellaneous category. The personnel support costs shown for FY 1983 and FY 1984 are based on preliminary data and are subject to change.

6/ Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From 1980 on, the reserve data also include officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

C. Pay Raise Assumption

Pay raises granted in recent years and the pay raise assumptions contained in the FY 1984 budget are shown in Table IX-2. The figures for General Schedule and Wage Board employees are for base salary only. The military figures are the overall average percentage increase in basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence. The figures are expressed as percentage increases over the previous year's pay scale.

TABLE IX-2
PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 ^{1/}
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4 ^{2/}
81	11.7	9.1	9.1 ^{2/}
82	14.3 ^{3/}	4.8	4.8 ^{2/}
83	4.0	4.0	4.0 ^{2/}
84	0.0	0.0	0.0

1/ Includes approximately 4 percent catch-up increase upon the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 30, 1974.

2/ Wage board raises were limited by legislative action each year after 1979

3/ Enlisted pay raises for FY 1982 ranged from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9. All warrant officers and commissioned officers received a 14.3 percent increase.

III. Detailed FY 1984 Manpower Costs

The costs in this section are derived from budget support detail submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total obligational authority (TOA). Since these data are expressed as TOA, they will not compare exactly with the cost data provided elsewhere in this chapter.

Table IX-3 provides a detailed breakout of FY 1984 manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements, indexed in the margins of Table IX-3, are discussed in more detail following the table.

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Table IX-3
FY 1984 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(from FY 1984 President's Budget in TOA-\$M)

<u>Index</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DOD Wide</u>	<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>Index</u>
<u>Military Personnel Appropriations</u>									
1	Basic Pay	10,012	6,970	2,240	8,356			27,578	1
2	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,171	937	251	1,081			3,440	2
3	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	214	306	81	260			862	3
4	Subistence (In-Kind and Cash Allowance)	1,165	834	275	922			3,195	4
5	Bonuses	262	292	90	137			781	5
6	Other Pay	208	517	42	254			1,021	6
7	Other Allowances	404	318	112	338			1,173	7
8	FICA	665	464	150	554			1,833	8
9	PCS Travel	1,136	655	209	913			2,913	9
10	Cadets	32	35	-	32			99	10
11	Miscellaneous	77	60	28	48			213	11
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>15,345</u>	<u>11,388</u>	<u>3,479</u>	<u>12,896</u>			<u>43,108</u>	
- Reimbursables <u>(Pay and Allowances)</u>									
	<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>15,215</u>	<u>11,294</u>	<u>-16</u>	<u>-138</u>			<u>-79</u>	
								<u>42,729</u>	
<u>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>									
		<u>15,215</u>	<u>11,294</u>	<u>3,463</u>	<u>12,758</u>			<u>42,729</u>	
<u>Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations</u>									
12	Pay	2,448	540	177	752			3,857	12
13	Allowances	445	88	24	114			670	13
14	Clothing	134	23	9	21			187	14
15	Travel	247	83	25	78			432	15
16	Other	27	9	3	12			51	16
	<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>3,301</u>	<u>743</u>	<u>-177</u>	<u>-976</u>			<u>5,198</u>	
<u>TOTAL RES/GRD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>									
		<u>3,301</u>	<u>743</u>	<u>177</u>	<u>976</u>			<u>5,198</u>	

<u>Index</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DOD Wide</u>	<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>Index</u>
17	Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-pay)							2,836	2,836
18	Military Retired Pay Appropriation							16,806	16,806
	<u>Civilian Costs</u> 1 2/								
19	Salaries	9,050	8,616			6,309	2,713	26,689	19
20	Health and Life Insurance	268	255			187	80	790	20
21	Retired Pay (DOD Contribution) Direct Obligations	634	603			442	190	1,868	21
	<u>TOTAL CIVILIAN COSTS</u> 1/ 2/	9,352	9,474			6,938	2,983	29,347	
	<u>Personnel Support Costs</u> 1/								
22	Individual Training								22
23	Medical Support								23
24	Recruiting and Examining								24
25	Overseas Dependents Education								25
26	Base Operating Support (50%)								26
27	Other Personnel Support								27
	<u>Total Personnel Support Costs</u> 1/								
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS</u> 1/								

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Navy civilian costs and support costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps. The data for development of the personnel support costs was not available as this report goes to press and will be furnished later.
 2/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Defense Family Housing, Military Court of Appeals, Civil Defense, and Military Assistance Accounts.

1. Basic Pay (\$27,578 million TOA) is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. It ranges in FY 1983 from \$6,883.20 a year for a new recruit to \$63,800 a year (effective December 18, 1982) for grades O-9 and above. The amount of basic pay a member receives is a function of pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total cost of basic pay is determined by the number of manyears distributed across grade and length of service (see table IX-8).

2. Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) (\$3,440 million TOA) BAQ is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. There are two BAQ rates for each military grade: One for members without dependents and another for members with dependents. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters or who are assigned to field or sea duty receive a partial BAQ payment. BAQ costs are a function of overall strength, the grade and dependency status distribution of the force, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ in FY 1983 is from \$ 1,472.40 a year for an E-1 with no dependents to \$ 7,635.60 a year for a flag/general officer with dependents (see table IX-8). The costs of in-kind housing are not shown in this category but are included in the family housing and base operating support categories.

3. Variable Housing Allowance (VHA). (\$862 million TOA) VHA is paid to military members receiving BAQ who reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States or who are assigned overseas but whose dependents reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States. It is a function of the number of military families residing off post in high housing cost areas of the continental U.S. and the cost of housing relative to BAQ rates.

4. Subsistence (\$3,195 million TOA) represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). All officers receive BAS at the same rate, which in FY 1983 is \$1,178.04 a year. Enlisted members receive either "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or BAS. There are three BAS rates for enlisted personnel. They receive \$4.68 per day (\$1,708.20 annually) when on leave or authorized to mess separately, which is the most common form of BAS, \$5.29 per day when a mess is not available, or \$7.00 per day when assigned duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available. The emergency ration rate is rarely used. Subsistence costs vary with the total number and grade distribution of manyears, the number of people receiving cash in lieu of in-kind allowances, and the cost of food to DoD.

5. Enlisted Bonuses (\$781 million TOA) include both Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses. Enlistment Bonuses (\$157 million TOA) are paid as an incentive for people to enlist in shortage skills. In FY 1983, high-quality Service personnel enlisting in selected combat and some combat support skills will receive this incentive in return for additional service obligation. The maximum enlistment bonus allowed by

law is \$8,000, but the actual level is a function of supply and demand in the national youth labor market and of service requirements. Reenlistment Bonuses (\$624 million TOA) include Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Regular Reenlistment Bonuses (saved-pay). All personnel who were on active duty on the effective date of PL 93-277 (June 1, 1974) receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2000 over a 20-year period. PL 93-277 limited the payment of reenlistment bonuses to critical skills with chronic and sustained shortages. This law replaced the Regular and Variable Reenlistment Bonuses with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). The SRB is given only to qualified people reenlisting in a critical and shortage skill during the first 14 years of active military service. The current maximum SRB level is \$20,000 for nuclear skills and \$16,000 for other critical skills. The SRB concept is intended to apply the principles of supply and demand to the career manpower requirements of the Services on a skill-by-skill basis. The current SRB, effective January 15, 1982, provides for a lump-sum payment up to 50 percent of the bonus with the rest paid in equal installments over the reenlistment period.

6. Other Pays (\$1,021 million TOA) include Incentive, Special, and Proficiency Pay. Incentive Pay (\$464 million TOA) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty and career incentive pay for submarine and aviation duty. Total incentive pay costs are dependent on the number and grade distribution of qualifying personnel. Special Pays (\$508 million TOA) include a number of pays designed to encourage continuation on active duty, such as bonuses for medical and nuclear-qualified officers, and pays to provide recompense to people performing certain types of duty, such as sea duty and diving duty. Proficiency Pay (\$49 million TOA) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas and for those meeting special requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain people. In accordance with the intent of Congress, Proficiency Pay has been sharply curtailed in favor of the use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus.

7. Other Allowances (\$1,173 million TOA) include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, family separation allowances, and separation payments. Uniform Allowances (\$401 million TOA) include the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted members entering active duty and to officers upon commissioning. Included in these allowances are the costs of uniform maintenance for enlisted personnel with more than six months of active service. Overseas Station Allowances (\$411 million TOA) are paid to certain military personnel serving in designated areas outside the continental United States to reimburse them for increased costs of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates vary by geographical location and by the availability of commissary and post exchange facilities. Family Separation Allowances (FSA) (\$52 million TOA) are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents. FSA Type I, equivalent to the "without dependents" BAQ rate, is paid to members assigned on permanent duty outside the U.S. or in Alaska, when government housing is not available. FSA I is designed to offset the added expense of maintaining two houses. It is not paid a member assigned in Hawaii or on permissive orders.

FSA Type II is a set monthly amount of \$30.00 for the added expenses of enforced family separation due to PCS duty away from home port or duty station aboard ship or temporary duty for a continuous period of more than 30 days. Separation Payments (\$309 million TOA) are paid to four groups of people who are leaving the Services: (a) members with unused leave for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; (b) members separated for physical disability reasons; (c) officers separated for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion; and (d) reserve members involuntarily released from active duty after completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four groups is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave. Public Law 94-212 limits to 60 days the total terminal leave in a career for which an individual can be paid. The FY 1977 Authorization Bill (PL 94-361) prohibited quarters or subsistence payments for any leave accrued after 31 August 1976.

8. FICA Contributions (\$1,833 million TOA) are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law (6.7% of basic pay up to \$38,100 in calendar year 1984).

9. PCS Travel (\$2,913 million TOA) is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. Table IX-4 shows detailed PCS costs by type and Service for FY 1984.

TABLE IX-4

FY 1984 PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	165	103	40	77	385
Training travel	50	48	8	35	141
Operational travel	63	138	28	119	348
Rotational travel	650	215	86	539	1,489
Separation travel	111	94	36	81	323
Travel of Organized Units	13	26	*	2	41
Temporary Lodging Expense	56	24	9	32	120
<u>Non-Temporary Storage</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>67</u>
Total Obligations	1,136	655	209	913	2,913
Less Reimbursements	5	3	2	1	11
Total Direct Obligations	1,131	652	207	912	2,902

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Number less than 1

10. Cadet Pay and Allowances (\$99 million TOA) includes the pay and allowances of those attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.

11. Miscellaneous Costs (\$213 million TOA) include death gratuities and apprehension of deserters. Death gratuities (\$8 million TOA) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Funds for apprehension of deserters (\$6 million TOA) cover the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. Unemployment compensation (\$199 million TOA) is for payment to eligible ex-service personnel. Fiscal Year 1984 is the first year of budgeting this entitlement.

12. Reserve Component Pay (\$3,857 million TOA) includes drill pay and pay for periods of active duty for training of reserve component people.

13. Reserve Component Allowances (\$670 million TOA) include BAQ, subsistence, the other allowances including special and incentive pays and FICA payments for reserve component people.

14. Reserve Component Clothing (\$187 million TOA) includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

15. Reserve Component Travel (\$432 million TOA) includes the cost of travel and transportation of reserve component people.

16. Other Reserve Component Military Personnel Costs (\$51 million TOA) include monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, and Platoon Leader Class), educational assistance, disability and hospitalization benefits, Death Gratuities, Administrative Duty Pay, and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

17. Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) (\$2,836 million TOA) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

18. Military Retired Pay Appropriation (\$16,806 million TOA) funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD. This appropriation depends on the retired military population and is independent of the current force.

19. Civilian Salaries (\$26,690 million TOA) are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, holiday, incentive, and special pays.

20. Civilian Health and Life Insurance (\$790 million TOA) includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs.

21. Civilian Retired Pay (DoD Contribution) (\$1,869 million TOA) is the DoD contribution, as employer, to the Civil Service retirement fund. This is currently 7% of total civilian base salaries.

22. Individual Training (\$ * million TOA) includes all the non-pay costs of individual training, including recruit training, flight training, professional training, Service Academies, and other training of individuals.

23. Medical Support (\$ * million TOA) includes the non-pay costs of medical support, including CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), military hospitals, and some research and development activities.

24. Recruiting and Examining (\$ * million TOA) is the non-pay costs of recruiting (including advertising) and examining military personnel.

25. Overseas Dependents Education (\$ * million TOA) includes the non-pay costs of this program.

26. Base Operating Support (50%) (\$ * million TOA) includes half of the non-pay part of Base Operating Support (BOS) costs. The 50 percent factor is an estimate of the portion of non-pay BOS costs related to the support of people.

27. Other Personnel Support Costs (\$ * million TOA) is a miscellaneous category covering the non-pay costs of personnel administration, civilian education and development programs, and other personnel activities. This page will be reissued and forwarded when these monies can be determined. The supporting data to enable computations are not available as this report goes to press.

IV. Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates

The current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables IX-5, IX-6, and IX-7. The General Schedule pay rates are in Table IX-5. Wage Board pay rates are in Tables IX-6 and IX-7, for Appropriated Fund and Nonappropriated Fund employees, respectively. Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are representative averages for wage areas. Each wage area has its own distinct pay table. These tables are included as samples only.

Current military pay rates are shown in Tables IX-8 and IX-9. Table IX-8 contains the active military basic pay rates, as well as Basic Allowance for Quarters and Basic Allowance for Subsistence rates. Table IX-9 lists the pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel. A training weekend is defined as four four-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by individual according to his level of authorized participation.

Table IX-10 shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay, quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances, variable housing allowance (VHA), and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because BAS, BAQ and VHA allowances are not taxed. Figures shown in Table IX-10 are the average cash and in-kind RMC for each pay grade and longevity step assuming that the total housing allowance received by members living off post is the sum of BAQ plus VHA and the value of in-kind quarters is equivalent to the BAQ rate.

All of these tables are as of 1 October 1982.

TABLE IX-5
ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES*

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$8,676	\$8,965	\$9,254	\$9,542	\$9,831	\$10,000	\$10,286	\$10,572	\$10,855	\$10,857
2	9,756	9,987	10,310	10,585	10,703	11,018	11,333	11,648	11,963	12,278
3	10,645	11,000	11,355	11,710	12,065	12,420	12,775	13,130	13,485	13,840
4	11,949	12,347	12,745	13,143	13,541	13,939	14,337	14,735	15,133	15,531
5	13,369	13,815	14,261	14,707	15,153	15,599	16,045	16,491	16,937	17,383
6	14,901	15,398	15,895	16,392	16,889	17,386	17,883	18,380	18,877	19,374
7	16,559	17,111	17,663	18,215	18,767	19,319	19,871	20,423	20,975	21,527
8	18,339	18,950	19,561	20,172	20,783	21,394	22,005	22,616	23,227	23,838
9	20,256	20,931	21,606	22,281	22,956	23,631	24,306	24,981	25,656	26,331
10	22,307	23,051	23,795	24,539	25,283	26,027	26,771	27,515	28,259	29,003
11	24,508	25,325	26,142	26,959	27,776	28,593	29,410	30,227	31,044	31,861
12	29,374	30,353	31,332	32,311	33,290	34,269	35,248	36,227	37,206	38,185
13	34,930	36,094	37,258	38,422	39,586	40,750	41,914	43,078	44,242	45,406
14	41,277	42,653	44,029	45,405	46,781	48,157	49,533	50,909	52,285	53,661
15	48,553	50,171	51,789	53,407	55,025	56,643	58,261	59,879	61,497	63,115
16	56,945	58,843	60,741	62,639	64,537	66,435	68,333	70,231	72,129	
17	66,708	68,932	71,156	73,380	75,604					
18	78,184									

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* Basic Pay is limited to \$63,800 annually.

TABLE IX-6
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (APPROPRIATED FUND)
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

STEP	NG-RATES					NL-RATES					WS-RATES				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
GRADE	\$ 5.83	\$ 6.07	\$ 6.31	\$ 6.56	\$ 6.80	\$ 6.41	\$ 6.68	\$ 6.95	\$ 7.21	\$ 7.48	\$ 8.61	\$ 8.96	\$ 9.32	\$ 9.68	\$10.04
1	6.21	6.47	6.73	6.99	7.25	6.83	7.11	7.39	7.69	7.97	8.99	9.36	9.73	10.11	10.48
2	6.61	6.88	7.16	7.44	7.71	7.27	7.57	7.87	8.17	8.48	9.38	9.78	10.17	10.56	10.95
3	7.00	7.29	7.58	7.87	8.16	7.70	8.02	8.34	8.66	8.99	9.78	10.18	10.59	10.99	11.40
4	7.37	7.69	8.00	8.30	8.61	8.11	8.46	8.80	9.13	9.47	10.15	10.58	11.00	11.42	11.85
5	7.76	8.08	8.40	8.73	9.05	8.54	8.89	9.25	9.60	9.96	10.54	10.97	11.41	11.85	12.29
6	8.13	8.48	8.82	9.15	9.50	8.95	9.33	9.70	10.08	10.45	10.91	11.37	11.82	12.27	12.73
7	8.52	8.87	9.22	9.58	9.93	9.36	9.76	10.15	10.54	10.93	11.29	11.76	12.23	12.70	13.18
8	8.89	9.27	9.64	10.00	10.38	9.79	10.19	10.60	11.00	11.42	11.67	12.16	12.65	13.14	13.61
9	9.27	9.65	10.04	10.42	10.81	10.19	10.62	11.04	11.47	11.90	12.04	12.54	13.04	13.54	14.05
10	9.63	10.04	10.44	10.84	11.24	10.61	11.04	11.48	11.93	12.37	12.36	12.86	13.37	13.89	14.40
11	10.02	10.43	10.85	11.26	11.68	11.01	11.47	11.93	12.39	12.84	12.75	13.28	13.81	14.34	14.87
12	10.38	10.82	11.25	11.68	12.12	11.42	11.90	12.38	12.85	13.32	13.25	13.80	14.35	14.90	15.45
13	10.75	11.20	11.65	12.10	12.54	11.84	12.32	12.81	13.31	13.80	13.84	14.41	14.99	15.57	16.14
14	11.12	11.59	12.05	12.51	12.98	12.23	12.74	13.25	13.76	14.27	14.52	15.12	15.72	16.33	16.93
15	11.59	12.05	12.51	12.98	13.23	12.51	12.98	13.41	13.93	14.47	14.82	15.42	16.02	16.62	17.22
16	12.05	12.51	12.98	13.23	13.59	12.87	13.34	13.81	14.29	14.82	15.32	15.92	16.56	17.19	17.84
17	12.51	12.98	13.23	13.59	14.05	13.34	13.81	14.29	14.82	15.32	15.82	16.42	17.05	17.69	18.26
18	13.00	13.50	13.98	14.45	14.98	14.34	14.81	15.29	15.82	16.32	16.82	17.42	18.05	18.68	19.26
19	13.50	14.00	14.50	15.00	15.50	14.84	15.31	15.88	16.35	16.85	17.35	17.92	18.55	19.18	19.78
IX-15	14.00	14.50	15.00	15.50	16.00	15.34	15.81	16.38	16.85	17.35	17.85	18.42	19.05	19.68	20.46
	14.50	15.00	15.50	16.00	16.50	15.84	16.31	16.88	17.35	17.85	18.42	19.05	19.68	20.46	21.22

TABLE IX-7
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (NON-APPROPRIATED FUND)
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

STEP	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
GRADE	\$ 3.57	\$ 3.71	\$ 3.86	\$ 4.01	\$ 4.16	\$ 3.92	\$ 4.09	\$ 4.25	\$ 4.41	\$ 4.58	\$ 4.69	\$ 4.89	\$ 5.09	\$ 5.28	\$ 5.47
1	\$ 3.82	\$ 3.97	\$ 4.13	\$ 4.30	\$ 4.45	\$ 4.19	\$ 4.37	\$ 4.54	\$ 4.72	\$ 4.89	\$ 4.94	\$ 5.15	\$ 5.36	\$ 5.56	\$ 5.76
2	\$ 4.12	\$ 4.28	\$ 4.45	\$ 4.63	\$ 4.79	\$ 4.52	\$ 4.71	\$ 4.90	\$ 5.09	\$ 5.27	\$ 5.24	\$ 5.46	\$ 5.68	\$ 5.90	\$ 6.12
3	\$ 4.41	\$ 4.60	\$ 4.78	\$ 4.96	\$ 5.15	\$ 4.86	\$ 5.05	\$ 5.25	\$ 5.46	\$ 5.66	\$ 5.54	\$ 5.77	\$ 6.00	\$ 6.23	\$ 6.47
4	\$ 4.72	\$ 4.92	\$ 5.12	\$ 5.31	\$ 5.51	\$ 5.19	\$ 5.41	\$ 5.63	\$ 5.84	\$ 6.05	\$ 5.86	\$ 6.09	\$ 6.33	\$ 6.58	\$ 6.82
5															
6	5.02	5.23	5.44	5.65	5.86	5.52	5.75	5.98	6.21	6.44	6.15	6.41	6.67	6.92	7.18
7	5.34	5.55	5.77	6.00	6.22	5.87	6.10	6.34	6.59	6.83	6.46	6.73	7.00	7.27	7.54
8	5.64	5.88	6.12	6.34	6.58	6.21	6.47	6.73	6.99	7.25	6.77	7.05	7.33	7.61	7.89
9	5.96	6.21	6.46	6.71	6.96	6.56	6.83	7.10	7.38	7.65	7.14	7.45	7.75	8.04	8.34
10	6.27	6.53	6.79	7.05	7.31	6.90	7.19	7.48	7.76	8.05	7.53	7.84	8.15	8.47	8.78
11	6.59	6.86	7.13	7.42	7.69	7.25	7.55	7.85	8.15	8.46	7.90	8.24	8.57	8.89	9.22
12	6.91	7.20	7.49	7.77	8.06	7.60	7.91	8.23	8.55	8.86	8.29	8.63	8.98	9.32	9.67
13	7.22	7.52	7.82	8.12	8.42	7.94	8.27	8.60	8.93	9.26	8.66	9.03	9.39	9.74	10.11
14	7.54	7.85	8.16	8.48	8.80	8.30	8.64	8.99	9.33	9.68	9.05	9.42	9.80	10.17	10.56
15	7.85	8.17	8.50	8.83	9.15	8.63	9.00	9.36	9.71	10.08	9.41	9.81	10.20	10.59	10.98
16															
17															
18															
19															

TABLE IX-8

MILITARY BASIC PAY (MONTHLY)*
EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1982

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS													
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER													
O-10	4,686.90	4,851.90	4,851.90	4,851.90	5,037.90	5,423.70	5,423.70	5,811.60	5,811.60	6,200.40	6,200.40	6,587.40	
O-9	4,155.10	4,263.00	4,353.60	4,353.60	4,464.30	4,650.00	4,650.00	5,037.90	5,037.90	5,423.70	5,423.70	5,811.60	
O-8	3,762.30	3,875.10	3,967.20	3,967.20	4,263.00	4,464.30	4,464.30	4,650.00	4,650.00	5,037.90	5,037.90	5,239.80	
O-7	3,126.30	3,339.00	3,339.00	3,339.00	3,488.40	3,488.40	3,488.40	3,690.90	3,690.90	4,263.70	4,263.70	4,555.80	
O-6	2,317.20	2,546.10	2,712.60	2,712.60	2,712.60	2,712.60	2,712.60	2,804.70	2,804.70	3,248.40	3,248.40	3,414.60	
O-5	1,853.40	2,176.50	2,326.50	2,326.50	2,326.50	2,326.50	2,326.50	2,397.30	2,397.30	2,896.80	2,896.80	3,063.30	
O-4	1,562.10	1,902.00	2,029.20	2,066.40	2,158.20	2,305.20	2,305.20	2,546.10	2,546.10	2,957.70	2,957.70	3,120.20	
O-3	1,451.70	1,623.00	1,734.90	1,919.70	2,011.50	2,084.10	2,084.10	2,305.20	2,305.20	2,361.90	2,361.90	2,361.90	
O-2	1,265.70	1,382.40	1,660.80	1,716.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	1,752.60	
O-1	1,098.90	1,143.90	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	1,382.40	
W-3E	0	0	0	0	1,919.70	2,011.50	2,084.10	2,196.30	2,305.20	2,397.30	2,397.30	2,397.30	
W-2E	0	0	0	0	0	1,716.60	1,752.60	1,808.10	1,902.00	1,974.90	2,029.20	2,029.20	
W-1E	0	0	0	0	0	1,382.40	1,476.60	1,531.20	1,586.40	1,641.60	1,716.60	1,716.60	
WARRANT OFFICERS													
W-4	1,479.00	1,586.40	1,586.40	1,623.00	1,696.80	1,771.50	1,845.90	1,974.90	2,066.40	2,139.30	2,196.30	2,267.70	2,343.60
W-3	1,344.30	1,458.30	1,458.30	1,476.60	1,494.30	1,603.50	1,696.80	1,752.60	1,808.10	1,862.40	1,919.70	1,994.00	2,066.40
W-2	1,177.50	1,273.50	1,273.50	1,310.70	1,382.40	1,458.30	1,513.20	1,566.70	1,623.00	1,679.70	1,734.90	1,789.80	1,862.40
W-1	981.00	1,124.70	1,124.70	1,218.60	1,273.50	1,328.40	1,382.40	1,439.70	1,494.30	1,549.20	1,603.50	1,660.80	1,660.80
ENLISTED MEMBERS													
E-9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,720.20	1,759.20	1,799.10	1,840.50	1,917.90
E-8	0	0	0	0	0	1,443.00	1,483.80	1,522.80	1,562.70	1,603.80	1,640.70	1,681.20	1,779.90
E-7	1,007.40	1,087.20	1,128.00	1,167.00	1,207.20	1,245.30	1,285.50	1,325.10	1,385.10	1,424.40	1,424.40	1,483.50	1,583.10
E-6	866.40	944.70	984.30	1,026.00	1,063.80	1,102.80	1,143.30	1,192.10	1,239.90	1,279.80	1,279.80	1,299.30	1,299.30
E-5	760.80	829.00	867.90	905.70	985.10	1,004.60	1,044.60	1,083.00	1,102.80	1,102.80	1,102.80	1,102.80	1,102.80
E-4	709.50	749.10	792.90	854.70	888.80	888.80	888.80	888.80	888.80	888.80	888.80	888.80	888.80
E-3	668.40	704.70	733.20	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30	762.30
E-2	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90	642.90
E-1	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60
IX-17	C/S 7,268.10												M/S 2,692.50

* Basic Pay is limited to \$5,316.00 (\$63,800.00 annually).

TABLE IX-8 (Continued)

**MONTHLY
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS RATES
EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1982**

PAY GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS		WITH DEPENDENTS		BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE RATES Officers: Enlisted Members:
	FULL RATE 1/	PARTIAL RATE 2/	20.70	13.80	
O-10	508.50	50.70	636.30	636.30	\$98.17 per month
O-9	508.50	50.70	636.30	636.30	
O-8	508.50	50.70	636.30	636.30	
O-7	508.50	50.70	636.30	636.30	
O-6	456.60	39.60	556.80	556.80	
O-5	420.90	33.00	506.70	506.70	
O-4	374.70	26.70	452.10	452.10	
O-3	329.40	22.20	406.50	406.50	
O-2	286.20	17.70	361.80	361.80	
O-1	223.50	13.20	290.70	290.70	
W-4	360.90	25.20	435.90	435.90	
W-3	321.90	20.70	396.90	396.90	
W-2	279.90	15.90	356.40	356.40	
W-1	252.60	13.80	327.30	327.30	
E-9	272.40	18.60	383.40	383.40	
E-8	251.10	15.30	354.00	354.00	
E-7	213.60	12.00	329.40	329.40	
E-6	194.10	9.90	303.30	303.30	
E-5	186.60	8.70	278.70	278.70	
E-4	164.40	8.10	244.80	244.80	
E-3	147.00	7.80	213.60	213.60	
E-2	129.90	7.20	213.60	213.60	
E-1	122.70	6.90	213.60	213.60	

IX-18

1/ Payment of the full rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates for members of the uniformed services to personnel without dependents is authorized by 37 United States Code 403 and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

2/ Payment of the partial rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under 37 United States Code 403(b) or 403(c), are not entitled to the full rate of basic allowance for quarters, is authorized by 37 United States Code 1009(d) and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

TABLE IX-9
RESERVE PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND*
YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
W-8														
W-7														
W-6														
W-5														
W-4														
W-3														
W-2														
W-1														
WARRANT OFFICERS														
E-9														
E-8														
E-7														
E-6														
E-5														
E-4														
E-3														
E-2														
E-1														
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
IX-19														

* Training weekend normally consists of four, four-hour training assemblies.

TABLE IX-10

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL

Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Average (RMC)

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
C/S														
0-10														
0-9														
0-8														
0-7														
0-6	36,458.12	41,189.28	40,521.30	40,521.30	44,857.36	46,986.22	46,667.07	47,978.88	54,150.54	56,419.98	57,383.88	60,024.65	64,155.74	72,446.92
0-5	29,020.56	33,568.23	35,427.49	35,319.08	35,854.10	37,100.14	38,121.45	40,932.17	42,483.34	44,042.28	45,063.80	52,063.65	53,609.82	81,063.37
0-4	26,157.77	28,415.18	29,877.86	32,339.22	33,569.42	34,537.01	36,043.82	37,516.98	38,288.52					81,061.89
0-3	22,550.03	24,066.31	27,696.60	28,416.86	28,882.06									81,751.91
0-2	19,265.54	19,855.61	22,951.42											
0-1														
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS WARRANT OFFICERS OR ENLISTED MEMBERS														
0-3E														
0-2E														
0-1E														
ALL 03	26,157.77	28,415.16	29,877.86	32,339.22	33,570.07	34,543.37	36,075.76	37,630.53	39,094.44					
ALL 02	?2,550.03	24,066.31	27,696.60	28,117.90	29,913.15	30,272.99	31,523.34	32,505.66	33,239.04					
ALL 01	19,265.54	19,855.61	22,951.42	23,609.12	24,845.69	25,559.94	26,281.61	26,997.43	27,954.72					
ALL CO	20,142.45	23,265.57	26,419.10	31,440.63	32,692.32	34,082.26	36,258.65	39,022.83	40,373.48	46,498.78	48,530.33	53,219.76	56,708.51	64,413.52

TABLE IX-10 (Continued)

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Average (RMC)

YEARS OF SERVICE	PAY GRADE UNDER 2										PAY GRADE 2																
	2	3	4	5	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	28	30	32	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50
WARRANT OFFICERS																											
W-4																											
W-3	26,467.47	27,725.21	28,939.06	30,394.66	31,114.98	31,873.36	32,855.36	33,807.38	34,769.52																		
W-2	20,906.46	22,132.38	22,709.56	23,194.16	24,118.96	25,095.80	25,901.34	26,522.30	27,223.69	27,956.42	28,671.56	29,381.04	30,329.88														
W-1	18,337.84	20,151.57	20,152.46	21,365.34	22,074.13	22,782.89	23,469.30	24,201.07	24,901.57	25,610.21	26,317.43	27,024.53															
ALL WO	18,377.36	20,164.44	20,510.25	22,143.81	22,928.28	24,101.63	25,643.67	27,017.48	27,887.80	29,392.36	30,553.20	32,393.42	34,625.00	38,698.20													
ALL OFF	20,138.50	23,239.41	26,348.38	31,216.40	32,433.40	33,530.00	35,446.62	37,666.56	39,464.09	44,372.06	46,737.42	49,482.19	54,046.61	60,286.53													
ENLISTED MEMBERS																											
M/S																											
E-9	29,542.41	31,555.47	31,961.97	32,486.23	32,975.60	34,327.80	36,963.24																				
E-8	26,834.72	26,580.91	27,112.49	27,632.27	28,174.19	28,657.34	29,190.34	30,486.36	33,108.97																		
E-7	21,824.33	22,411.43	22,921.55	23,441.18	23,951.47	24,730.71	25,237.63	26,753.09	26,003.88	27,297.87	29,862.72																
E-6	17,441.99	18,471.88	18,977.93	19,488.28	19,977.57	20,471.71	20,992.98	21,751.88	22,241.05	22,755.75	23,008.08																
E-5	15,435.34	16,233.10	16,335.01	17,214.68	17,977.50	18,479.76	18,992.48	19,483.46	19,739.09																		
E-4	13,874.52	14,365.39	14,909.99	15,674.27	16,101.89																						
E-3	12,779.29	13,237.06	13,596.45	13,964.20																							
E-2	12,015.46																										
E-1	10,948.62																										
ALL ENL	12,084.29	13,902.02	15,052.13	16,287.57	17,764.95	19,345.61	20,363.56	21,702.87	22,660.80	24,426.26	25,123.73	27,571.30	29,760.16	34,449.90													
ALL DDO	12,487.72	14,611.38	16,176.88	17,854.23	19,947.22	22,122.70	23,814.99	25,737.12	28,049.12	29,620.77	30,960.45	33,233.16	38,811.08	43,864.34													

CHAPTER X
MANPOWER AND FORCES BY LOCATION

I. U.S. Strategic Forces

END FY 1984 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1054 ICBM	CONUS	
20 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 19 CONUS	
32 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	1 Japan 31 CONUS	Deter nuclear and conventional attack against the US and our allies, our military forces, and bases. If deterrence should fail, support measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the US and our allies.
<u>ANGUS</u>		
13 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>USAFR</u>		
3 Tanker Squadrons (3 KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
35 SSBNs 1/		
4 Submarine Tenders (for SSBNs)		

1/ Includes four TRIDENT SSBNs

DEFENSIVE

AIR FORCE

Active

5 Interceptor Squadrons (F-15, F-106) CONUS Airspace control and crisis air defense.

ANGUS

10 Interceptor Squadrons (F-4, F-106) CONUS Airspace control and crisis air defense.

II. U.S. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Forward deployments of US tactical/mobility forces are shown in the first display below. In addition to location, this display provides the missions of deployed units. The second display shows the locations of units in or near the United States.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

END FY 1984 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other US forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack with a minimum of loss of NATO territory and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Deter North Korea aggression and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in ejecting North Korean forces.
<u>Special Mission Brigades</u>		
Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
172d Infantry Brigade	Alaska	Defense of Alaska.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of the Panama Canal.

Armored Cavalry Regiments

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment W. Germany Force presence. Provides reconnaissance and security forces.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft</u> ^{1/}		
<u>Sixth Fleet</u> ^{2/ 3/}	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Provide naval force in Mediterranean in the event of a NATO conflict.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		Provide crises management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
14 Surface Combatants		
15 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
1 Amphibious Ready Group ^{4/}		
2 ASW Patrol Squadrons		
<u>Middle East Force</u> ^{2/ 3/}	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
<u>Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific</u> ^{2/ 3/}	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict.
21 Surface Combatants		
13 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
2 Amphibious Ready Groups ^{4/}		Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific.
4 ASW Patrol Squadrons		Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.

^{1/}These numbers and locations are representative and continually subject to change due to vessel acquisitions, deployment changes, decommissionings, and new conflict crises.

^{2/}Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from US homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.

^{3/}SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets are providing units from the assigned forward deployed forces to the Indian Ocean in response to JCS tasking for presence in that area.

^{4/}An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Atlantic Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean.
III Marine Amphibious Force 3d Marine Division (-)	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces and logistical forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-) 3d Force Service Support Group (-)		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)		

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Europe

14 Squadrons	United Kingdom	Provide force presence in forward areas. Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction and reconnaissance for a NATO conflict.
16 Squadrons	West Germany	
1 Squadron	Netherlands	
3 Squadrons	Spain	
1 Squadron	Iceland	
5 Squadrons (Dual-based)	W. Germany, Italy, England. (US Based)	
40		

Pacific

4 Squadrons	Philippines	Provide force presence.
3 Squadrons	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide close air support,
6 Squadrons	Korea	gain air superiority, and
13		provide interdiction and
		reconnaissance for an Asian conflict.

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, TACCS and airborne TACS squadrons.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Air Force Mobility Forces</u> 1/		
<u>Europe</u> 2/		
2 Squadrons 1 Squadron	W. Germany United Kingdom	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacuation capability for theater forces.
<u>Pacific</u>		
1 Squadron 2 Squadrons	Japan Philippines	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacuation capability for theater forces.

1/ Includes tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft.
 2/ Includes rotational squadron.

UNITS IN OR NEAR THE UNITED STATES

END FY 1984 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Active Army</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) 1/ 2d Armored Division 1/ 4th Infantry Division (M) 1st Cavalry Division 3/ 9th Infantry Division 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 82d Airborne Division 7th Infantry Division 2/ 24th Infantry Division (M)2/ 5th Infantry Division (M)2/ 25th Infantry Division2/	Fort Riley, Kansas Fort Hood, Texas Fort Carson, Colorado Fort Hood, Texas Fort Lewis, Washington Fort Campbell, Kentucky Fort Bragg, North Carolina Fort Ord, California Hunter/Stewart, Georgia Fort Polk, Louisiana Hawaii

1/ These divisions each have one brigade in Europe.
 2/ Composed of two active brigades and one from the reserve components.
 3/ Composed of two active brigades.

Army Separate Brigades

194th Armored Brigade 197th Mechanized Brigade 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Knox, Kentucky Fort Benning, Georgia Fort Hood, Texas
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Armored Cavalry Regiment

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment

Fort Bliss, Texas

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
49th Armored Division	Texas
50th Armored Division	New Jersey, Vermont
40th Infantry Division (M)	California
38th Infantry Division	Indiana, Michigan
28th Infantry Division	Pennsylvania
26th Infantry Division	Massachusetts, Connecticut
42d Infantry Division	New York
47th Infantry Division	Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa
Undesignated Infantry Division (M)	To be determined

Army Separate Brigades 1/ 3/

30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
149th Armored Brigade	Kentucky
155th Armored Brigade	Mississippi
48th Infantry Brigade (M) 2/	Georgia
157th Infantry Brigade (M)	Pennsylvania (USAR)
218th Infantry Brigade (M)	South Carolina
256th Infantry Brigade (M) 2/	Louisiana
69th Infantry Brigade (M)	Kansas
32d Infantry Brigade (M)	Wisconsin
67th Infantry Brigade (M)	Nebraska
30th Infantry Brigade (M)	North Carolina
29th Infantry Brigade 2/	Hawaii
81st Infantry Brigade (M)	Washington
45th Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
187th Infantry Brigade	Massachusetts (USAR)
39th Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
205th Infantry Brigade	Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa (USAR)
41st Infantry Brigade 2/	Oregon
53d Infantry Brigade	Florida
73d Infantry Brigade	Ohio
92d Infantry Brigade	Puerto Rico
58th Infantry Brigade	Maryland
116th Infantry Brigade	Virginia

1/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included.

2/ Round-out brigade for active Army division.

3/ Three of the separate brigades shown below will be used to form the additional ARNG division. As of preparation time, the three brigades have not been selected.

Army Armored Cavalry Regiments

107th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Ohio, West Virginia
116th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Idaho, Oregon, Mississippi
163d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Montana, Texas
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Tennessee

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft</u>	
<u>Active</u>	
<u>Tycom/Second Fleet/Western Atlantic</u>	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
5 Multipurpose Carriers	
84 Surface Combatants	
113 Attack Submarines, Patrol Combatants, Mine Warfare Ships, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
10 ASW Patrol Squadrons	
<u>Tycom/Third Fleet/Eastern Pacific</u>	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
4 Multipurpose Carriers	
68 Surface Combatants	
93 Attack Submarines, Patrol Combatants, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
8 ASW Patrol Squadrons	
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
<u>Second Fleet and Western Atlantic</u>	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
7 Surface Combatants	
10 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
3 Auxiliaries	
7 ASW Patrol Squadrons	
<u>Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific</u>	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
3 Surface Combatants	
10 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
3 Auxiliaries	
6 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

Marine Corps Forces

<u>Active</u>	
<u>I Marine Amphibious Force</u>	
(1st Marine Division/3d Marine Air Wing, 1st Force Service Support Group, plus supporting elements).	Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), El Toro, Calif.; and Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
II Marine Amphibious Force (2d Marine Division/2d Marine Air Wing, 2d Force Service Support Group plus supporting elements).	Camp Lejeune, N.C.; MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.; MCAS, New River, N.C.; and MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.
1st Marine Brigade 3rd Marine Regimental (Rein), Aircraft Group 24, plus supporting Brigade Service Support Group).	MCAS, Kaneohe Bay; and Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (Command Element)	
(HQ 27th Marine Regiment/Marine Air Group 70 (Nucleus)/Brigade Service Support Group 7 (Nucleus))	Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif. (Operational Units will be assigned from Marine Amphibious Forces as directed to support Near-Term Prepositioned Forces)
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
Division Wing Team (4th Marine Division/4th Marine Air Wing/4th Force Service Support Group).	Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana
Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/	
<u>Active</u>	
60 Squadrons 2/ 56 CONUS 3 Alaska 1 Hawaii	CONUS, Alaska and Hawaii
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
60 Squadrons 58 CONUS 1 Puerto Rico 1 Hawaii	CONUS, Puerto Rico and Hawaii
1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, electronic combat, tanker/cargo (KC-10), TACCS, and airborne TACS squadrons.	
2/ Excludes dual-based squadrons.	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Air Force Mobility Forces</u> 1/	
<u>Active</u>	
28 Squadrons 2/	CONUS and Alaska
27 CONUS	
1 Alaska	
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
52 Squadrons 3/	CONUS and Alaska
51 CONUS	
1 Alaska	

- 1/ Includes strategic and tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft. Does not include rescue or tanker/cargo aircraft.
- 2/ Excludes rotational squadrons.
- 3/ Includes C-130 reserve squadrons and C-5, C-141, and C-9 USAFR Associate Squadrons.

III. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country

The tables shown on the following pages reflect active duty military personnel strengths by regional area and country for FY 1982 through FY 1984. The FY 1982 actual data count people where they are actually located on 30 September 1982 to include people on temporary duty for over 30 days. The FY 1983 and FY 1984 projected data show people where they are permanently assigned and show all patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees and cadets in CONUS rather than where they may actually be located at the end of the Fiscal Year. The following tables show U.S. Military planned and actual strengths ashore in European NATO countries at the end of FY 1982 and explains the reasons for the FY 1982 Actual Strength exceeding the planned strength shown in last years report.

FY 1982 Planned End-Strength Ashore in Europe
in NATO Countries

	Total	DoD	Army	Navy	Air Force	USMC
Permanently Assigned (PCS and rotational TDY units)	315,567	217,052	13,835	83,533	1,147	

FY 1982 Actual End-Strength Ashore in Europe
in NATO Countries

	Total	DoD	Army	Navy	Air Force	USMC
Permanently Assigned (PCS) (Rotational TDY units)	316,058	220,839	12,871	81,210	1,138	
TDY 30 days	(312,620)	(220,839)	(10,311)	(80,332)	(1,138)	
(REFORGER and other training exercises)	(3,438)	(0)	(2,560)	(878)	(0)	
(Other TDY) ^{2/}	6,899	6,406	67	348	78	
TOTAL	(6,480)	(6,480)	(0)	(0)	(0)	
	(419)	(-74) ^{3/}	(67)	(348) ^{4/}	(78)	
	322,957	227,245	12,938	81,558	1,216	

- 1/ As reported in the FY 1983 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. modified to include Spain, which was not a member of NATO when the FY 1983 Report was published; and to delete 6978 Army spaces in Germany which were double counted. This strength actually belongs in the Continental U.S.
- 2/ Net of people assigned to Europe who are TDY outside of Europe and people assigned outside of Europe who are TDY to Europe.
- 3/ The major reason for the actual strength exceeding planned strength is the Army policy to man Europe at 102 percent of authorized strength.
- 4/ The primary reason for the actual strength being less than planned strength is seasonal rotational patterns. People who enlisted in the summer had not yet completed their training and arrived in their new units (in Europe) prior to the departure of the people they are to replace.

CHAPTER XI

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This chapter provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1983.

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1983 DMRR by component are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>FROM</u>	10	<u>MILITARY</u>			<u>CIVILIAN</u>		
			<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>
<u>ARMY</u>								
KDTE Restructure	Research and Development	Division Forces	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
FEMA Support (USAR)	Defensive Strategic Forces	Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	-
<u>NAVY</u>								
Base Operations (Logistics)	Logistic Support Operations	BOS - Support Installations	0.4	0.4	0.4	-	-	-
Tactical Cryptologic Support	Intelligence	Naval Support Forces	*	*	0.1	-	-	-
Missile Repair Facilities	Maintenance Operations	Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-	0.9	0.9	0.9
Naval Supply Center, Jacksonville	BOS - Support Installations	Supply Operations	-	-	-	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>								
Appellette Leave/IHCA+6	Personnel Holding Account	Non Defense Planning and Programming Category	1.1	1.1	1.1	-	-	-
	(Patients, Prisoners and Holdees)							
<u>AIR FORCE</u>								
AB Ground Defense	Strategic	Tactical	-	-	0.1	-	-	-
Utah Testing and Training Range	BOS	Central Support	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1
Eastern Test Range	BOS	Central Support	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Strategic	0.5	0.7	0.7	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Tactical	0.1	0.3	0.3	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Mobility	*	*	*	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Intelligence	1.5	1.6	1.6	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Research and Development	0.8	0.8	0.9	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Geophysical	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	-	-

AUTIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984
AIR FORCE (Continued)								
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	BOS	-	-	-	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Medical	-	-	-	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Individual Training	0.0	1.2	1.2	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Central Logistics	0.8	0.7	0.7	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Centralized Support	0.5	1.0	1.0	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Management Headquarters	0.7	0.8	0.8	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA	Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2	-	-	-
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	IMA							

* Fewer than 50.

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